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Introduction 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis presents a case study conducted within a Norwegain company, Raufoss 
ASA and their process of technology transfer in relation to establishing a new plant in 
Montreal, Canada. The research methods have mainly been observations and semi-
structured interviews during a three year period from 2000-2003. 
 
In this thesis I deliver arguments for the importance of place and the prominence of 
reciprocity in the global economy. Globalisation represents an enabling structure for 
technology transfers to occur, at the same time such a technology transfer is also 
affecting globalisation.  
 
Place is regarded as important for understanding this technology transfer, and the 
individuals involved in this project are seen as carriers and representatives of places. 
Through this argumentation I show that the cultural and institutional heritage at 
different places involved in such a technology transfer is considerable affecting the 
process at several levels. The learning processes underline the reciprocity of this 
process. The actors perspective of learning gradually change from what can be called a 
one-dimensional character, towards what can be characterised as reciprocal or 
interactive learning, as those involved got more experience during the project.  
 
Those involved perceived technology in a broad way and included knowledge, skills 
and attitudes when they defined it. But when enrolling the network at the plant in 
Montreal, they were not able to follow-up their intentions. They fell into what I have 
labelled the technical trap and focused too much on the technology. This is explained 
through recognising that they are trained to handle technical equipment and not the 
socio-cultural issues. A more holistic approach and background to these challenges 
would therefore be preferable, to meet the reciprocal challenges that the global 
economy requires.    
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Introduction 
1. An Overview 
 
 
1.1 From case to case to case 
 
The industrial consequences of globalisation are a theme that has been my interest field 
all through my studies and research work. Among these consequences are an intensified 
competition and a steady increasing degree of industrial reorganisation across national 
borders. Originally my research project was labelled ‘international acquisitions and 
mergers’. The intention was to study how different geographically located units within 
an international company would adapt to and effect the development within the new 
mother organisation. This project was supposed to be done in cooperation with a 
department within the Raufoss ASA group. Raufoss ASA had at that time (2000) 
recently, as a response to the global challenges, acquired a company with several units 
in five different European countries.  
 
In the early phases of this project everything was going smoothly. I had started to work 
with and oriented myself towards the unit in the Raufoss ASA group. But suddenly it 
became hard for me to get information, and the situation became rather uncomfortable. 
But quite soon afterwards I was told “off the record” that the management had decided 
to sell most of the units and activities that I had planned to study. This meant that I was 
losing my case. 
 
This period was not wasted, however. I had learnt a lot about Raufoss ASA and their 
different organisations. I had discovered a lot of interesting literature on the issues of 
globalisation and industrial development. I had experienced a more operative side of 
globalisation that attracted me. What stroked me the most was how production lines at 
different places, that produced similar products, performed differently. For me this was 
a starting point of developing an interesting thought: Is place an important factor for the 
performance of industrial production? 
 
Still, I had to find a new case. One of the professors at the research centre at Dragvoll 
Gård where I had my office, put me in contact with another Norwegian company, 
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Fundo Wheels, producing aluminium wheels for the automotive industry. I met with 
this company and we agreed on that I should set my PhD thesis on their process of 
establishing a new production line at their sister company in Bahrain in the Persian 
Gulf. The new working title of my thesis was ‘technology transfer’. I started gathering 
information, but first, in spring 2001, I spent two weeks working on the production line 
at their plant in Høyanger to become familiar with their production process. During 
these two weeks I took notes and afterwards started conducting interviews, both in the 
local organisation and in the local community. I was more or less finished with my 
empirical studies in Høyanger and we were starting to plan for my trips to Bahrain to 
continue the empirical work there. Then it became clear that the company was in severe 
economic trouble and was heading towards bankruptcy. Two things became rather 
obvious that i) they had to cancel their plans of establishing a new production line in 
Bahrain, they couldn’t justify the costs, and ii) they had to refinance the company. I was 
losing my case again.  
 
These two stories can serve as an illustration of the intensification and the pace of 
change in the global economy. Even if I had learned a lot and my thoughts about 
globalisation and the operational consequences for industrial activity were developing 
in an interesting way, my situation was rather frustrating. I had now lost two cases, on 
which I had spent quite a lot of money and time. The positive side was that at this time I 
had gained some experience with working with another company and doing research on 
a process of technology transfer there.  
 
In the autumn 2001 the Raufoss ASA group had decided to set up an establishment in 
Montreal, Canada. The establishment was supposed to be carried out through their 
daughter company - Raufoss Chassis Technology (RCT)1. They made contact with me 
and wanted me to join them in this process. As one of their representatives expressed it;  
“We want you to join us, so that you can help us to ask the questions we do not ask. 
You have a different background and see things in a different way in opposition to us, 
and our technical point of view. In this way we think this could be fruitful cooperation 
for both you and us.” 
                                                 
1 In the thesis I do not make clear distinctions between Raufoss ASA and Raufoss Chassis Technology, 
because these are just formal distinctions. I find it more important to make distinctions between the 
actors involved within these companies and the Canadian organisation, as shown in chapter 9.5. 
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This invitation was just what I needed at that time. We agreed on a plan for the 
fulfilment of this project after just a few discussions. This cooperation was in both my 
and Raufoss ASA’s interest. I was able to utilise some of the experience I had achieved 
in my work with Fundo, and Raufoss ASA was able to introduce me to a case that was 
important for them. At the same time they got a chance to salve their bad conscience for 
the first case that fell through.  
 
 
1.2 Developing the scientific approach 
 
At this time I had moved from a focus on international mergers and acquisitions and 
how different geographical location affected such an international cooperation, to a 
focus on technology transfer from one place to another. Either way, these approaches 
were, in my opinion, related to each other. Globalisation formed the background and 
the consistent idea in this has always been how social and cultural phenomena at 
different places affect organisational or business related processes between places. In 
this way I didn’t have to make huge changes in my original research plans, the 
fundament was more or less the same. I developed a few research questions in 
cooperation with Raufoss ASA, who after a short while became my main contacts in 
this process. We concluded that my overall main concern should be how technology 
transfer can be done from my perspective and at what degree would the places involved 
affect this process. This was practically done in the way that I developed my research 
questions and then Raufoss ASA agreed. What was more important in my view were 
the agreements on how this study was to be carried out. They accepted and encouraged 
my desire for being involved in the processes of this technology transfer. As long as I 
agreed that the business development was the most important aspect for them and was 
to be prioritised, they had no problems with me being thoroughly involved and asking 
questions on the processes. I was licensed to talk with whomever I wanted, in both the 
Norwegian and Canadian organisation. It was also agreed that I could directly contact 
and make appointments with those people I wanted to interview. Raufoss introduced 
my project to the Canadian Management who would be responsible for introducing on 
me further, should I  need that sort of assistance.  
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Before I elaborate further on the scientific approach and get into the research questions, 
I will give a brief introduction to the background story of the establishment in 
Montreal. 
 
 
1.3 From Raufoss to Montreal 
 
At 08.21 on December 20th, 2000, an announcement ticked in at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange2. The chief content of the announcement was that Raufoss ASA had been 
awarded a contract with General Motors (GM) for supply of aluminium wheel 
suspensions to their American production platform3. Approximately six months 
previously Raufoss ASA had been awarded a supply contract to General Motor’s 
European platform EPSILON. To meet the supply to the EPSILON production 
platform, Raufoss ASA was building a new factory at Raufoss. The company had 
previously produced aluminium wheel suspensions at Raufoss but not in the volume the 
new contract involved (see chapter 9). This made it necessary to establish a new, 
modern factory to meet the requirements of the GM contract. The contract was of a 
considerable size with a value of several hundred million Norwegian crowns a year, and 
a duration of seven years. 
 
Thus a new contract had been signed for deliveries to GM, the American market of the 
world’s largest car manufacturer. It was certain that, these deliveries could not be 
served from Raufoss in Europe. This was due to the considerable distance between 
Europe and North America, the distance was too far and the risk of delivery delays was 
considered too high. It was necessary to establish some form of production on the 
American continent. The form of the chosen solution was an important and essential 
                                                 
2 “The Raufoss Group has received a promise of order from General Motors North American Car Group 
(GM) for delivery of wheel suspensions to several of GM’s American manufactured cars. The order has 
an annual value of several hundred million Norwegian crones in full batch production and is a 
continuation and expansion of the cooperation established in connection with deliveries to GM Europe 
announced in November 1999. Batch production for North America is expected to commence in 2002…” 
(Stock Exchange announcement 20 December 2000) 
 
3 Production platform is understood as the way GM has chosen to organise its production. This 
philosophy is based on the idea of producing as much as possible on the various models identically and 
letting the aesthetics and amount of extras and engine rating constitute the difference between the 
models. What you “don’t see” on the car should be identical. GM has one platform for Europe adapted to 
the European market’s wishes and needs, and one platform for the American market adapted to its wishes 
and needs. 
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question. The different solutions ranged from the establishment of a proprietary factory 
to possibly licensing the production to a joint venture partner. Another issue was where 
the production should be located if a new purpose-built factory was to be established. 
The American continent is of a significant size, and there were a host of different 
alternatives for localisation. When choosing a production location for the European 
market, the solution was fairly easy as the production environment at Raufoss was the 
only real alternative. The technology was developed at the innovative automotive 
environment at Raufoss. This automotive milieu has a history of innovating automotive 
products in aluminium. Today there are approximately seven companies who serve the 
automotive business in one way or another at Raufoss. In Norway there are no other 
such agglomerations of related companies serving the automotive business with more 
or less related products.  
 
Based in this automotive community at Raufoss, Raufoss Chassis Components (RCC) 
was now facing major challenges. Following a sourcing process RCC decided that the 
sister factory in North America would be located north of Montreal, Canada. The city 
of Montreal has approximately 2.5 million inhabitants and is located in the Quebec 
province in south-eastern Canada. RCC gained access to an industrial site, including 
buildings, in an industrial area near Boisbriand, 30-40 km north of Montreal. A local 
management were hired almost immediately to manage what would become the 
Canadian organisation Raufoss Automotive Components Canada (RACC). With the 
localisation issues solved and newly hired management for RACC in place, RACC and 
RCC were ready to start the planning process. 
 
 
1.4 The purpose and general research questions 
 
Establishing a new factory on a different continent represents a series of challenges. 
Technology transfer is a series of complicated processes that involve individuals, 
organisations and places. In addition those involved go through several complicated 
learning processes that I want to learn more about. When it comes to technology 
transfer, a lot of studies have been carried out, but mostly in a macro oriented and 
quantitative way (i.e. Ivarsson and Alvstam 2003, 2004, 2005, Ivarsson 2002, 2002a). 
My approach is a lot more micro oriented and focuses on the critical processes and 
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actors involved. It is hard to see how the more macro oriented studies capture what I 
regard as the essence of technology transfer, namely the actors involved and the range 
of complicated transformation and learning processes they go through.  
 
My approach is inspired by Gertler’s (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001) studies of technology 
transfer and technology implementation. Case studies of implementation of technology 
in new contexts and technology transfer show that these are difficult processes (Gertler 
1995). The origins of the difficulties are often of a more profound character, than what 
is initially realised (Gertler 2001). This is very well documented in Gertler’s (1997) 
article on technology transfer from Germany to Canada that especially triggered my 
interest. Here he addresses the challenges related to the regional culture and institutions 
in both the host country and country of origin. This implies some kind of reciprocity in 
the technology transfer. In that relation Morgan delivers a more general, but important 
perspective when he states (1997:495):”we are now beginning to appreciate that 
globalisation and localisation, far from being mutually exclusive processes, are 
actually much more interwoven than is generally acknowledged”.  With this 
perspective in mind and inspiration from Gertler’s studies I will try to dig even deeper 
into the challenges concerning technology transfer in this thesis.  
 
In my case a considerable amount of technology developed at Raufoss would be 
transferred to Montreal. The technological equipment that would have to be set up in 
Montreal would mainly be a logistical challenge to deal with. In addition, one would 
need to find good solutions and working methods for a range of other challenges. A 
substantial amount of activities would have to be coordinated across the Atlantic, 
varying from specific and definite activities like fitting of machines, to more complex 
and diffuse activities such as skills transfer, learning and further development of 
existing solutions. 
 
Technology transfer of this kind can be understood in different ways. An essential 
aspect is how one understands the concept of technology and how one defines 
technology. One definition of technology is to view it as physical objects. Such a 
definition reduces technology transfer to just being an issue for logistics. A somewhat 
broader definition is that presented by McKenzie & Wajcman (1985), where technology 
is defined as physical objects that perform tasks. An alternative to this view is Levin’s 
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(1997) definition that also ties technology to an element of knowledge. Levin maintains 
that technology also comprises the knowledge of how the physical objects should be 
operated or handled to perform certain tasks. This understanding also implies that 
technology can be coded in a cultural setting and that it therefore must have a meaning 
in a cultural and social context. Hence technology requires cultural comprehension, 
knowledge and skills. This means that technology transfer is a much more complex 
process than just an issue for logistics. This discussion will be elaborated further in 
chapter 6. 
 
Including cultural comprehension, knowledge and skills, technology can be interpreted 
in relation to Latour’s understanding of technology. In Latour’s inscription concept 
(1991) he argues that technology is inscribed with social meaning. This is a result of the 
technology having been designed in a social setting that will have left, or inscribed, 
social marks on it. This understanding of technology can also be seen as an argument 
for the existence of place-specific technology. In other words, technology most often 
will have been developed in the social setting of a specific place, and this place, 
through its social setting, will have inscribed signs and symbols in the technology, 
giving meaning to the participants that are an active part of the specific social setting. 
 
Based on the argument above one can legitimately claim that technology is place-
specific through the inscription of social codes in the physical objects (see also chapter 
3). To handle and understand the physical objects demands knowledge and 
understanding of the actual objects, in addition to the contexts in which they were 
developed. Based on this it can be said that the operators of these physical objects must 
have knowledge of this context, meaning that people in this context can act as 
translators with decoding skills. This means that they become representatives for places 
that are inscribed in the technology, and thus it is reasonable to assume they also hold 
considerable decoding skills. Decoding skills in this context are skills to make the codes 
inscribed in the technology implicitly or explicitly comprehensible. 
 
I have now briefly accounted for an approach to technology where I have also 
incorporated people as important aspects in the understanding of technology. This has 
been done by looking at the level of the individual, while at the same time involvement 
on a collective level has been suggested by arguing that the social context is important 
 9
Technology Transfer 
and then linking this to place. In the field of geography place is a central concept and 
this will be reflected upon in this thesis. At this point I wish to introduce Thrift’s (1997) 
notion of place where place should be understood as “passings that haunt us”. This 
approach suggests that individuals will be characterised by the places they live or 
reside, and simultaneously they will characterise these places through their very 
presence. Further this will involve an understanding of the individuals becoming 
characterised by, and carriers of, places. In this context individuals can be regarded as 
actors representing places. This will be elaborated further in chapter 3. 
 
This leads to an understanding of technology, places and individuals as actors in a 
tightly woven network. Such an actor-network reasoning (Latour 1987, Law 1992) 
seems as an interesting starting point to understand the complexity of challenges related 
to the globalisation of the economy. At the same time this forms the basis of a 
framework for analysis of transfer processes. Such a tightly woven network including 
technology, places and individuals indicates interaction and reciprocity in the relations 
between these factors.  
 
Based on this background the main purpose of the thesis is, firstly; to address the 
challenges related to the technology transfer process, and, secondly; to discuss how the 
transfer process are, and should be, carried out.  
 
The research questions of the thesis are elaborated on the basis of the theoretical 
framework that are presented and discussed in section 3. These questions will address 
the transformation processes this technology transfer represents. Each of the chapters in 
this section underpins one of the research questions.  The questions are:  
 
-  In what way do the historical trajectories at different places, understood as 
cultural or institutional aspects, affect the transfer process?  
 
-  How is learning perceived in this process of technology and knowledge transfer, 
and how is the learning carried out in practical work?  
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- To what degree are the enrolment of the actors and the actants seen as equally 
important in this technology transfer? And whether they are treated differently or 
not, why is it so?  
 
In this introduction chapter I have outlined a comprehension and possible frame for 
analysis of these questions. However, in the establishment of the new factory, this 
process is highly unlikely to be a one-way process directed from Raufoss, where the 
staff in Montreal remains passive recipients. Technological development is often a 
complex process with contributions from several actors (Pinch & Bijker 1987). This 
implies that the context or social system where the technology and production process 
will be implemented also will be an important actor in a potentially successful 
technology transfer. This leads to my last research question: 
 
To what degree is place and reciprocity important and prominent in this case of 
technology transfer? 
 
Through analysing how the different places interact with each other I will be able to 
make some statements as to their contribution to this process. I will alternate between 
analysis on the levels of place and analysis of the more inter-human character in the 
interactions between the various actors in this process. By doing this I wish to throw 
light on the correlations between the place concept as the level of analysis, meaning the 
geographical perspective and its implications, and the actual inter-human processes that 
take place in the interaction between representatives from Raufoss and Montreal.  
 
 
1.5  Presentation of the thesis 
 
In this chapter I have presented the background for the thesis and how I resulted in 
having the case I have been studying. The chapter ended with an elaboration of a 
presentation of the purpose and the research question that I will try to answer in the 
thesis. 
In chapters 2-7 I elaborate upon my theoretical position. In Chapter 2 I discuss what 
globalisation is about and I address what have been the main forces that have been 
active in changing the economy into a global one. This leads into chapter 3 that takes 
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the discussion from the global level and into a discussion of regionalisation and place. 
This is done by going from the global level and through a discussion of regionalisation 
as an alternative way of understanding the economy before the discussion ends with an 
argumentation of how place is understood and different perspectives on the concept of 
place. Chapters 2-3 are mainly based on discussions within the discipline of geography.  
In chapter 4 I present my theoretical position concerning the concept of culture. Here I 
give a brief introduction to culture and how this can be understood. Institutionalism is 
also presented as an approach in this relation. The chapter ends with a presentation of 
creolization. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the concept of learning and presentations of several learning 
theories. Here I present different perspectives of how knowledge is created. 
In chapter 6 I discuss different ways of understanding technology. Actor Network 
Theory is part of this discussion. How technology is developed is also an important 
aspect in the discussion along with the question of how technology is transferred or 
disseminated. 
In chapter 7 I present my methodological approach. Here details of the data material 
are presented and I discuss the quality of the data achieved. The fieldwork is 
thoroughly presented, and I also reflect upon some theoretical and empirical 
considerations.  
Chapter 8 gives an understanding of the background for the automotive industry and its 
development. The development of this industry has had severe consequences for 
Raufoss and their development. This development is important to bear in mind when 
we are trying to understand both Raufoss’ position as a company and why Raufoss had 
to establish a new plant in Montreal. 
Chapter 9 is an empirical presentation of the background of the case. This includes the 
history of the company Raufoss, in addition to a presentation of the product and the 
production lines that are at stake for this technology and knowledge transfer. Further, 
the search for location alternatives in North America is presented. At the end of this 
chapter I give a presentation of the most active and important actors in this transfer 
process. 
Chapter 10 is the first analytical chapter, but it is also an empirical presentation, where 
the transfer process of knowledge and technology is the focus. This is a more or less 
step-by-step presentation of the process from the starting point with planning and 
preparations and towards the start of production in Montreal. 
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In Chapter 11 the cultural issues are analysed. Here I analyse how culture has played a 
role in this transfer process and I present some important differences in culture and 
which affects these have had on the process.  
Chapter 12 presents an analysis of the learning processes. The starting point where 
Raufoss considered this to be a one –way learning process, and the acknowledgement 
of this being a reciprocal process is essential in this analysis. Another important issue 
here is the different emphasis on the technical training and the socio-cultural training. 
In chapter 13 I analyse and discuss the technology and knowledge in the light of an 
actor network approach. How they recruited the personnel and built the Canadian 
organisation are central aspects. Getting the technical equipment and deliveries in place 
are also important issues here.   
Chapter 14 is the final chapter where I draw my conclusions of this study in relation to 
whether I am capable of answering my research questions. And further I present some 
interesting research issues that could be an opportunity for further investigation 
concerning research in technology and knowledge transfer.  
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Globalisation and place 
 
2. Globalisation  
 
Globalisation has become a well-known term in recent years, mostly used to describe 
the global economic development but also the geographic extent of economies. The 
term is also used to describe the global extension of other phenomena such as 
ecological challenges like pollution or social and health issues such as the spread of 
HIV.  The notion of globalisation is being used to describe a variety of factors, among 
them economic expansion and the following integration of economies. Most authors 
and commentators have accepted that the world has gone global in one way or other. In 
everyday speech there is considerable confusion and a variety of meanings attributed to 
the notion of globalisation. One common interpretation is that globalisation is 
something mysterious and uncontrollable. Or like Amin & Thrift (1997:147) has put it, 
it is often seen as “an ‘exogenous’ force which threatens local and national identities, 
integrities and autonomies”. This is especially evident in political rhetoric.  
 
In academic literature there is less confusion, and the term is used more consistently.  
Nevertheless, the understanding of globalisation is more polarised (Dicken et al. 1997).  
Consequently, it is necessary to discuss and present a suitable definition of the term for 
the intents and purposes of this chapter and thesis. My basis is that globalisation 
provides an important backdrop to understanding the transfer of technology. In this 
chapter I will discuss the phenomenon of globalisation in the view of some well-known 
authors on this matter. On the basis of this discussion I will try to present an 
understanding of globalisation that is relevant in my perspective: to explain how the 
general, global development in the automotive industry is affecting the situation of  a 
Norwegian car-component producer, and further how this car component producer 
meets some of the challenges. After arguing for how globalisation should be seen as an 
important backdrop and an enabler for technology transfer, I will, in chapter 3, discuss 
how regionalisation and, in the last instance, place become important factors for 
understanding the transfer of technology.  
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2.1 Modernity 
 
If globalisation is a new and important societal change, it is important to put the 
phenomenon in a wider perspective. Such a perspective can be found in Anthony 
Giddens’ “The Consequences of Modernity” (1990), which is recognised as a 
considerable contribution to social science. Giddens argues that several important 
changes took place in the social life  and organisation of Western Europe in the 
seventeenth century. These changes subsequently developed worldwide, driven by the 
forces of industrial and political revolutions in Western Europe. The discontinuity of 
modernity is in this relation linked to a certain period of time and with an initial 
geographical location (Giddens 1990, 2003W).  
 
The discontinuities that represent the transition from traditional society to modern 
society is recognised by the sheer pace of change, scope of change and the intrinsic 
nature of modern institutions. Modernity’s pace of change is one of the most obvious 
discontinuities; this is particularly conspicuous in the technological sphere, but also in 
other fields.  Even though traditional societies were also dynamic societies, they could 
not match the rapidity of the changes in the modern society. The extent of the changes 
in modern society was also much greater than what was known in traditional societies. 
When new areas of the globe came in contact with each other, this led to new types of 
social understanding and social change. The third discontinuity that separates the 
modern world from the traditional world is the intrinsic nature of modern institutions. 
Some of the modern world’s institutions were simply not present in traditional 
societies. The political system of the nation-state is one example, the production 
system’s dependency on inanimate energy is another.  
 
Thus,  I understand modern society as that which emerges in Western Europe around 
the seventeenth century, a society profoundly different from traditional society in the 
way that changes are faster and more comprehensive and that its institutions are 
considerably new and different. In other words, our society  transformed into something 
completely new around the seventeenth century.  
 
Another central aspect of modernity is the disembedding of social systems. The 
disembedding mechanisms of social systems are evident in the creation of symbolic 
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tokens and the establishment of expert systems. To illustrate what he means by 
symbolic tokens, Giddens uses money as an example. He argues that money illustrates 
how social relations are lifted out of the local context of interaction by the use of the 
symbolic token. Likewise, our trust in expert systems is another example of the same 
phenomenon. Modernity distances us from the social relations we were previously 
dependent on interacting within. The question is whether it is possible to understand 
this also as the beginnings of globalisation and a global society?  
 
 
2.2 From modernity to globality? 
 
My question above raises  another question; does Giddens´s understanding of 
modernity also represent a common understanding of globalisation, or globality, and a 
starting point for what is recognised as globalisation? When reading the daily press and 
observing political debates, a common understanding of globalisation seems to be the 
increase of speed and the expansion of social processes. This is, more or less, the same 
as what Giddens argues to be the important discontinuities of modernity. And he does 
in fact claim that modernity is inherently globalising (Giddens 1990).  
 
Based on this  perception it can be difficult to distinguish modernity from globalisation 
or what we might call globality. One attempt is made by Giddens (1990:64) himself: 
“Globalisation can thus be defined as the intensification of world wide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa.”  Hence, according to Giddens, 
globalisation represents an intensification of social processes worldwide, among them 
the effect that something happening in one place affects other places. This is how I 
understand globalisation in interrelation with modernity and not in opposition to it. As 
Giddens also considers, globalisation can be seen as a consequence of modernity, but 
also a prolongation of modernity. This leads to an understanding of globalisation as an 
intensification of central aspects of modernity. 
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The intensification 
To use the term intensification to describe some of the main factors of globalisation 
makes sense for my perspective, and it also opens up for including and giving right to 
the claim that globalisation is a process that has been going on for a long time.  
Consequently, if we take communication as an example, communication technologies 
have improved increasingly in the last decades to bridge distances. However, according 
to Harvey (1989), this happened in the end of the nineteenth century as well, when new 
enabling technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, train and steamship contributed 
to increasing speed in the communication between people. In our days we have also 
experienced new advanced enabling technologies that help us increase the speed in our 
communication. Through the 1980s and 1990s the Internet and e-mail have been some 
of the main catalysts and examples of this development. These technological 
developments have contributed considerably to what Giddens (2003W) claims is an 
example of the intensification of social relations across the globe.  
I find Giddens’ reflections on this issue as quite general; he discusses the issue on a 
societal level, and his discussions are most relevant and interesting. There is a need for 
a more profoundly spatial discussion and a more precise discussion of what this means 
in economic and industrial terms. In the following I will discuss more concrete the 
different aspects of globalisation and different positions within the globalisation debate. 
When using the term globalisation I will, in the rest of this thesis, primarily focus on 
the economic globalisation. 
 
 
2.3 “Pro- and antiglobalists” 
 
In understanding globalisation with industrial development in mind, the different 
opinions are easily connected to different political views. The business gurus and neo 
liberals are quite often found on, lets call it a pro-globalisation side, and those on the 
political left on the more anti-globalisation side4. This division has led to a polarised 
debate pinpointed by Dicken et al. (1997). The reason why it is interesting to link these 
two sides to political standpoints is that, the two sides understanding of and 
                                                 
4 This is a rough separation between these two sides, that will be explained later on. 
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argumentation for or against globalisation is more or less based on the same points. 
Korten (1995:131) summarises the ideal world of the pro-globalisation side, or what he 
calls the “global dreamers”, in this way: 
 
• “The world’s money, technology and markets are controlled and managed 
by gigantic global cooperation’s. 
• A common consumer culture unifies all people in a shared quest for 
material gratification. 
• There is a perfect global competition among workers and localities to 
offer their services to investors at the most advantageous terms. 
• Corporations are free to act solely on the basis of profitability without 
regard to national or local consequences. 
• Relationships, both individual and corporate, are defined entirely by the 
market. 
• There are no loyalties to place or community.” 
 
This vision or ideal world is fundamental in the “global dreamers” understanding of the 
society we are aiming for or, at least, moving towards. The paradox in my point of view 
is that this is exactly the same society that the anti globalisation activists fear. The 
argumentation presented at the demonstrations in Seattle, Prague, Geneva and 
Gothenburg, during the first few years of the 21st century, seems to be based on a fear 
that the society envisioned by global dreamers is likely to become a reality.  
 
It is, however, more important that the “global dreamers” present globalisation as a 
condition. This can be interpreted as if, in the global dreamer’s eyes, globalisation is a 
higher-level of societal development. A second point is that they in their approach 
speak of globalisation as a homogeneous phenomenon; it is an all-encompassing 
condition that affects the life of everyone in one way or another. The scarlet thread in 
this approach is that the world is seen as a common marketplace with a common 
consumer culture. According to this understanding the world has become one, with no 
room for diversity or the need for different development. This interpretation is based on 
the understanding of the global condition as a fulfilment of the complete market 
economy.  
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This approach and understanding of the global development is of course leading to 
reactions on the anti-globalisation side. Important questions to ask in this respect are 
then: is the vision or the ideal world of the global dreamers likely to become a reality, 
or at least; do we see any sign of this becoming a reality?  
 
To answer these two questions I will rely on Dicken et al. (1997). They deconstruct 
globalisation and present an alternative point of view and approach to globalisation. 
They argue that globalisation is a process rather than a condition. They summarise their 
approach in six principles (Dicken et al. 1997:165): 
 
• “Globalisation is a complex of processes, not an end-state or “new 
order”. 
• Globalisation is a contradictory process, not an unbending force or a 
unidirectional trend. 
• Globalisation will proceed hand in hand with uneven spatial 
development; it is not the opposite to it. 
• Globalisation processes, just like any other, do not float in the air, but are 
realized in specific institutionally, historically and geographically specific 
sites. 
• Globalisation implies qualitative as well as quantitative change, in the 
sense that there are changes in the relationships between scales, social 
structures and agents. 
• Globalisation involves the complex diffusion, rearticulation and 
reconstitution of power relationships, not simply a zero-sum redistribution 
among nation states and the TNCs” 
 
This understanding of globalisation is quite opposite to that of the “global dreamers”, 
which is based on the ideal types of infinite mobility of capital, the prevalence of 
unregulated market forces, the attainment of absolute power by transnational 
corporations, the demise of the national state and homogenisation in social, political 
and economic conditions. Dicken et al.’s (1997:161) argumentation strives to be an 
alternative argument to the “undertheorized empirical claim and counter claim which 
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have characterized aspects of the debate”. The main argument and contribution in their 
approach to globalisation is their focus on globalisation as a process. In answer to the 
questions raised above, the world that the “global dreamers” are dreaming of and the 
one that the anti-globalists fear do not seem to becoming a reality according to Dicken 
et al. (1997).  In their perspective both the pro- and the anti-globalists perspective is far 
too unbalanced, and globalisation is a more complex issue than presented in their 
argumentation.  
 
 
2.4 Enablers 
 
Seeing globalisation as a process more than an end-state or new order has important 
impact on how to understand technology transfer. To fully understand the process of 
economic globalisation, however, it is also important to understand the background for 
the process and also to understand the forces that maintain it. When trying to identify 
the background for economic globalisation, one immediate thought that comes to mind 
is trade across national borders. But as Glasmeier (1999:9) argues; “There has always 
been some level of trade across national boundaries for as long as national boundaries 
have existed”.  Hence,  globalisation has to be understood as something more than just 
simple trade across national boundaries. This is also in accordance with Giddens’ 
discussion as I have presented in chapter 2.2. Amin & Thrift (1997:147) indicate that 
“globalisation can be traced back at least four centuries from the rise and subsequent 
expansion of capitalism across the world”. At the same time they argue that an 
intensive globalisation took place in the early 1970s as a consequence of the break up 
of the Bretton Woods system, which regulated the financial control of the national 
economies. According to this, the time before this intensive globalisation can be seen as 
a time with various degrees of- and perhaps non-intensive- globalisation.  
 
What has changed then? 
To understand globalisation fully it is necessary to know what forces are operating in 
the global economy, thereby actively shaping the development. However, there is not a 
clear cut between the forces that are underpinning and reinforcing the global economy 
and what might be seen as the foundation and basis for the global development. This 
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will be elaborated further in the following sections. There are several authors 
contributing to the discussion of forces operating in the global economy, Glasmeier 
(1999) is already mentioned and I will also rely on Amin and Thrift (1997), Martin and 
Schumann (1998) and Harvey (1989) .  
 
The deregulation of the Bretton Woods system is often mentioned as one possible 
starting point for the intensive globalisation. The liberalisation of trade across national 
boundaries, and the general opening of markets world wide, through lower tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers, has reduced the protection long enjoyed by firms located especially 
in the western world and Japan. Through the liberalisation these firms have been 
exposed to a competition that was unthinkable only a few decades ago (Glasmeier 
1999).  
 
This liberalisation has created a new market, namely the fast growing financial marked. 
When Bretton Woods collapsed, it opened up for speculation in different nations 
currencies. The further liberalisation of the financial markets opened up for 
speculations in a lot of other financial services or assets. This has resulted in increased 
centralisation of the global financial structure (Amin & Thrift 1997, Martin & 
Schumann 1998), and it has increasingly led to a development where “the financial 
capital has become an independent force in the modern world “ (Amin & Thrift 
1997:148, Harvey 1989). In fact, the power of the global financial forces has started 
challenging the national economies. This became especially evident in several incidents 
in Europe during the 1990s (Martin & Schumann 1998), but the Brazilian economy has 
also been challenged by these non-governed uncontrolled financial speculations. 
Despite this undesirable financial speculation, especially expressed by so-called 
globalisation sceptical organisations such as Attac, the deregulation of trading across 
national boundaries has also eased the trade in the more material industry. The more 
specifically spatial effects and its relevance for the automotive industry will be 
discussed in chapter 8. 
 
Another factor that has been important in the creation of the global economy is the 
technological change of the last thirty years, and the following dramatic reduction in 
communication and transportation costs. “This has lessened the need for manufacturing 
plants and other major service centres to be close to either the headquarters or their 
 24
Globalisation and place 
markets” (Glasmeier 1999: 10). The technological change has opened up for a more 
dispersed organisation of the economy, and according to Glasmeier’s quotation, the 
need for proximity regarded to headquarters and production plants have been reduced.  
This is also commented by Amin and Thrift (1997:148, my underline) when they sum 
up one of the factors rising up in the name of globalisation; “the internationalisation of 
technology, coupled with an enormous increase in the rapidity of redundancy of given 
technologies”. The technological change and the internationalisation of technology are 
important aspects of the development in the economic and industrial sphere. The 
technological change and the price reduction on transportation and communication can 
be seen as an enabler for internationalisation, as Amin and Thrift speak of, or 
globalisation which I prefer to say, of technology. Anyway, this development opens up 
for – and eases – the breakup of industrial production processes into sub-processes that 
can be located in different nations. 
 
Another tendency we can see in the industrial development of the last thirty years is the 
dramatic internal restructuring of transnational firms (Glasmeier 1999). As a response 
to the changes in their external environment they have had to go through considerable 
changes themselves. The have gone from internal vertical integration of production 
“towards more flexible patterns of “multi-source” international production that 
requires less ownership and more reliance on strategic alliances, short term contracts, 
and the shipment of components from many different international sources to as many 
different markets” (Glasmeier 1999:10) This quotation, in my point of view, is based 
on the special business situation of a firm with a high volume product for homogenous 
markets around the globe in mind. It does not necessarily apply to the automotive 
industry. Thus, we must be careful to generalise from the case of one business situation 
only. Amin and Thrift (1997) are concerned about the internal structure of the 
companies as well as about the development in general. They claim that we can se a 
major rise in transnational oligopolies. The tendency seems to be that firms at a much 
earlier stage of their development have to be globally oriented, and that their national 
market share is becoming less important, when they head towards the “global market”.  
 
Finally there has emerged an economic diplomacy and, parallel to this, states and 
regional governments have developed new economic strategies (Amin and Thrift 1997, 
Glasmeier 1999).  On a supranational level an economic diplomacy has evolved, 
 25
Technology Transfer 
constantly developing and negotiating international trade agreements. World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Money Foundation (IMF) are the most prominent actors 
in this relation. These organisations are laying the basis for further development of 
trade between nations. The most striking change may still be the reactions of new 
strategies of national and regional governments according to the new challenges they 
experience. They have realised the new competition arising and are becoming 
increasingly aware of the changes taking place internationally, and in response they 
have developed new economic strategies. This implies new marketing strategies 
designed by national or regional professional “place-marketing” firms. Examples of this 
are the Irish Development Agency (IDA) in Ireland or SGF (The Société Générale de 
Financement du Québec) in Quebec Canada. These are professional Place marketing 
businesses owned by the national or regional government. Their objective is to attract 
industries, often predefined, to the area and negotiate the financial solutions, in some 
cases taking direct part in the financial solutions. This activity seems to have been 
important both for Ireland and Quebec. 
 
 
2.5 Summing up 
 
In this chapter I have presented a discussion of globalisation. The starting point was 
Giddens’ discussion of modernity. Through the discussion of the intensification of an 
already existing global process I turned the focus towards different positions within 
today’s debate of globalisation. I ended the chapter by focusing on what I call the 
enablers, which is what has made this intensification possible. The changes in the 
global economy have led to new national and regional strategies. These new national 
and regional strategies exemplifies that economic activity in the global economy are 
taking place in actual places, regions or nations. 
 
The enabling forces and the following intensification of the global economy have lead 
to increased interaction across national borders. In clear words this is what makes 
technology transfer possible. Being able to transfer technology and production systems 
in this global context becomes important for businesses to stay competitive and being 
able to satisfy costumers around the world. The implication of this argument is that they 
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have to be capable of transferring their technology and production system from one 
place in the world to another in an efficient way. 
 
This argument has a couple of consequences for this thesis. Firstly, there is need for a 
further elaboration on how this intensification of the global economy has localised 
consequences. And secondly how is place perceived as an important factor in these 
processes of transferring technology from one place to another in the global economy. 
There are several theories that argue for an economy that is being more regionalised 
because of these changes taking place at the global level. I will now turn to a 
presentation and discussion of these theories. 
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3. Regionalisation 
 
In a situation where we can allow ourselves to operate with notions like “global 
dreamers” when referring to the pro-globalisation side and also claim that the anti-
globalisation side is afraid that the “global dreamer’s” world will come true, it suggests 
that we are not quite there yet. This allows for a perspective that assumes another 
possible direction for the development, or at least a complementary alternative. 
Regionalisation might be seen as such an alternative perspective. This is addressed as a 
paradox by Amin and Thrift (1994), when they point to the phenomenon that the 
globalisation has led to a rise in the interest for, and an increasing emphasis on, the 
local and regional circumstances. In my interpretation of Amin and Thrift (1994) they 
do not see globalisation as opposed to regionalisation, but rather as two parallel 
processes that have to be seen in relation to each other.  
 
I will give an outline of different contributions that argue for a more regionalised 
economic development. Such an argumentation is needed as a tool in the attempt to 
clear out my standpoint concerning what does place mean in our globalised world. 
Several authors have presented different theories on a more regionalised development 
of the economy. The first to emphasise the regional dimension was Marshall (1919) 
with his notion of industrial districts. Others are Perreux (1955) with his growth pole 
theory, and Porter’s cluster theory (1990, 1998 and 2000) represents further 
development in this direction. In the following I will present Asheim and Isaksen’s 
(2000) regionalisation thesis, and then I will present Maskell et al.’s (1995) theory of 
the localised capabilities. Through my argumentation of regionalisation I will end up 
with my way of viewing place in the global economy. 
 
 
3.1 The regionalisation thesis 
 
In chapter 2 I have discussed globalisation and its background. The perspective of 
globalisation as a process of homogenisation and a world wide sourcing process 
focusing on the lowest possible input costs is also often referred to as neo-fordist 
development. In this perspective globalisation may have a tendency to be interpreted as 
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“the end of geography” as the importance of national and geographical boundaries is 
reduced as a consequence of the liberalisation of trade. The regionalisation thesis or the 
post-fordist development is often seen in opposition to globalisation, but might also be 
seen as an integrated part of globalisation. At the same time regionalisation indicate 
that other production factors that are far more place-specific, is becoming more 
important in the new global economy. These factors are often “non-economic” factors 
that are creating competitive advantage and different regional economic development 
and growth rate (Asheim and Isaksen 2000). This makes regionalisation a perspective 
with focus on economic activity that are depending on resources that are specific to 
particular places, and which cannot be imitated easily by places that lack these qualities 
(Storper 1997). Porter (1998:78) points at the essence of this when he states: “the 
enduring competitive advantages in the global economy lie increasingly in the local 
things – knowledge, relationships, motivations – that distant rivals cannot match.” 
Regionalisation is thus a perspective that emphasis that the firms and their 
competitiveness are embedded in local economic, social and cultural structures. 
According to Asheim and Isaksen (2000) the regionalisation thesis has four main 
building blocks: innovation, interactive learning, localised learning and clusters. These 
are presented below.  
 
Innovation 
It is a common assumption that today’s economy is less predictable and standardised 
than it was in the days of Fordism. This change in the economy requires new strategies 
for being competitive. Innovation and learning are seen as two key issues in this 
relation. One consequence of this is that the ability to learn and to innovate is crucial to 
be able to determine the competitiveness of firms, regions and countries. The increased 
focus on knowledge assets and learning abilities in the construction of competitiveness 
is important in gaining local and regional development. At the same time these factors 
are acknowledged as new production factors and are becoming new important location 
factors changing the industries’ geographical patterns (Malmberg 1997). Innovation 
and learning are in this way new and important factors that need to be understood and 
taken into consideration when analysing regional uneven development (Asheim and 
Isaksen 2000). 
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Interactive Learning 
The second building block is interactive learning. Interactive learning is the 
conceptualisation of innovation as a complex interactive non-linear learning process. 
This view involves a critique of and an alternative to the linear innovation process 
model, which focuses more on radical technological innovation (see chapter 6). It is 
recognised that much innovation is incremental rather than radical, and often a result of 
organisational learning rather than formal research and development work (Porter 
1990). This view of innovation is based on the idea that the innovative performance of 
an economy is depends on the firms’ ability to utilise the innovative resources of each 
other and of research institutions and the public bodies. This view makes networking, 
interactive learning and co-operation strategic important factors in promoting 
competitiveness. This type of co-ordination of the economic activity, based on trustful 
co-operation, is rather different than the principle of hierarchical control that was 
dominating under Fordism. This way of co-ordinating the economy seems to be 
important for the knowledge accumulation and diffusion, at least in two ways. The first 
is that networks between firms seem to encourage new knowledge through an extended 
specialisation between firms. The second is the importance of informal social 
institutions (see chapter 4) in the work of creating the learning processes and innovative 
activities. This links the innovation process to humans, through the understanding of 
communication and human interaction as vital aspects in innovation activities (Asheim 
and Isaksen 2000).  
 
Localised Learning 
Stating innovation as a social process where social institutions play a vital role is 
leading to the next building block, localised learning. Seeing innovation as a social 
process implies that these processes are influenced by a context. The historical and 
cultural context of these informal institutions and the social processes become 
important and are linking the innovation processes to a place. In this term learning can 
be seen as a localised process and not a placeless activity. Learning is then to a large 
extent shaped by the historical trajectories of the local milieu, and the local institutions 
created through its history (Nilsen 1999, Dale and Nilsen 2000). Knowledge is often 
divided into two different types, explicit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) and tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi 1966) (see chapter 5). Tacit knowledge is often constituted through 
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practices and routines and is also an important dimension that contributes to the 
argumentation of linking learning to a local activity. The learning processes are thus to 
a large extent localised, and the regional perspective and dimension becomes evident as 
Asheim and Isaksen (2000:170) state: “The competitiveness of firms is partly seen to 
depend upon the stock of knowledge and the learning ability in the regional milieu.”. 
 
Clusters 
The fourth building block in Asheim and Isaksens (2000) argumentation is clusters. 
Whether it is clusters in Porter’s terms or more agglomerations on a general basis might 
be an issue for further discussions that I don’t want to elaborate further here. The main 
issue is the focus on the agglomerations or clustering of firms in certain places where 
“…close inter-firm communication, socio-cultural structures and institutional 
environment may stimulate socially and territorially embedded collective learning and 
continuous innovation.” (Asheim and Isaksen 2000:175). With references to Maskell et 
al. (1998:59) they point precisely at the essence of this argumentation: “The proximity 
between the different actors makes it possible for them to create, acquire, accumulate 
and utilise knowledge a little faster than their cost-wise more favourable located 
competitors”. This underlines the point that regionalisation, as an interactive localised 
learning process, are important for firms’ competitiveness through innovations and are 
an alternative to the cost focused approaches that are emphasised by the neo-fordist 
globalisation perspective. 
 
 
3.2 Localised Capabilities  
 
In their outline of regional competitiveness and learning Maskell et al. (1998) 
emphasise embeddedness of firms in local economies through what they call localised 
capabilities. According to their argumentation firms become competitive by utilising–
directly or indirectly - important assets and possibilities in their place of location. These 
localised capabilities are important resources that give the firms advantages in relation 
to other firms in different localities. Maskell et al. (1998) refer to all such regional or 
national resources that influence a firm’s competitiveness as localised capabilities of 
the area in question. The localised capabilities are influential according to the firm’s 
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development and they are also important in restraining the space of a firm’s possible 
actions. This becomes clear when they argue (Maskell et al.1998:51); “No firm can 
pursue strategies that entirely disregard the quality and character of the capabilities in 
the region and country of location”.  What is pinpointed here is that a firm’s strategies 
must – to some extent – be anchored in the localised capabilities. Of course firms can 
pursue strategies that are not anchored in the character of the local environment, but 
their ability to succeed will be affected by the local capabilities. On the basis of this 
Maskell et al. (1998:51) conclude that: “No firm is thus unequivocally footloose, 
located in any environment what so ever”. Every firm is, in this respect, embedded in 
their own environment and local milieu though the localised capabilities. What then, 
are the localised capabilities? 
 
The localised capabilities consist, in Maskell et al. (1998:53) outline, of four main 
elements: 
 
• The institutional endowment 
• The built structures 
• The natural resources 
• The knowledge and skills 
 
Institutional endowment can be understood as the areas contemporary patterns of 
behaviour, and habits of both action and thought. These are elements of the social 
system that are durable and of a persistent nature, thereby contributing to a routine of 
action and behaviour. The institutional endowment of a region includes more or less all 
the social actions in relation to the supply of capital, land and labour, including the 
markets for goods and services. A region’s institutional endowment is a result of 
historical processes and constructions. This leads to the hypothesis that a region with a 
certain industrial history is also able to develop an institutional endowment that 
supports this specific industrial activity (Nilsen 1999, Dale & Nilsen 2000).  
 
In this connection the knowledge and skills of the region are of importance. When the 
institutional endowment has been developed together with the industry, it implies that 
so has also the region’s knowledge and skills. The knowledge and skills of the area, and 
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the institutional social system have developed and is a result of history. So are also the 
built structures and the natural resources. The built structures we see in a region today 
are the result of earlier actions and decisions, and in that sense they are historically 
constructed. The natural resources in an area are also definitively a result of historical 
processes. 
 
The localised capabilities are in this sense a heritage from earlier times. History is in 
this way affecting today’s development and the possibilities firms face in their 
activities. These localised capabilities are, in different degrees, compatible with the 
needs of the market economy.  Based on the fact that every place has its own history 
and development, this can be seen as a major contribution to the different strengths and 
weaknesses between regions in an economic sense. The heritage of a region is 
contributing to today’s development and actions. 
 
Another way of understanding the region is to relate it to place.  In the following I will 
argue place to be the more concrete notion and a more meaningful way of 
understanding spatiality. Place is one of the central issues in the discipline of 
geography, and in the following I will try to give an outline on how I regard place and 
how it affects the way this thesis is put together. 
 
 
3.3 The concept of place 
 
As the outline of globalisation suggests, I am critical to the attempt of viewing the 
world as a placeless space where everything has become or is becoming the same. 
Holloway & Hubbard (2001:22), states that: “Some commentators have even predicted 
the “end of geography””, by referring to an argumentation where all places becomes 
more or less the same through the globalisation of the economy. This is a view that has 
been debated among geographers. As shown in the globalisation debate I am sceptical 
to the idea of the global dreamers, and I will argue that there are reasons to be sensitive 
to a more fragmented development. Place is one of the central issues in geography. In 
my outline of the conception of place and how place is to be viewed in this thesis I will 
rely on Agnew (1987) and the three principal meanings of the term he presents. The 
three principal meanings of place are, in his terms: place as a “location”, “sense of 
 33
Technology Transfer 
place” and “place as locale”. In my further presentation I will, to some extent, rely on 
Agnew’s approach. I will also, however, rely on Dale (1994) and Berg and Dale (2004), 
who has taken Agnew´s ideas further, and I will elaborate on this by introducing my 
own approach.  
 
Place as location 
One perspective that has been identified is seeing place as location. This perspective, 
however, reduces place to be a spot on the map. Hartsthorne (1939) with his conception 
of the world as a fascinating mosaic of places can be seen as a representative of this 
view. When viewing places as distinct points of the earth’s surface he is definitively 
seeing place as a location. But this view can be taking a step further. Place can also be 
seen as a backdrop to social activity.  This puts place in the position where it provides a 
background for social life.  As such, place functions as a frame around the objective, 
physical and material conditions of social interaction. As Entrikin (1991) points out, 
place is viewed from the outside in a decentralised way. It is described in a rational 
manner and this rationality is contributing to reducing place to nothing but a location.  
The objective description is a goal in itself, with focus on the measurable side of places 
and their visible characteristics and differences (Pred 1984). Within economic 
geography analyses of the location of economic activity, based on cost and market 
conditions, is an example of this point of view.   
 
Sense of place 
The understanding of place as experience was developed within the American 
humanistic geography in the 1970s ( see Relph 1976, Tuan 1977, Buttimer 1976). 
Sense of place is essential in this perspective, and the subjective and experienced 
dimension of place is emphasised. What is important is not what places are like for 
“real”, but how they are experienced. People’s actions are based on how they 
experience a place, not necessary how it really is. What people feel and sense is seen as 
important points of reference.   Thus, in order to understand human action it is regarded 
as important to understand human experience. In this perspective place is understood 
from the inside, as something that must be experienced.  
 
 34
Globalisation and place 
This approach to place is inspired by both phenomenology and existentialism. The 
phenomenological aspect is evident in the perspective of place as an experienced 
phenomenon. Like Tuan (1977:149) put it; “Space is transformed into place as it 
acquires definition and meaning”. At the moment when the geographical space 
becomes meaningful through human experience and interpretation, it is transformed 
into place. This, as mentioned above, links place to human experience and human 
interpretation. This perspective focuses on how people interpret their relationship to the 
area in which they live their lives. Places become meaningful and important when 
people have a relationship with and a connection to the place (Tuan 1977). In an 
existentialistic perspective this involves how people feel connected to places. Place can 
then be seen as something that represents security and familiarity and is an important 
part of our identity construction. Where our construction of identity is concerned, place 
seems to be an important factor. One often describes oneself as an inhabitant of a 
certain place. I, for one, identify myself as “Trondheimer”. Because I am born in 
Trondheim and raised here I identify myself as an inhabitant of Trondheim. And by 
identifying myself as a “Trondheimer” I separate myself from other places. Trondheim 
is the place to which much of my identity is tied, and because of my history I feel some 
kind of familiarity to this particular city. Like Relph (1976) argues place represents a 
safe and familiar basis for our existence, and that we orientate our lives and experiences 
around it and in relation to it.. Hence, place is central to human existence (Simonsen 
1993). 
 
Place as Locale 
Another way of viewing place is to see it as the Giddens (1984) inspired concept 
“locale”. By locale we understand the settings in which social relations are constituted. 
In this perspective it is assumed that people that live in the same place develop more or 
less the same way of experiencing that place. This makes place a collective 
phenomenon through the activities and ideas of the people present (Dale 1994). As 
such, place has to be understood in light of the context it represents, in opposition to an 
understanding based on universal laws and principles. The duality of structure, based 
on Giddens´s (1984) understanding of structure, is an important issue in this respect, 
implying that structures are directly involved in human action at the same time as being 
a result of human action. According to Pred (1984) places are created and recreated 
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through social interaction and are not static. The continuous creation and recreation by 
the people living there give places vitality. But this can also be viewed the other way 
around, like Relph (1976:34) so precisely have stated it: “people are their place and a 
place is its people”. The interrelation between places and people are evident and the 
dynamism between them is an important understanding. This issues places as a rather 
dynamic feature in constant development rather than a constant statically frame. The 
dynamic qualities of a place are determined by what we may call social practice. Social 
practice refers to the repeated social activities of a place that give locale its meaning. In 
other words:  a place is constituted through its social practice. Locale in this sense is the 
context in which social practice and interaction appear (Giddens 1984, Simonsen 1993). 
Place then becomes the meeting place where different people’s daily activities meet in 
time and space (Dale 1994). In this approach individuals are seen as both subjects and 
objects, viewed in light of the context they appear in, or are a part of, not just as 
specified subjects or objects (Pred 1984).  
 
Another way to view place is to see it as something between the universal and a 
specific locality. In this perspective place is seen as encompassing both general and 
place specific features. This locality perspective on place is present in studies on 
economic restructuring and changes in business structure. General economic 
restructuring processes have a tendency to produce different outcomes in different 
places, because the place-specific terms are different (Dale 1994). In this argumentation 
there is an implicit assumption of places as specific and particular features, with unique 
developments paths, at the same time they can be understood much likely as “locale” 
and its contextual approach. The general economic processes meet place specific 
traditions, institutions, attitudes and cultures, and this makes the results dependent on 
the place. 
 
 
3.4 Place meets place 
 
Social constructions 
In a “locale” perspective places can be seen as social constructions and as meeting 
places. In this context I find Doreen Massey (1991, 1993) and her “Global sense of 
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place” highly relevant and important. In her outline she points out that places are 
becoming more like network inspired meeting places that stretch far beyond the local 
arena. This is exemplified by a description of her London neighbourhood. In this 
description material, social and cultural representatives, from different places around 
the world, meet in the streets of London. In my interpretation her London 
neighbourhood is then constructed in this setting. These representatives from different 
places in the world become bodily actors and representatives for these places in the 
streets of London. The representatives bring their places with them into London and 
then construct their new neighbourhood in London to what particular place it becomes 
under the influence of all the different representatives present in this neighbourhood. 
The actors, in this perspective, become carriers of place, and together they take part in 
the construction of places. The result can be a place-specific mixture, a creolisation or 
an hybridisation (see chapter 4). 
 
Passings that haunts us 
Another author that presents a perspective relevant for my purpose is Nigel Thrift. With 
his “Steps to an ecology of place” (1999), he represents a view that I find much in 
accordance with, and relevant to, Massey’s perspective. Thrift argues that places can be 
seen as “passings that haunt us” (1999: 310). By this statement he means that places 
are dynamic and “taking form only in their passing” (1999:310), and that places haunt 
us, but we also haunt places. With this he wants to get beyond and further from notions 
like context and setting. The way I understand Thrift is that he is pointing at durability 
as an important aspect of place. This durability implies the continuous interaction 
between people and place. But in addition I see Thrift as inspired by Latour5 and his 
thinking. In relation to this I find it appropriate to interpret him in a Latourian way as 
well. His contention that places haunt us and we haunt places, can be interpreted in a 
Latourian manner: places inscribe us and we inscribe places. The inscriptions made are 
then important for further actions and paths of development, both individually and in 
terms of place.  In this way we carry place with us in our life journey, and places are 
affected in the same way by our presence - both when we are in a place and when we 
have moved on from a place. 
 
                                                 
5 I will come back to Latour and his writings in the chapter 6. 
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This takes me to an important point in my conception of place, the interaction between 
a place and its people. I have earlier quoted Relph (1976:34), as one of the 
representatives of the humanistic geographical perspective, with his famous quotation 
“people are their place and a place is its people”. This point is an important aspect of 
the interrelated way we have to view places. When working with places we must take 
people into account, and the other way around. To understand a person is about 
understanding where he comes from, also in terms of place. This means that to 
understand a technology transfer where people from different places meet, is to 
understand the places they come from, and not only their organisational background.   
 
This connection between community and place is interesting in regards to Wengers 
(1999); “Communities of practice”. This work is interesting both in the perspective of 
seeing technology transfer as a process of transferring communities in some way, but 
also in the way that people must be understood as parts of places or communities. 
Wengers outline of “Communities of practice” will be elaborated further in chapter 5. 
 
 
3.5 Summing up 
 
Where does this outline of globalisation, modernity, regionalisation, place and 
individuals take us? In the last two chapters I have tried to argue that important features 
of modernity are similar to the important features of what is labelled globalisation. In 
other words, it is difficult to distinguish between globalisation and modernity. Despite 
this, it seems reasonable to talk about intensification in certain areas of society that we 
can label as a result of globalisation. Even though the terms modernity and 
globalisation can both be viewed as arrogant and, in my point of view, they tend to 
glorify and exaggerate the importance of western society and its progress. At the same 
time they are helpful when trying to understand recent development in society. Most 
importantly, we must understand globalisation as a contradictory, complex process (and 
not an end-state) that goes hand in hand with uneven spatial development that are 
realized at specific sites causing qualitative as well as quantitative changes (Dicken et 
al. 1997). Even though there have been some changes in several areas: liberalisation of 
trade across national boundaries, increased growth in the financial market, 
technological change that has contributed to dramatic reduced communication and 
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transportation costs, and an internal restructuring of transnational firms, there has 
emerged economic diplomacy, and states and regions have developed new economic 
strategies. These events has encouraged and made technology transfers possible. 
 
One of the consequences we can spot is that globalisation also can be understood as a 
process of regionalisation, where the importance of and the focus on regional and local 
activities are increasing. This can be seen as a paradox, but is more likely to be 
understood as one of the contradictory processes of globalisation that Dicken et al. 
(1997) argue for. Within economic geography this has been emphasised by the focus on 
regionalisation as an alternative and additional conception of globalisation. This 
increased focus on regions and more place specific areas involves a concretisation of 
the global level and discussion. Places are important aspects of the global development. 
The global development is taking place through the interaction between the people and 
place. 
 
Seen in this perspective, places become more prominent and important. When 
understanding places as social constructions that are constructed by the individuals and 
the materiality present, as well as by its history, places become continuously changing 
phenomena. In this way they can be understood as “passing that haunts us”   (Thrift 
1999:310). Places are in this respect constantly constructed and reconstructed by 
individuals alone, in interaction with other individuals, and by materiality and history. 
We can be a part of places we have been to and places we are in now; we mentally 
change a place to something else when we arrive, than it was before our arrival. 
Likewise, we, as individuals and groups, change when we arrive and experience new 
places. In addition to carrying places with us when we move around in the world, the 
places we have been to before are, in one way or another, inscribed in us. On our way 
or on our journey we meet people inscribed by other places. These meeting points are 
interesting and important events in the global society, because this means that when 
people meet, places meet.  
 
So in the last two chapters I have argued that globalisation can been seen as an 
intensification of modernity. The global changes that I have referred to, has been 
important enablers for this intensification to happen. Technology transfers between 
places in different countries are a direct consequence of these global changes. 
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Regionalisation, as I have presented it in this chapter, can be seen as an alternative to 
globalisation as a homogenous process and are linking this development to places. In 
other words globalisation is taking place. The discussion of place that I have elaborated 
shows the importance of place in this picture, but at the same time also the important 
role played by individuals, understood as carriers of place. Globalisation is then taking 
place through human everyday action. 
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4. Cultural distinctions and institutionalism: 
 
In this chapter I will rely on two theoretical concepts, culture and institutionalism. 
Culture is a highly relevant issue in this thesis. At the same time I have previously 
worked a lot with the concept of institutionalism that I also find relevant in this work. 
However the distinction between these two concepts is rather vague, since they more or 
less overlap. I will argue for a broad definition of these two conceptions. In applying 
such broad definitions, however, it is important to unpack and identify the different 
components of the concepts. Through an unpacking of these concepts I will try to come 
to a useful understanding of them. 
 
 
4.1 Culture 
 
The complex concept of culture 
One of the huge and important concepts in social science is culture. A lot is said about 
culture and, for sure, a lot will be said in the future.  In 1952 Kluckhon and Kruber 
identified 300 different definitions of the concept culture. The number of academic 
publications has risen dramatically after 1952; this reflects that culture is a complex 
notion and often hard to grasp. You can’t physically hold it in your hands, you can’t 
point it out, and you can´t feel it in any distinct way. It is necessary to try and make this 
notion more clear and understandable. Amundsen (2003:36, my translation) is inspired 
by Alvesson & Björkmann (1992) when he concludes that there is  relative consensus 
that culture can be characterised as follows: 
 
- Culture often refers to a collective phenomenon 
- Culture is historically defined 
- Culture is socially constructed, i.e culture is created by humans and lived by a 
group of people. 
- Culture is qualitative by nature, and not easy to measure. 
- Culture is inertial, hence changes are slow. 
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I think this quotation illustrates one of the challenges posed by the notion of culture, 
namely that it is complex. At the same time it is helpful in the way that it expresses 
some of the complexities of the concept. In other words, it suggests that the concept of 
culture is possible to handle when it is defined properly.  
 
A direct and concise definition of culture is given by Hannerz (1992:3): 
“For culture,…….., is the meanings which people create, and which create people, as 
members of societies. Culture is in some way collective. “ 
This implies that culture is relational. It is not connected to one object or one person but 
to the relations between people and artefacts, and to the interpretations and translations 
of symbols. Because of the danger of objectifying culture, I prefer to focus on the 
creation or the construction of meaning as Hannerz has stated above, and what might be 
seen as culture. The constructivist approach clarifies the differences between the 
understanding of social systems as organisations on the one hand, and technical 
systems, which are not able to construct their own meaning and interpretation of the 
situation, on the other. By focusing on this constructivist aspect of culture I am trying to 
avoid an objectifying and stereotypical approach to culture that might result from 
relating it to organisations or social systems only. This means that I am trying to 
develop an analytical approach to culture that embraces this constructivist approach and 
at the same time is operational for understanding the meeting point of different cultures. 
 
In this context I find Hannerz (1992) and his three-dimensional model valuable in my 
effort to clarify what I mean is an important feature of the culture notion. I interpret 
Hannerz´s three dimensional model as interrelational (1992:7): 
 
1. Ideas and modes of thought as entities and processes of the mind – the entire 
array of concepts, proportions, values and the like which people within some 
social unit carry together, as well as their various ways of handling their ideas 
in characteristic modes of mental operation; 
2. Forms of externalisation, the different ways in which meaning is made 
accessible to the senses, made public; 
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3. Social distribution, the ways in which the collective cultural inventory of 
meanings and meaningful external forms- that is 1 and 2 together – is spread 
over a population and its social relationships. 
 
The first aspect of Hannerz’ model is the traditional cultural perspective, which most of 
the research, the writings, and the daily use of the notion refers to. It is probably the 
differences in the ideas and modes of thought, the ways of thinking and differences in 
how various people perceive the world that often comes to mind when talking about 
culture. The second aspect of the model focuses on expressions, how the ideas are 
expressed through action, through language, through the way we dress and through the 
way we react. It is these expressions that are interpreted as cultural symbols. These 
externalisations represent the expressions of constructed meaning of ideas and modes of 
thoughts. The third aspect is telling us something about dissemination, and to what 
extent cultural ideas and expressions are distributed. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the forms can be similar even if the meaning 
attached to the form is different. This means that things might not turn out to be what 
they seem to be. One example can illustrate this: Todays youth has its rap culture with 
origins from the afro-American dominated areas of New York. The rap sub culture 
emerged as a musical expression similar to a capella, and the texts were about how 
tough it was “living up in the hood”. In my home town, Trondheim, despite being a 
small city with very few afro-americans, there are also rap artists. These rappers 
emulate the ways of their New York counterparts. They dress the same way, use much 
the same language and the same moves, and they sing songs about the same issues. 
They seem to be carriers of a global rap culture. When we look closer at them, 
however, their ideas and modes of thought are quite different. It is hard to adopt the 
ideas of the Afro-American in the Bronx area when you are a white youngster in a well 
suited home in the safe area of Trondheim. Commercial interests throughout the globe 
have distributed Rap music. What has been distributed is in fact the form and the 
externalisation rap music, but the ideas of rap music is more difficult to spread even 
though they try hard by using all the artefacts the originals do. So even if the form rap 
is the same around the globe, there are reasons to believe that the idea rap varies a lot. 
This means when we see rappers throughout the world today we see the global form 
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rap, and probably not the culture rap, because it is so much more differentiated than we 
like to think. 
 
Social construction and construction of meaning through 
interaction 
Social constructivism is one direction in the social sciences. The term was introduced 
by Berger and Luckmann in their book “The social construction of reality” (1966).  The 
essence in this perspective is questioning what is it that is nature and what is culture. 
Secondly, a central aspect is that the social should be understood as both constructions 
and evolution. In my perspective this implies a dynamic element in this approach to 
reality. I find this relevant in this work, both in regards to my perspectives on place (see 
chapter 3) and to my perspectives on technology (see chapter 6). But also it is relevant 
to my approach on culture and the construction of meaning.  This will be elaborated 
further in this section. 
 
When people with different backgrounds come together in close cooperation, they start 
interacting with each other. This implies interpreting (Berger & Luckmann 1966) the 
different actions of others. In this social interaction meaning is constructed through 
daily actions. The next step is that meaning is externalised through form, and a pattern 
of interaction is constructed. When a group has constituted their ideas, like beliefs, 
values, meaning and concepts, they externalise them through their actions, and through 
this externalisation the ideas are distributed to a greater group of people. Hepsø (2005) 
has developed a model inspired and based on Berger and Luckmann (1966), see figure 
4.1. I find this model interesting and highly relevant for developing an understanding of 
what is going on in processes of interpretation, and how meaning is established 
between individuals in groups. 
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Subj.
reality
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Interpre-
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Construction of meaning
Internali-
sation
(Hepsø 2005)
 
Figure 4.1 Construction of meaning (Hepsø 2005) 
 
The main issues in this model are based on the notion that every individual has its own 
understanding of reality, a subjective reality. This understanding is externalised and 
then interpreted by other individuals. This group of individuals together construct an 
objective reality based on each others interpretation of their externalised subjective 
reality. This objective reality is then internalised into each individual’s subjective 
reality.  
 
These concepts of externalisation and distribution are important where technology 
transfer is concerned. When different people meet and start exchanging their different 
understandings, values, beliefs and meanings, they start processes of interpretation each 
others actions and messages. This exchange may turn out to be one of the core 
processes of technology transfer. When individuals externalise and exchange ideas and 
experiences through this process, they construct a new basis or foundation of shared 
ideas. When they collectively externalise ideas in front of other groups, they have 
started the process of distributing these ideas. Where organisations are concerned this 
process goes on continuously. Different sub groups distribute their ideas to other sub 
groups and vice versa. I argue that an organisational culture, like any other culture, is 
constantly constructed though a process of interaction between different groups or 
individuals. A good example to illustrate this is that you never step out in the same river 
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twice (Hannerz 1992). You can step out in a river twice but not the same river. Because 
the stream changes all the time the amount of water changes, rocks are moved and 
creates new streams, and so on. This is also the case with culture: it is constantly 
constructed in different ways and thereby constantly changing, even though it seems the 
same on a day- to-day basis. 
 
Hannerz´s model can be understood as an outline of culture and its externalisation and 
dissemination.  Meaning, values, beliefs and understanding constitute central aspects of 
a culture. In sum these elements might be seen as that which gives individuals in a 
population a common direction or a common interpretation of how the world should be 
understood. These cultural aspects are expressed or externalised in different forms, 
manifested as language or other more symbolic actions or artefacts.  
 
Based on Hannerz model we may conclude that culture is constantly moving or 
changing. Cultural ideas and meaning are expressed and shared in a population of a 
certain extent. This is one approach to culture and a way of understanding this complex 
issue. Another theoretical approach to these issues can be found in what has been 
addressed as institutional theory. In my previous work (Nilsen 1999, Dale & Nilsen 
2000) this is an approach that I have found useful in understanding human interaction, 
and it has influenced my dissertation work. Hence, I will present relevant aspects from 
institutional theory that will contribute to a relevant understanding of the cultural 
aspects tied to the transfer of technology and knowledge.  
 
 
4.2 Institutionalism 
 
One concept that has been used in a variety of ways and has many meanings, both in 
the field of economic geography and other social sciences, is the concept of institutions. 
Lots of papers tell us that “the institutional endowment” (Maskell et al.1995) or “the 
institutional setting” is crucial to the economic development of a region or a local 
community. There are few studies, however, that dive more deeply into the questions of 
what institutions are, how they are constructed and constituted, and how they work in a 
local setting. There are some scholars, however, like Scott (1995) and Karlsen (2000) 
that have done substantial research in this area. 
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In this outline I will start with a brief overview of what the concept of institution 
entails. Based on Scott (1995) and his clarifying analysis of the various institutional 
schools and traditions, I will argue for a broad conception of institutions, which 
includes regulative, normative as well as cognitive elements. As already state in the 
introduction to this chapter, it is important to unpack and identify the different 
components of the concept. Through an unpacking of this concept I will try to come to 
a useful understanding of it; this will involve Scott´s analysis (1995) as well as results 
from my own prior research (Nilsen 1999, Dale & Nilsen 2000) and analysis done by 
Dale (2002).   
 
The concept of institution 
Some authors use the concept of institution in the same way as in everyday speech: as a 
synonym for organisations such as schools, hospitals, firms, trade unions, political 
parties, and research centres, or as an expression of the basic structures of society, such 
as marriage, the family, the government, the constitution.  
 
Others define the concept in more abstract terms, as formal, established, enduring social 
systems. This way of defining the concept can be found in studies on the process of 
institutionalisation, where “to institutionalise” means to formalise an activity or a 
relationship through a formal agreement or organisation. For example, “the 
institutionalisation of regions” (Paasi 1986, 1991) means to establish political, 
economic and cultural institutions that are capable of maintaining and reproducing 
territoriality and inherent symbolism. Examples of such institutions are the army, the 
police, schools and educational bodies, administrative organisations, and media. 
Similarly, “the institutional Europe”, i.e. the European Union, is “defined through 
institutional structures that are constitutive of the European economic and cultural 
integration” (Paasi 2000:6). The two concepts of institution and institutionalisation 
signify approximately the same, institution is the noun, while institutionalisation is the 
verb. 
 
Still others focus on power by defining and understanding institutions as the power 
structures of society, the political, legal, and economical laws and rules that regulate 
 49
Technology Transfer 
labour markets and industrial relations. This understanding is found in the regulation 
approach, with its focus on the way accumulation and regulation systems in different 
countries result in different “institutional settings” for economic activity (e.g. Gertler 
1997, Digiovanni 1996, Krätke 1999).  
 
A quite different conception is found among a large and growing school of institutional 
theorists who are stressing that institutions are the collectively held beliefs, values, 
mores and rules that condition or constrain individual action. This approach has clearly 
parallels to the concept of culture. For these theorists, “to institutionalise” must be 
understood as the formation of values through habits (routines, practices). The tradition 
of institutional theory, which has been most salient within economics and sociology, is 
based on the last definition. Institutional theories, which tend to regard institutions in a 
wide perspective, with emphasis on the regulative and normative, as well as the 
cognitive aspects of institutions, has experienced a considerable revival in the social 
sciences during the past decades.  
 
Some approaches 
The geographers Amin and Thrift (1994:14), define institutions mainly as 
organisations. They talk about: 
 
“a plethora of institutions of different kinds (including firms; financial institutions; 
local chambers of commerce; training agencies; trade associations; local authorities; 
development agencies; innovation centres; clerical bodies, unions, government 
agencies….., business service organisations; marketing boards)” 
 
In their opinion, the social and cultural factors crucial for economic success are best 
captured in the term “institutional thickness”. Four factors contribute towards the 
construction of institutional thickness in a region. Firstly, there has to be a strong 
presence of the kinds of institutions listed above. Secondly, the institutions involved 
must have a high level of interaction amongst each other. Thirdly, this high level of 
interaction must result in clearly defined structures of domination and coalition 
resulting in the collective representation of what used to be sectional and individual 
interests. Finally, a mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise or 
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“script” has to be developed.  Their definition of “institutional thickness” is broadly in 
accordance with the concept of institution I am trying to develop here.  
 
In taking this point of departure I am in accordance with, among others, Storper, who 
writes about formal public institutions, but states that:  
 
“All institutions are not public, however, and many are not coterminous with formal 
organizations. Institutions consist of “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and 
informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” 
and overlap with conventions. For this reason institutions cannot be reduced to specific 
organizations, ..."   
 
and  
 
“Successful formal institutions then, have a hard organizational side, and a “soft” 
conventional foundation.” (Storper 1997:268-269).” 
 
This quotation of Storper´s is fruitful because it points at the distinction between formal 
and informal conventions as important factors concerning institutions. However, much 
of the literature on institutions within the field of geography does not go further than 
stating that institutions are important, without discussing the content of this concept in 
any depth. Often the concept seems to be used in several of the meanings presented 
above, even within the same paper or article. Especially do the tendency to conflate the 
concepts of “organisations” and “institutions” cause much confusion in the literature. 
Different kinds of institutions are then mixed together into an all-inclusive concept, 
embracing everything that matters in the environment of the firm. As noted by, among 
others, Lundequist (1998), it is no wonder, then, that institutions are important.  
 
Unpacking the concept 
Recent theorists have recognised the value of differentiating between the concepts of 
“institutions” and “organisations” (e.g. Scott 1995, Harrington & Ferguson 1999, 
Lundequist 1998). When talking about schools, universities, hospitals, firms, research 
centres etc., they should be referred to as organisations. Such organisations of course 
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can be seen as a result of wider institutions, as ideas to how various functions of society 
should be organised. Furthermore; once they are created, these organisations also 
develop institutions of their own: a company culture, a university culture and so on, 
which tend to set the formal and informal “rules” of how to act and behave in the 
different positions within the specific organisation. To “institutionalise” may in this 
sense be defined as “to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task 
at hand.” (Selznick 1957:17).  Lundequist 1998 applies a metaphor, where he sees 
organisations as the players and institutions as the rules of the play. To develop this 
metaphor further I would like to put it another way. If we see the players as 
synonymous to the organisations, the rules of the play must be seen as the formal 
institutions; the informal institutions must then be seen as the players’ understanding of 
how to perform during the game, how to play the game tactically and technically. 
Organisations are influenced by the way institutions (rules) are formulated, while at the 
same time the organisation (the players), through their activities, influence the formal 
institutions (or rules) and informal institutions (or how the game is played).  
 
Even when differentiating between organisations and institutions, the concept of 
institutions is a very broad and rather “chaotic” one. The thinking and theorisation 
about the concept of institutions is far from institutionalised. 
 
One of the scholars that have tried to tidy up in the various approaches to the concept is 
Richard Scott, a sociologist in the field of organisational studies. Scott (1995) gives a 
comprehensive overview of the development of institutional approaches in the fields of 
economics, sociology, political science and organisation theory, and the various 
meanings and usages that have been associated with the concept of institution in these 
fields. I find his way of thinking deeply clarifying. He starts up with a broad definition:  
 
“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by 
various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple 
levels of jurisdiction.”  (Scott 1995:33) 
 
Scott argues that although there is value in such an inclusive and integrated definition, 
the disadvantage is that it “knits together three somewhat divergent conceptions that 
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need to be unpacked” (Scott 1995:34). There is a need for a distinction among the 
several components and to identify the underlying assumptions, mechanisms, and 
indicators for each of them. Scott bases his unpacking on the notion that different social 
theorists have identified and emphasised different elements as vital components of 
institutions. The disagreement is, according to Scott (1995), centred round three axes of 
controversy: (i) varying emphases on institutional elements, (ii) varying carriers of 
institutional elements, and (iii) varying levels of institutional elements.  
 
The most important of these controversies is the varying emphasis that is put on the 
regulative, the normative, and the cognitive elements of institutions. These three 
elements are called the “three “pillars”- identified as making up or supporting 
institutions” (Scott 1995:35). I will briefly comment each of them, although also 
leaning on other authors than Scott.  
 
The regulative aspects6
In one way or another, “all scholars emphasise the regulative aspects of institutions; 
institutions constrain and regularise behaviour” (Scott 1995:35). Economists have a 
tendency to view institutions as resting primarily on the regulative pillar7. They give 
prominence to regulative processes like rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning 
activities. These may be formal, written rules as well as informal, unwritten codes of 
conduct. Institutions are mainly seen as political and economic regulations, functioning 
as constraints on individual choice and activity. Institutions have the main function of 
creating predictable conditions (Karlsen 1999). This characterisation is typical of the 
“new” institutionalism in economics.  
 
This emphasis can be viewed as closely tied to the traditional object of study within 
economics; the study of behaviour of individuals and firms in markets. This perspective 
is recognised by its desires to create predictable and controllable conditions. It also 
reflects the economists classical conception of economic behaviour; seeing individuals 
                                                 
6 As already mentioned Scott (1995) uses the term pillar when talking about the different elements of 
institutions. I find it more relevant to emphasise the different aspects of institutions. This is done to 
underline that most often institutions consist of not just one of the pillars Scott talks about, but most 
probably of a mixture of the three aspects that will be presented in the following. 
7 “The economic historian Douglass North, for example, features rule systems and enforcement 
mechanisms in his conceptualization.” (Scott 1995:35) 
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and organisations primarily as pursuing their self-interest through instrumental, 
expedient behaviour, all the while calculating the costs of rewards and penalties. Rules 
or collective expectations, if there are any expectations in this perspective at all, are 
obeyed because it is in the actor’s self-interest to conform.  
 
In his influential criticism of Williamson’s work on transaction costs, Granovetter 
(1985) argues that this kind of thinking about economic behaviour is “an atomised, 
undersocialized conception of human action, continuing the utilitarian tradition.” 
(1985: 483). He claims further that (1985: 487): “Actors do not behave or decide as 
atoms outside a social context, ……. Their attempts at purposive action are instead 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.” 
 
In addition to this I find it relevant to return to the quotation of Scott (1995) mentioned 
above where he says ”the regulative aspects” (:35, my underlining). I think it is 
important to realise that understanding the regulative pillar is not just a matter of 
understanding laws, rules and other more or less obvious regulating issues, but also to 
emphasise the regulative aspects of social conduct. These may often be rooted in old 
formal regulations, or they can also be a social heritage from previous times (Nilsen 
1999, Dale & Nilsen 2000). Being open for the regulative aspects of institutions is also 
a way to reduce the danger of being related to an under-socialised perspective. 
 
The normative aspects 
Other theorists see institutions as primarily resting upon the normative pillar, 
emphasising the normative system of prescriptions, evaluations, and obligations that 
influence social life. These norms specify how things should be done; they define the 
appropriate values, goals, means, behaviour and a lot of expectations to social conduct.  
 
As with regulative rules, normative rules can be formal or informal. They impose 
constraints on social behaviour, although at the same time they empower and enable 
social action. They prescribe rights and privileges as well as responsibilities and duties. 
According to this view, “Actors conform not because it serves their individual 
interests, narrowly defined, but because it is expected of them, they are obliged to do 
so” (Scott 1995:39). When the regulative pillar is based on a logic of instrumentalism, 
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asking “What is my interest?” the normative pillar is based on a logic of 
appropriateness, asking “What is expected of me?”.  
 
The normative approach to institutions can be traced back to some of the classical 
sociologists as Durkheim and Parsons, who saw shared norms and values as the basis of 
a stable social order. In the early works, and especially in Parsons’, there was a 
tendency to view role-regulated behaviour as deterministic, or “over-socialised” as 
Granovetter (1985) terms it. Actors were perceived to “adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to 
occupy” (Granovetter 1985:487).8
 
Selznick’s conception of institution is a good example of this kind of thinking, and  
highly relevant to my study. Selznick (1957, 1992) sees the institution as a supplement 
to the formal structure of the organisation. In his view “organisations” are transformed 
into “institutions” over time. This process of institutionalisation is “reflecting the 
organization’s own history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and 
the vested interest they have created, and the way it has adopted to its environment.” 
(Selznick 1957:16).  
 
Individuals take their own personalities, values and interests into the organisation. The 
values of the organisation are then the sum of the values of its members. At the same 
time the members are going through a process of socialisation; a parallel of the 
institutionalisation process that are going on at the organisational level. The social 
commitments that are formed through the social interaction within an organisation 
provide the basis for its stability and integration. These processes give an organisation 
its identity, and an organisational culture emerges. In this process, which Selznick 
(1992) labels “thick institutionalising”, the organisation becomes infused with value. It 
also becomes filled by commitments to its self-maintenance and a struggle to preserve 
its values.  
 
                                                 
8 The terms “under-socialized” and “over-socialized” are parallel to the dichotomies of  “homo 
economicus” vs. “homo sociologicus”, methodological individualism vs. collectivism, and voluntarism 
vs. determinism. These are traditional dichotomies that often have been caricatured.  
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Scholars who stress the normative aspects of institutions do not necessarily view actors 
as “slaves of social conventions”, but can see them as “reasonable people adopting to 
the rules of institutions” (Scott 1995:39). The conception of human motivation and 
behaviour must encompass aspects of rationality as well as of rule-following, and the 
normative rules have to be selected, interpreted and reflected upon. This means that in 
addition to understanding the normative as expectations from the surroundings, it must 
also be seen as a normative map of the individuals regulating its decisions as well. The 
point is that norms may be set by the surroundings, but the individuals may as well 
have a defined norm system of their own to follow. On the basis of this decisions are 
taken. It is important, as well, to state that the individuals’ construction of the situation 
is depending on a combination of collective and individual experiences and 
expectations. Through negotiations and interpretations of this mix of experience and 
expectations the foundation is laid for decision making. 
 
The cognitive aspects 
A third group of institutionalists gives greater attention to the cognitive elements of 
institutions, stressing the importance of symbols (words, signs, and gestures) in shaping 
the meaning we attribute to objects and activities. This is the main focus of the new 
institutionalism within sociology, which can be traced back to Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) and their emphasis on the creation of shared knowledge and belief systems 
rather than rules and norms as the basic guidelines to human action. A basic point of 
this institutional school is that if we are going to understand or explain actions, we must 
take into account the interpretations and meanings attached to them. Individuals in 
interaction collectively construct meaning; they are creating a common frame of 
reference. Common cognitive frameworks mean a common way of understanding and 
interpreting a situation or an action, and it allows repeated, routine action.  
 
Of utmost importance is the creation of categories, typifications, and classifications (of 
people, groups, goods, services, behaviour etc.) A common system of classification, or 
shared definitions, is seen as basic to the stability of an organisation or a society 
(Douglas 1986).  Many such classifications are taken for granted. They are seen as “the 
way things are” and routines are followed because they are “the way we do it”, 
overlooking that they in fact are social constructions. While the normative pillar 
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emphasis the social obligations as the basis for compliance, the cognitive pillar stresses 
the way situations are framed and social identities defined (Scott 1995). Social 
identities can be understood as “our conception of who we are and what actions make 
sense to us in given situations.” (Scott 1995:44).  
 
In understanding the cognitive pillar it is important to include and understand the social 
constructivist approach as well. The way I understand this is that these need to be seen 
as closely interlinked, and to be viewed in relation to each other. In an institutional 
analysis the constructivist approach is a good supplement to the normative approach. 
And the normative approach also legitimises the constructivist approach in relation to 
not becoming over social-constructed. 
 
Summarising institutionalism 
The three institutional aspects, or “pillars”, vary greatly in content. Partly, the variation 
is a matter of substantive focus, and partly it is linked to more profound differences in 
underlying assumptions that are important to be aware of. On the other hand, the 
division between the normative and the cognitive “pillar” is not necessarily sharp. As 
noted by Karlsen (1999), the “taken for granted” is not only a cognitive matter, it can 
also have strong normative connotations, being embodied in language and social 
practice. 
 
It has to be stressed, however, that Scott’s distinction among the regulative, normative, 
and cognitive pillars is an analytical one. At the concrete, empirical level all the three 
pillars will be of importance, and partly interwoven. As he puts it:  
“The distinctions I have proposed among the three conceptions – the three pillars – of 
institutions are analytical in the sense that concrete institutional arrangements will be 
found to combine regulative, normative, and cognitive processes together in varying 
amounts. However, particular institutional forms will vary in their composition, some 
resting on primarily on the regulative, some on the normative, and some on the 
cognitive pillar.” (Scott 1995:144).  
 
The way I see it, using institutions as analytical tools is complex. And in this relation 
they should be handled with care, and it has to be expressed that to understand the 
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institutions is first and foremost about identifying them. To tell whether an institution is 
regulative, normative or cognitive is difficult, even though it seems important to do so 
if the issues at stake are an operational approach to institutions. 
 
4.3 Creolisation: the third culture 
 
With inspiration from linguists, the concept of creolisation has emerged in cultural 
studies. When Hannerz (1992) introduces the creolisation concept in his “Cultural 
Complexity”, he simultaneously warns against the danger of exaggerating the use of 
this metaphor. It is, however, an interesting metaphor that I find relevant in a study 
involving different cultures. The essence of the metaphor creolisation is the 
amalgamation that occurs when different cultural components are joined in new, and 
often unpredicted, ways, often resulting in new meanings and different cultural forms. 
This might be seen as the rise of a third culture. Another approach to this can be found 
in Pieterse (1995) and his concept of hybridisation, when he refers to the making of 
global culture as a global melange. What is essential in these perspectives is, in my 
view, that there is a constantly ongoing process between different actors from a 
diversity of cultures; via this process the making and development of something new 
and different often comes about. This new and different culture is created, however, on 
the basis of the cultures that meet. Their meeting is characterised by dynamic 
negotiations, where the different cultural forms of externalisation (i.e. symbols), ideas, 
and modes of thought are translated and interpreted. In my opinion this perspective 
acknowledges and represents a view of vital and dynamic local cultures that 
collectively constitute whatever can be called global culture, if any at all. In many ways 
such an approach acknowledges the local embedded character of culture, at the same 
time as it incorporate culture in terms like Castells (1996) global flow. In my 
perspective it is important to understand what might be an end result of a process were 
actors with different backgrounds work together over a time period. This is highly 
relevant to my approach to place elaborated in chapter 3, and what happens when place 
meets place. In this way it is an important perspective to include in this analysis.  
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4.4 My perspective on culture and institutionalism 
 
In trying to work out a perspective on culture to provide me with a useful approach for 
my purpose, I have relied heavily on Hannerz (1992) and his three dimensional model 
that regards culture as consisting of: 1.Ideas and modes of thoughts, 2. Forms of 
externalisation, and 3. The social distribution of these phenomena. In addition to this I 
find Hepsø’s (2004) interpretation of Berger and Luckmann (1966) – where she ends up 
with an understanding of how meaning is constructed – relevant to my perception of 
how the actors in this process of technology and knowledge transfer construct meaning 
in an environment of cultural plurality.  
 
Culture is thus a phenomenon that is constantly changing and is constructed day by 
day; at the same time the phenomena is also historically anchored. On the basis of this I 
have recognised that institutionalism that has been an important approach in my 
previous research, also is an important understanding to keep in mind.  I regard the 
normative, cognitive, and regulative pillars as important factors in trying to understand 
different ways of acting in a cultural complex setting. At the same time I have stated 
that it might be hard to distinguish between these three pillars. By defining culture as 
the ideas underlying our expressions and the way this is distributed in a population, I 
have equipped my approach with a relevant analytical tool.  
 
By this approach to culture and institutions I want to elaborate the role these play in 
such a transfer process. What I am searching for is more precisely:  
 
In what way do the historical trajectories at different places, understood as 
cultural or institutional aspects, affect the transfer process?  
 
This research question will be analysed in chapter 11. 
 
 59
Technology Transfer 
5. Learning 
 
5.1 Some theories of learning 
 
In this dissertation I view the process of technology transfer with emphasis on the 
interaction between the participants involved. As stressed in Section 2, this process can 
be viewed as a process of interaction between places and is based on the global 
economical changes that we have witness recently. This includes challenges of a 
cultural character, as indicated in the previous chapter, and it will also, as I will argue in 
chapter 6, to some extent include technical artefacts. Another perspective, too, has to be 
included in order to say something about what is going on between the participants. 
Learning is in my opinion a fundamental process in understanding how a production 
system is transferred from one context to another.  
 
When learning is a fundamental process for understanding how the transfer is made, it 
is most likely also relevant in the process of understanding how these places interact. 
My main argument in concluding the place debate in chapter 3, is that individuals must 
be understood as representatives of place, and that places are constantly changing in 
relation to the people that are present. Every dialogue or interaction between two 
individuals is in this perspective also a dialogue and meeting between two constantly 
changing places. On this basis I will outline some theoretical perspectives on the 
importance of learning and what learning is about. In light of these perspectives I will 
see if it is right to assume that learning is also a fundamental process when places 
interact.  
 
In this process I will first rely on Wenger (1998) and his “Communities of practice”. 
Further I will present some of Schön’s (1983) perspectives on the reflective practitioner 
and “learning by doing”, which, in my opinion, seems to be an important aspect of this 
transfer process. I will also present Argyris and Schöns (1996) arguments related to 
organisational learning and their model of single- and double-loop learning. At last I 
will present the main thoughts of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) to give some input on 
how knowledge is created and how a divide between the four different ways of 
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handling knowledge can be anticipated. These ways of handling knowledge seem 
important to the way knowledge is created and handled in this transfer process.   
 
Communities of practice 
I have outlined place to be embodied and represented through people, and in chapter 6 I 
will also include place to be embodied and represented through artefacts. This implies 
that when people interact with people or artefacts from a different place it is an 
interesting meeting point. At least related to the place discussion it is a very interesting 
meeting point. This suggestion, however, requires consistent argumentation, and I find 
it important to provide a credible explanation of how people can interact with both 
people and artefacts. A discussion on this can be found in Wengers Communities of 
practice; learning, meaning and identity (1998), where he presents an argument that I 
find interesting. By giving a short introduction to Wengers argumentation I will 
elaborate on how people and artefacts are important in the learning processes.   
 
The central element in his social theory of learning is, as the title of the book suggests, 
communities of practice. The term communities of practice should according to 
Wenger be viewed as a unit. By using this term he distinguishes it from other and more 
complex and less tractable terms like culture, activity or structure, and he also defines a 
special type of community – a community of practice. To associate community and 
practice he uses three dimensions to describe the relation between them. These three 
dimensions are; mutual engagement, a joint enterprise and a shared repertoire. Mutual 
engagement means that a community is created through a practice based on doing 
things together out of engagement in a specific direction or field of interest. By joint 
enterprise we understand a common initiative for the community, an initiative that 
reflects a direction. This includes both agreement and disagreement, it is not necessary 
for the community to agree in every situation, disagreement can also be viewed as a 
productive part of the enterprise. The shared repertoire is the community’s resources for 
its efforts in negotiating meaning. These resources include routines, ways of doing 
things, stories, symbols, and other things that the community has produced or adopted 
and included in its practice. In this way the shared repertoire is related to, and can be 
understood as, cognitive aspects of institutions like I have presented in chapter 4. 
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Even though Wenger (1998:52) likes to see the term as one unit, practice is inevitably 
important in this connection: 
 
 “Practice is about meaning as an experience of everyday life.” 
 
Communities of practice presuppose stability of membership over some time and also 
that they have been acting as an integrated community for a period of time to sustain 
continuity. In this perspective practice is social practice, and is always related to a 
social context.  
 
Social practice is important in communities of practice, and participation is a central 
element in this context. Participation, or lack of participation, in transfer processes is a 
relevant issue concerning the creation of ideas, the development of solutions, the local 
adoptions and the implementation processes. Wenger (1998:52) presents a model of 
dualism between participation and reification.   
 
1) meaning is located in a process I will call negotiation of meaning 
2) the negotiation of meaning involves the interaction of two constituent 
processes, which I will call participation and reification 
3) participation and reification form a duality that is fundamental to the human 
experience of meaning and thus to the nature of practice. 
 
Reification means that the actors relate to abstractions as objects and objectify them. 
Processes of reification are transformations of abstract ideas to something concrete and 
objectified. Participation and reification are reciprocal to each other. The question of 
participation is a question of who is involved in the reification processes where the 
ideas and the abstractions for the changes are transformed into concrete solutions and 
practises. Wenger’s argumentation is that reifications can be seen as a way of relating 
to artefacts, while participation is a way of relating to individuals. Reification means 
how the personnel relate to the machinery that arrives from Raufoss. Participation 
points at how the personnel from different social practises relates to each other. In this 
way Wenger’s contribution serves my purpose in the way that it opens up for learning 
in relation to both individuals and artefacts, which is highly relevant for this thesis.  
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Wenger’s model describes this way of learning. He introduces two new concepts to 
describe how learning is applied in relation to individuals and how it can be understood 
in relation to artefacts:  brokers and boundary objects. Both hold the function of 
carrying ideas and understanding between different arenas. This presupposes that both 
the brokers and the boundary objects are present in different arena or in places. His 
model illustrates this as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Wenger on participation and reification (1998:105). 
 
This model illustrates how meaning and learning is developed between different arenas 
or contexts, as Wenger addresses it, or places, as I will prefer to apply it to. The brokers 
and boundary objects then become important actors in the learning processes between 
these places. The implications of this is that the learning processes is depending on how 
those involved relates both to the people and how they relates to the machinery or the 
technical artefacts.  
 
The reflective practitioner and learning by doing 
Schön (1983) delivers arguments on the reflective practitioner. In this he challenges 
traditional rationality, which he claims to be a technical rationality. He argues for a 
perspective based on reflection in action. In his outline of these arguments (1983: 49) 
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he argues:  “Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in 
our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing 
is in our action.” The reflections made in action are vital in Schöns argumentation. In 
regard to this, learning is also something that happens in action. But in Schöns 
argumentation the action performed encompasses more than learning, “Phrases like… 
“learning by doing” suggest not only that we can think about doing but that we can 
think about doing something while doing it.”(Schön 1983:54). This is what he calls 
reflection in action, the foundation for his concept “The reflective practitioner”.  
 
Based on this foundation Schön claims that acquiring professional knowledge and skills 
can best be done by working with a skilled person. In this situation you learn when you 
work with the skilled person as you both work and reflect on what you are doing at the 
same time. This links the learning process to the place in which the learning is taking 
place. The place is where the skilled person is doing his job. Together with Argyris, 
Schön has taken ”reflection on action” a step further with their single- and double- loop 
learning. This will be elaborated further in the next section. 
 
Single- and double-loop learning 
Argyris and Schön (1996) have distinguished two learning typologies; single- and 
double-loop learning. In their definition of single loop learning Argyris and Schön 
(1996:20) explain as follows: “By single loop learning we mean instrumental learning 
that changes strategies of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways that 
leave the values of a theory of action unchanged”. An example of this is that an oven is 
set to have an exact temperature, and when this oven is measured there is a discrepancy. 
The temperature is then adjusted to what it is suppose to be. To avoid further 
discrepancy in the temperature in the future, the inspection routines are considered, 
possibly resulting in more frequent inspections of this temperature. The theoretical 
basis for the action is left unchanged, even though the temperature is adjusted when it is 
not in accordance with the instructions. This situation then is an example on a single 
loop learning episode. 
 
Double loop learning is according to Argyris and Schön (1996:21) defined this way: 
“By double loop learning, we mean learning that results in a change in the values of 
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theory-in-use, as well as in its strategies and assumptions. The double loop refers to the 
two feedback loops that connect the observed effects of action with strategies and 
values served by strategies. Strategies and assumptions may change concurrently with, 
or as a consequence of, change in values.” Returning to the temperature example, a 
learning process including a double loop would turn out in a different way. Instead of 
changing the routines through more frequent control of the temperature, the 
organisation might have to reconsider their methods and look for other possible ways of 
improving this situation. Such improvement might result in a change in the fundamental 
values of the theory-in-use and in its strategies and assumptions. This change in 
fundamental values and the new way of doing things represents the second loop in the 
learning process. 
 
The theory of single- and double-loop learning is that the single loop, more or less, 
represents learning at first glance. By reacting to the visible and what at first glance 
seems evident, and then taking action from this is an example of single loop learning. 
The double loop demands a more critical view on the whole situation and raises 
questions of more fundamental character. The intention with these questions is to find 
new solutions that go beyond the actual solving of the problem. By the second loop the 
foundation that the situation relies on is brought into a critical light, and its validity is 
questioned, possibly resulting in changes to both fundamental values and strategy.  
 
 
5.2 The creation of knowledge 
 
One way to understand the kind of transfer process studied here is that there is crucial 
knowledge linked to technology, which has to be shared with the new organisation or, 
in Wengers (1998) words, community. The way the sender and receiver create this 
knowledge in common is one way of understanding this transfer. Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) present a model of knowledge creation. The main assumption for their model is 
that knowledge is created in the interaction between tacit (Polanyi 1966) and explicit 
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) define this process 
as consisting of four main processes; socialisation, externalisation, combination and 
internalisation (figure 5.2). In different ways these processes contribute to knowledge 
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creation on the borderline between what is recognised to be tacit and explicit 
knowledge. 
 
To Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge 
 
 
Socialisation: from tacit to tacit. 
Socialisation is in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s terms based on acquiring tacit knowledge 
from each other by observation, imitation, and practice – not necessarily with language. 
An example of this is how apprentices learn their craftsmanship from their masters. A 
central element in this is that individuals can acquire knowledge from other individuals 
without the use of language. Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) puts it this way:  
“ Socialisation is a process of sharing experiences and thereby creating tacit 
knowledge such as shared mental models and technical skills” 
The sharing of experiences is a key issue in their theory. They are strongly influenced 
by the German philosopher Gadamer’s (1989) concept of fusion of horizons. In short, 
this concept argues that true understanding is a “fusion” of two people’s interpretation 
of a situation or an object. When two persons share the same understanding of a 
situation or an object their mental models amalgamate. Sharing of experiences and 
understanding is important for the transfer of knowledge. Knowledge is often 
associated with specific emotions and contexts, and disconnected from these settings 
specific knowledge may make little sense. By being in a place with people who have 
Internalisation 
Tacit 
Knowledge Socialisation Externalisation 
From 
Explicit 
Knowledge Combination 
Figure 5.2 Four modes of knowledge conversion (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995:62) 
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knowledge in certain situations, and where their knowledge becomes visible through 
actions, tacit knowledge is learned and transferred. This means that the location of the 
learning situation is also of importance in order to acquire tacit knowledge. To be in a 
place where knowledge is experienced through shared mental models in action becomes 
important in this context. 
 
Externalisation: From Tacit to Explicit. 
The next step in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model of knowledge creation is what they call 
externalisation. In their terms, externalisation is the process of taking knowledge from a 
tacit condition and make it explicit.  This happens when the tacit knowledge becomes 
explicit by being turned into metaphors, analogies, concepts, hypotheses or models. In 
this process language is an important factor. This is all about expressing and 
conceptualising the tacit knowledge into images that make sense in interaction with 
others. Regardless of whether the language is spoken or written, it is a medium that is 
useful and important in the process of making knowledge explicit. Even though 
expressions through language may not be precise and adequate enough; they will either 
way help promote and trigger reflections and aimed interaction between individuals. 
Through this process of reflection and aimed interaction new metaphors will be tested 
and either rejected or accepted. The language then becomes a highly sophisticated and 
important tool in this process of creating shared mental models for making tacit 
knowledge explicit.  
 
Externalisation presupposes that the tacit knowledge is expressible, and Nisbet (1969:5 
quoted in Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) argues; ”much of what Michael Polanyi has called 
tacit knowledge is expressible – in so far as it is expressible at all – in metaphor”.  It 
can surely be discussed to what extent tacit knowledge is expressible, but still: 
metaphors, analogies and models can be argued to be important tools in the process of 
making tacit knowledge explicit. It is definitively important in the process of creating 
reasonable expressions that make sense between people. These expressions become 
meaningful in the interaction between individuals. This relational aspect is, in my 
opinion, important. 
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Combination: From explicit to explicit. 
What Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) call combination is probably the most common way 
of perceiving knowledge creation. This is a process of systemising knowledge into 
understandable concepts: by exchanging and combining different kinds of knowledge, 
individuals with varied experiences create new knowledge Combination is mostly 
carried out through media such as documents, meetings, telephone conversations, or via 
computerised communication networks. This process is the one we most commonly 
associate with learning situations in schools and universities. When one type of explicit 
knowledge is combined with other types of explicit knowledge, new knowledge is 
created. When individuals from different levels or departments in the same company 
share their different knowledge, combination is likely to occur, and new knowledge can 
be created as a result. As this type of knowledge creation is a well established practice, 
it is a common way of defining what knowledge creation is. As we know, however, 
there are many different possibilities when the creation of knowledge is concerned.  
 
Internalisation: From Explicit to Tacit 
Internalisation characterises the process where explicit knowledge becomes tacit. This 
takes place when the knowledge goes from being explicit to becoming embodied. 
Internalisation is closely connected to a notion like “learning by doing” (Schön 1983), 
and can thus be understood as what happens when an action or an act is learned and 
become part of a persons own register. By this I understand internalisation to be 
essentially about the process of making knowledge personal. When explicit knowledge 
becomes tacit, it is helpful to support this process by verbalising the knowledge or 
documenting it in other ways. By documenting it , the internalisation of knowledge will 
be eased; additionally, this documentation is useful in spreading explicit knowledge to 
other people in the organisation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). In the way I interpret 
internalisation, however, I find it more related to a personal register and embodied 
knowledge. In this perspective documenting this tacit knowledge is rather problematic. 
In my opinion the knowledge creation has then turned further to what has been 
addressed as the externalisation process at this point. This means that the process has 
continued through the model of knowledge creation, and subsequently gone directly 
from internalisation to externalisation. This may prove problematic for this model, or 
could at least be a possible point for criticism. This will be further discussed below. 
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The knowledge spiral 
The knowledge creation model gives a good introduction and basis for understanding 
how knowledge is created. The four steps are important and are presented in an 
understandable way. Socialisation, externalisation, combination, and internalisation 
make sense in the attempt to understand the creation of knowledge. To make this model 
more operational, Nonaka & Takeuchi introduce the knowledge spiral. The knowledge 
spiral is an attempt to show the interaction between the four modes, and introduces time 
as a new dimension (place as location is an implicit dimension of the model). The 
model could be read in the following way: it starts with socialisation, also referred to 
“as building a field of interaction” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995:70-71); then the process 
moves on to the externalisation mode where dialogue or collective reflections are 
important features. The third mode is a combination where existing knowledge is 
combined into new knowledge and understanding. Finally the internalisation mode 
represents a mode where the knowledge is acknowledged and internalised by the 
individuals.  
 
This step for step presentation of the four modes of knowledge conversion is too 
sequential and  not sufficiently interactive. The knowledge spiral is an attempt to show 
how the four modes interact together, but, in my opinion, this attempt ends with making 
the model more sequential rather than interactive. Maybe my interpretation of this is 
too negative in relation to their intention, but I do not find Nonaka & Takeuchi clear 
enough on this subject to rule out other interpretations. Knowledge conversion can take 
the form of socialisation through externalisation and combination to internalisation, but 
it does not have to take this form, and most likely it does not take this form. Nonaka 
and Takeuchi’s (1995) presents a theoretical model, with a questionable empirical 
support. It is hard to realise how their empirical presentation support this knowledge 
spiral. An unstructured interaction between these four modes is more likely to be a 
valid explanation and model of knowledge creation and conversion than a linear and 
sequential presentation. I will come back to this issue in chapter 6 where I discuss the 
interactive innovation model (see also chapter 3). 
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Figure 5.3 The knowledge spiral (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995:71) 
 
 
5.3 My perspective on learning 
 
Artefacts and individuals are important in the learning process. At the same time, 
learning must be seen as part of a context; in Wengers (1998) terms it has to be related 
to a community of practitioners. This community of practitioners can be viewed as 
representatives of place; learning is place bound through its representatives. Through 
my presentation of learning theories I have argued that the practitioners are important in 
a learning perspective. Schön’s (1983) book “Reflective Practitioner” presents the core 
argument and gives the operators in my case study a central role in the learning process. 
It is also, in my point of view, necessary to give everyone with hands-on experience an 
important role in the learning process. Both Schön and Wenger represent a direction 
that argues for participation as a core value in the learning process.  
 
In relying on Argyris and Schön (1996) I have extend my learning perspective through 
their argumentation of single- and double loop learning. This argumentation implies 
organisational learning as an important aspect of the learning perspective. This 
perspective is also helpful in the attempt to understand learning in an extended 
perspective, where fundamental aspects of the context are challenged in the learning 
process. The double loop might challenge the context of the learning situation. For my 
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purpose these perspectives are highly relevant. In addition, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
(1995) model on different perspectives of knowledge creation is important. The 
interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge is of great importance in transfer 
processes where both tacit and explicit knowledge is at stake.  
 
My interpretation of Wenger (1998), Schön (1983), and Agyris & Schön (1996) has 
provided me with a backdrop for understanding learning. Their ideas are essential to 
how I approach the concept of learning. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) are also 
fundamental to how I approach learning, because they represent a concretisation of 
what is actually going on in the learning processes through their model of how 
knowledge is created, even though I am critical to their empirical support.  
 
Operators and people with hands-on knowledge are important actors in the process of 
learning, both in terms of tacit and explicit knowledge. In this connection it must be 
emphasised that participation is important in the learning process, in example through 
learning by doing. Learning has to be viewed as a social process, taking place between 
individuals that represent places. Learning is the fundamental process where places 
meet, challenge and develop each other. 
 
On the theoretical foundation I have thus far presented, I will attempt to create an 
analysis that can help me answer the research questions I outlined in chapter 1. To do 
so this chapter has raised certain issues that will be important for me to shed light on 
the analysis.  
 
Firstly, I will question how learning is perceived in this process of technology and 
knowledge transfer, and, secondly, how this is carried out in practical work?  
 
This research question will be answered in chapter 12. In my search for answers to 
these questions I will focus on what has been the intended way of creating learning 
processes, as well as on what has been the real learning processes taking place in the 
project. By comparing this result with the theoretical perspectives presented in this 
chapter I will try to articulate answers to how this learning could have been organised 
in an alternative way, and whether or not there are some discrepancies between what is 
theoretically predicted and what is practically carried through. 
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6. What is Technology? 
 
Technology encompasses us all in our everyday lives. From the moment we wake up in 
the morning until we go to bed in the evening, technology is an essential part of our 
activities. It might have been easier to clear up the concept of technology by asking 
‘what is not technology’, an observation that encourages me not to do so, and underline 
the need for clarification. Technology is an important issue in this thesis and also in 
society in general. In the same way as for the concepts of culture and institutions, 
technology is also a slippery term and a difficult concept to get a grip on, the 
interpretative load is considerable. Therefore I find it necessary to discuss this notion 
and then try to understand what we perceive it to consist of and how we understand it, 
in an attempt to end up with a suitable definition.  
 
In this outline I will try to deliver an argumentation about technology as something 
more than just the technical artefacts. Relying on Levin (1997) and MacKenzie & 
Wajcman (1985), I will give an argumentation of technology that also includes 
knowledge. In the following I will try to include skills and attitude as important issues 
as well. I will also discuss briefly the difference between seeing technology as 
determined by technology itself or as a result of social constructions. To understand 
technology it is also important to understand how it is developed. Inspired by Pinch & 
Bijker (1987) and Asheim & Isaksen (1997) I will therefore present two different 
models to give an understanding of the development of technology. Further I will 
introduce Actor Network Theory to get a grip on how to view the actors in such a 
perspective.  This discussion will mostly rely on Latour (1987) and Callon (1987), and 
leads to a discussion of how the transfer of technology can be perceived.  The diffusion 
model will be examined in relation to Latour’s (1987) translation model. To complete 
the discussion of technology, I will end with the introduction of inscription (Latour 
1991) and de-scription (Akrich 1992). By this I hope to give a plausible argumentation 
for the relation between the technical artefacts and the human actors. 
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6.1 Physical artefacts 
 
From one, rather unproblematic viewpoint, technology can be understood as “the 
machines and equipment necessary for transforming raw materials to finished 
products” (Levin 1997:298). This quotation argues for a quite common and, to a certain 
degree, mainstream understanding of the technology notion, namely as physical objects 
or artefacts. But as also Levin, amongst others, points out, such a tangible approach to 
technology has a limited interest and is most likely an oversimplification of the reality. 
If this approach is a fair conceptualisation, the challenges and problems linked to 
technology are then in fact material problems or problems related to physical things. 
Technology transfer will in this perspective, as Levin points out, be reduced to a 
question of moving things from one place to another. We have to go beyond this 
understanding and into a more complex landscape of seeing technology.  
 
Machines that performs tasks 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, technology might be seen as physical objects that 
perform tasks (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). Dialling a telephone number and 
getting a response on the other end is using technological artefacts to achieve the goal 
of talking to a person over some distance.  Or like Levin (1997) exemplifies, driving a 
car or programming a computer are other ways where humans use technological 
artefacts to achieve goals. This means human actions that use technological artefacts to 
satisfy the various needs. Human activity utilizes technological artefacts to change raw 
material into finished products. This means that it is not relevant to view technology as 
separate from humans and human activity. It is necessary to view these two as tightly 
linked. 
 
Knowledge an important factor 
Out of this perspective a new question arises, and that is how are the material artefacts 
linked to human activities? Both Levin (1997) and MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) 
answer this point by claiming that knowledge is required in the process of utilizing the 
technological artefacts. The technological artefacts and the human actors may be linked 
together, but this demands that the individual actor has the required knowledge to 
operate the artefact. And if the individual doesn’t have the required knowledge, the 
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artefact and the individual are not linked together. To operate one of today’s 
complicated computer based industrial machines, highly skilled workers with the 
required knowledge to operate the machine are needed. Without the required 
knowledge the industrial processes might turn out to be complete chaos, or at least very 
poor results of the process. But this also implies that the skills and the willingness to 
operate the machines are represented. This leads into an understanding that extends the 
notion of knowledge.  
 
The concept of technology 
Both Levin (1997), MacKenzie &Wajcman (1985) and Pinch, Hughes & Bijker (1987) 
agree on an understanding of technology that includes knowledge. I will let Levin 
(1997:299) sum up their common concept: “Technology is the material artefacts, how 
to use the artefacts to reach desired goals, and the knowledge of how to utilize it.”  I 
find this conceptualisation interesting but not satisfying. The reason why I am not 
satisfied with this conceptualisation is that it takes human actions too much for granted. 
Is it so, that a person who is in possession of a technological artefact, an artefact that 
can help him reach the desired goals, and when he also has the knowledge of how to 
use it, will be able to use this artefact? The answer will at best be ‘maybe’. My point is 
that this understanding of technology assumes that everyone that has the relevant 
knowledge also has the same skills and the same attitudes. I find that reasonable to 
doubt. For example, if you have a car, it is not enough to have knowledge about how to 
drive the car, even though it is required. You also need to have the skills to drive the 
car, and you need to have attitudes that are consistent with car driving. It is not enough 
with just the knowledge of how to operate technological artefacts; skills and attitudes 
are just as important. By a little adjustment of the quotation of Levin the conception 
will look more like this summed up; 1) Technology is the material artefacts, 2) how to 
use the artefacts to reach desired goals, and 3) the knowledge, skills and attitudes of 
how to utilize it.   
 
This is a broad but at the same time necessary approach to what studies of technology 
have to be based on. Studies that do not take into account this complexity are in danger 
of simplifying the technology itself and also the context it appears within. Such a 
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simplification will, from my point of view, neither justify the technological artefacts, 
the constructors nor the operators of the technological artefact.  
 
A social construction vs. determinism 
The relation between technology and society can be presented from two different 
standpoints. These standpoints are, on one level, quite extreme, but that 
notwithstanding, they represent two different viewpoints on this issue. The first one is 
in some way technological determinant, and has its basis in the idea that the technology 
follows its own logic and thereby determines its use (Winner 1977). The other 
standpoint can be understood as claiming that it is society and its human actors that 
create and develop the technology and also use it the way they want to achieve their 
desired needs. From my point of view the technology determinant perspective is some 
kind of extreme, it can surely be relevant in some cases, but on a societal  level I find 
the social constructed technology viewpoint more preferable. According to this there 
should be no doubt that technology is tightly knitted to human activity, which shouldn’t 
surprise anyone, after all technology is human made. Technology as a physical artefact 
is not a self-creating and recreating process. I will in this elaboration give a more 
precise argumentation of how technology is socially constructed and constructed in an 
interactive process between different actors and social groups. 
 
 
6.2 How technology is developed 
 
The Linear model 
When defining what technology is about this leads into a discussion of how it is 
developed. I have until now claimed that technology is socially constructed, even 
though I have not been precise on how this is carried out in a broader sense. Trying to 
understand how technology is created is much more about understanding how 
innovation is made.  
 
The innovation literature represents quite an amount, but two main perspectives have 
been dominant. Traditionally, technological innovation and development have been 
understood as a linear process. In this understanding of technological development the 
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process starts with basic research, which leads to applied research, this research finishes 
with technological development, which leads to product development, this product is 
then produced and comes into use. I have deliberately sketched this process rather 
schematically. This understanding is characterized by sequential thinking and an 
impression that it is possible to work out detailed plans for the development of 
technological innovations. This linear model can be visualized as in figure 7.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
Applied 
research 
Techno 
logical 
development 
Product 
development 
Usage Production Basic 
research 
Figur 6.1. A six-stage linear innovation model (Pinch & Bijker 1987:23). 
 
The linear model is often related to the fordistic production forms (Andreasen et al. 
1995) It is, as mentioned, recognized by the sequential approach but also of 
specialization and separation of the different contributors. Research and development 
within firms are separated from the production, and the communication between the 
actors is typically one-way communication. This separation also implies that the firms 
are less involved in the innovation processes. The innovation process is more or less 
driven by the Research and Development institutions, which are not in operative 
contact with the organisation’s production departments to a very large extent. 
 
The non-linear alternative 
An alternative understanding of technological development and innovation is what 
Pinch and Bijker (1987) present as the multidirectional model. Their multidirectional 
model is more or less the same as what is elsewhere called the interactive innovation 
model (Asheim & Isaksen 1997)9. In these models the innovation process is understood 
as a non-linear process. These models have their basis in the criticism of the linear 
process, claiming that the linear model does not give a correct picture of how 
innovations are carried through. Another point in this criticism is that the linear process 
does not take into account interactive learning and the interaction between the different 
                                                 
9 The interactive innovation model is, as I am concerned, a far more used expression than the 
multidirectional model. But their mission and point is, the way I see it, the same. 
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actors in the development process. In the interactive model it is assumed that all 
different departments of the firms take part in the innovation process, and in addition it 
is assumed that the firm also interact with other firms and institutions in this process of 
innovation. Specialized R&D departments cannot carry out continuous improvement 
alone. Cooperation, interactivity and collective actions are important features in this 
interactive innovation model. 
 
Another important aspect of this model is that it includes both the social and technical 
aspects of the process. This is a profound challenge in technology studies according to 
Pinch and Bijker (1987), namely the need for a way of studying technology that focuses 
on, and takes technology seriously. Like Layton (1977: 198, quoted in Pinch and Bijker 
1987:21-22) argues:  
 
“What is needed is an understanding of technology from inside, both as a body of 
knowledge and as a social system. Instead technology is often treated as a “black box” 
whose contents and behavior may be assumed to be common knowledge.” 
 
Both Pinch and Bijker’s (1987) presentation and the interactive innovation model take 
these arguments into account. Pinch and Bijker focus on the social groups that 
contribute to the technological innovation. The social group is defined as the group of 
people working with the technological artefact. The social group decides which 
problems are relevant and which are not, and in this way they also define and constitute 
meaning into and of the artefact.  
 
 “A problem is defined as such only when there is a social group for which it 
constitutes a “problem”” (Pinch & Bijker 1987:30).  
 
In the interactive innovation model one crucial aspect is, as mentioned, that there are 
most likely several different social groups interacting, and in that way  defining in 
common what are problems and not. These social processes involved in the 
development and the problem definition of the technology, constitutes one of the most 
crucial points of the interactive innovation model, namely the interaction between 
social aspects (and within and between social groups) and the technological aspects. 
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6.3 Transfer process 
 
One central aspect when studying technology transfer is to define a transfer process. In 
this thesis I will try to work out a way of how we can understand the transfer process of 
technology. As a geographer, one of the most striking terms that come to mind is 
diffusion. In recent years other concepts or notions have also been discussed. In her 
presentation of these approaches Aslaksen (1999) distinguishes between transfer and 
diffusion. According to her, diffusion should be understood as one mode of technology 
transfer. The spread of a generic product to thousands of different consumers with the 
same purpose in mind, for example coca-cola where the purpose is to drink it, is such a 
mode. Transfer in contrast involves more complicated processes than just the spread of 
the product. According to Aslaksen the transfer concept is often related to disciplines 
such as economics, business management and engineering. It is more likely to involve 
transformation of products or tools.  
 
Diffusion theory 
I am not quite satisfied by letting the notion of diffusion go so easy. The traditional way 
of understanding the spread of ideas has been based on the diffusion model (Rogers 
1962). In human geography there is a long tradition for understanding the spread of a 
phenomenon as diffusion (Johnston et al. 2000). Johnston refers to Sauer (1941) who 
argues that the understanding of diffusion through cultural traits can be traced back to 
Ratzel. Sauer argued that the specific contribution of geography was to create a 
reconstruction of how diffusion is affected by different physical barriers and the 
evaluation of these pathways. Many of these perspectives reappeared in Hägerstrand’s 
“Innovation of diffusion” (1968). In this contribution diffusion is argued to be a spatial 
process. Within this model the information is spread and circulates through a regional 
system. Within this regional system there is resistance consisting of both physical 
barriers and individual resistance. It is assumed that this resistance is crucial in 
checking the transformation from information to innovation. The innovation that 
survives the resistance is then spread through diffusion waves (Gregory 1985). Latour 
(1987) also talks about a diffusion model, but without explicitly referring to the 
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diffusion theory and these authors. However I find these models similar to those Latour 
presents, and therefore I find his critique adequate for my purpose.  
 
When Latour presents the diffusion model, he is concerned about what he addresses as 
its strange characteristics. His first concern is that in the diffusion model it seems like 
the people too “easily agree to transmit the object, it is the object itself that forces them 
to assent.” (Latour 1987:133). The people’s behaviour seems to be a result of the 
diffusion of the object or the fact or the machine, this means that it is the object that 
carries out this action. This must be understood as a more or less technological 
deterministic way of viewing how ideas or physical objects are spread.  
 
This is related to his second concern, namely what is it that carries out the ideas and 
objects when they do not depend on the behaviour of people? Latour claims that the 
inventors of ideas and objects get a too central position in the diffusion model, a 
position that is problematic because it does not reflect in a proper way upon what it is 
then that carries out the ideas or objects. In the diffusion model the idea or the object is 
filled with energy by its inventor and then thrown out into society. Society and its 
inhabitants in this model represent resistance. So the spread in the diffusion model is a 
function of the energy it is given by its inventor and the resistance it meets in society. 
In Latour’s critique of the diffusion model he also presents an alternative: the 
translation model. 
 
Translation model 
In opposition to the diffusion model, the translation model in Latour’s (1987) 
perspective takes the people and society into account. Where the diffusion model sees 
the society and people as resistance, the translation model sees them as crucial 
contributors to the spread of the idea and the object. The object is in this way of 
thinking not given a starting energy from the inventor, but the people who are presented 
to the idea or the object and then find the idea or object interesting or relevant, carry it 
out. Then they present the idea for others who on their own evaluate the idea and either 
reject or accept it. If they accept, they might contribute to the further spread of it to 
others. The point is that in this perspective the people and society are not seen as 
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resistance, but they are in fact those who transmit the idea or object to others after 
having evaluated it.  
 
The idea or object is in this way, in the literal sense of the word, carried out in society. 
What happens in this process can be described by looking at some of Latour’s other 
terms. He claims that the idea’s way through different groups and people is 
characterized by transformation (Latour 1987). In addition to these translations there 
also takes place an interpretation of the ideas at each level (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 
1995). The ideas go through continuous negotiations (Latour 1987), which influence 
the extent of the spread. Different groups with different interests try to attend and claim 
the importance of their interests in the new situation that occurs when a new idea is 
presented (Brunsson and Olsen 1993).  
 
Actor Network Theory 
The Actor Network Theory (ANT) has in recent years become an important perspective 
that takes both the technical and social aspects into account when studying technology. 
When Callon (1987:93) introduces the term, he defines the actor network to be 
reducible to neither “an actor alone nor to a network”. Like other networks ANTs 
consist of both animate and inanimate actors and series of heterogeneous elements that 
are linked together over a certain period of time. In this way the actors of ANT can be 
distinguished from the traditional actors of sociology that excludes non-human actors as 
contributors and important features of networks. Even though an actor network is not a 
well-defined predictable and stable network. An actor network links both natural and 
social elements, and the actors can at any time redefine their identity and mutual 
relationship. In that way the actor network is able to bring in new elements to the 
network (Callon 1987). ANT is a way of trying to cope with both the social and 
technical aspects of society. It is in a way an attempt to be “ a more direct and less 
laborious way to write the strong programme” (Latour 1988:23).  
 
Latour (1987) point at the importance of building strong networks, and at the same time 
being able to build the networks in such a way that the actors choose to stay in the 
network. The building of networks is characterised as enrolling the network (Knutstad 
1998). What is important in the process of enrolling the network is to create legitimacy 
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and common understanding of reality. This might be seen as constructing a common 
reality and a basis of facts that the network agrees upon. By constructing a common 
basis of facts or understandings the network is strengthen. 
 
Inscriptions 
One of the central notions within ANT is inscription. This refers to the different 
meanings linked to and attached within technical objects. Technical objects embody 
meaning, and a “set of relations between heterogeneous elements” (Akrich 1992: 205). 
This means that technical elements are constructed by the innovator or the constructor, 
with the basis in the constructor’s understanding of the world and with his 
interpretation of how the technical object are supposed to be operated by the operators. 
This means that what gives meaning to the constructor, even though this can indeed be 
an unconscious process, will be inscribed in the technical object. These can be very 
advanced statements of high importance to the operator, statements that require a huge 
amount of knowledge and experience. But also fairly simple statements, like Latour 
(1991) shows in his story of the hotel keys and their rather heavy attachment. A heavy 
attachment that reminds, or gives a signal to the guest that it might be smart to leave the 
key at the hotel desk.  
 
But as mentioned, these inscriptions might also be of a much more advanced level. 
When Akrich (1992:208) argues: “A large part of the work of innovators is that of 
“inscribing” this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the technical content of 
the new object”. The way I read Akrich is that she assumes the innovator to be fully 
conscious and that his action is intended. When the innovator inscribes the product, it is 
an intended act where his interpretation of the world is related to the product. I doubt an 
understanding of inscriptions as results of intended and fully consciousness acts. First 
of all I think inscriptions can be the result of an unintended action of the innovator. 
Second, in operation of advanced industrial machinery, with very complex relations 
between the machines and very different causal connections between the different 
machines and the results, these inscriptions might be very hard to see to an untrained 
eye or inexperienced operator. This means that the machinery itself can inscribe 
messages or sign into the product. These might be inscriptions that are not intended by 
the innovator.  
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De-scriptions  
Akrich (1992) introduces the term de-scription in her outline of how technology users 
can be able to use new technology or not. What she is pointing at is the negotiation 
between the innovator and the end-user of the technology. In this process the 
inscriptions in the technology are continuously translated and negotiated between the 
central actants, in this case the innovator and the end-user. This process is what she 
addresses as the de-scription. I find this terminology useful and interesting. But I will 
also address a question to this use of the term ‘script’ including both inscription and de-
scription. To me these terms are both very explicit, the innovator can quite easily give 
the script which I interpret to be quite obvious based on for instance the empirical 
studies of Akrich. In these studies the technical elements at stake are the technology 
transfer of a photoelectric lightning kit and generators. These examples are far less 
complicated than the technology and production line that are at stake in my empirical 
studies. What is inscribed in the technology, based on Akrich’s empirical examples, 
seems quite easy to de-scribe, this process seem more or less to be possible to solve by 
handing over a piece of paper with instructions.  
 
I think this is a too easy way of understanding this process. In my point of view the 
inscription and de-scription involve much more than the spoken words and the 
visualized artefacts. It is necessary to include terms like encoding and decoding in this 
process. The more advanced the technology is, the more tacit knowledge and cultural 
meaning will be present and encoded in the technology. These signals or signs in the 
technological artefact are most likely not inscribed by the innovator in a conscious 
action. Most likely a lot of the signs and signals in the artefact are put there 
unconsciously by the innovator or even by the technology itself. My point is that there 
must be room for understanding the inscribing process and the de-scription process in a 
more advanced way than how the empirical examples of Akrich suggest. To get a step 
further from inscriptions and de-scriptions, maybe encoding and decoding are more 
fruitful ways of understanding this process, and to capture the tacit dimensions and the 
unconscious signs of the innovator. 
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6.4 My perspective on technology  
 
In this chapter I have defined technology to be something more than just the technical 
artefacts. Relying on Levin (1997), MacKenzie & Wajcman (1985) and Pinch, Hughes 
&Bijker (1987) I define technology to include knowledge of the technical artefact. In 
addition to this I claim that skills and attitudes to utilise the knowledge and the 
technical artefacts also must be included in such a conception. I end the first section of 
this discussion by claiming that I consider my perspective and foundation to rely on a 
social constructive perspective in opposition to what can be seen as a technological 
deterministic perspective.  
 
Further, I have discussed how technology is developed. This is done by presenting the 
linear model and the interactive model, relying on Pinch & Bijker (1987) and Asheim 
& Isaksen (1997). Technology development must be seen as an interactive process 
between a pluralistic set of actors. In the extension of this discussion I present Actor 
Network Theory to get a grip on the actors and how they operate and how they can be 
perceived. In this discussion, relying on Latour (1987) and Callon (1987), I introduce 
the discussion of how transfer should be understood. I conclude that transfer should 
mainly be understood as a process of translation rather than diffusion. I end this ANT 
discussion by pointing to the relation between the human actors and the technical 
actants by introducing the concepts of inscriptions (Latour 1991) and de-scriptions 
(Akrich 1992). I also try to suggest that this should be taken a bit further by introducing 
encoding and decoding as potential relevant and more precise concepts in this 
discussion.  
 
In this chapter the technical artefacts is linked with human activities and defined 
technology to also include skills, knowledge and attitudes. By using Actor Network 
Theory I have tried to make the enrolment of both the technical actants and the human 
actors as equally important. To establish a new plant at a new location might be seen as 
establishing or enrolling a new actor network.  Several questions arise out of these 
arguments. The most important of these are: 
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To what degree are the enrolment of the actors and the actants seen as equally 
important in this technology transfer? And whether they are treated differently or 
not, why is it so?  
 
These questions will be analysed and answered in chapter 13. In that analysis I hope to 
be able to contribute to an important understanding of central aspects of the dynamics 
of technology transfer. Based on the theoretical approach I have presented here, it is 
important to find answers regarding the relations between the technical actants and the 
human actors in such a process. 
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7. Method 
 
7.1 Methodology 
 
Methodology is about the tools and the procedures that science uses to achieve 
knowledge. Reflections of how to achieve this knowledge are of course also a 
methodological issue. This means that methodology encompass a critical evaluation of 
which tools and procedures should be utilized in a particular research project. And this 
is also an important issue; different research projects demands different methodological 
approaches. The main divide in methodology is set between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. These two sets of approaches can be seen as two extremities of a scale 
(Grønmo 1982). Between these two we find a spectrum of different methodologies that 
have more or less quantitative and qualitative aspects within them. The quantitative and 
qualitative approaches are often seen as opposing each other, but they should rather be 
seen as complementary. Situations seldom occur where one of these approaches could 
have replaced the other (Grønmo 1982). Which one you chose is dependent on what 
kind of research question is at stake and what kind of study this should result in. If you, 
as a researcher, are searching for new knowledge, that might be diffuse and not very 
explicit, a qualitative approach is often preferable. This will enable you to develop new 
concepts and understanding of the field through interaction with those involved. 
 
Acquiring data 
Even if the data is based on a qualitative or a quantitative approach it is important to 
give an account of how the data is collected, or as I would like to put it: how the data is 
acquired. I do not like the term ‘collect data’ although it is quite common. From my 
point of view collecting things gives too strong an association to picking up things, like 
for instance blueberries. When you pick blueberries, the only active actor is yourself; 
the blueberries are just passive victims of our actions. Collection of something implies 
that one of the parts is passive and the other is active, and for me this seems rather 
strange. The way I experience what I have done during this work is that I have acquired 
data. The people I have been working with have been very active and not passive at all. 
I have not picked or collected anything from them, but I have conversed with them in 
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interaction with them. In these conversations I have acquired information that I have 
turned into data by interpreting the information.  
 
In the following I will elaborate how I have acquired the data that this thesis rests upon. 
I will start with my own background situation, or more specific the professional context 
I have been working within. This includes presenting some projects I have been 
working on during this study. These are projects that have been directly relevant for and 
a part of my study. Thereafter I will present the more traditional aspects of the 
fieldwork that have been carried out. This includes a presentation of the selection of 
respondents and the interviews. In a figure 8.1 I will document the time spent at the 
sites at Raufoss and Montreal. Then I will present some theoretical and empirical 
considerations on this study. I will end this chapter by discussing the quality of the data 
achieved and then conclude on the trustworthiness of this study. 
 
 
7.2 The organisational context of the PhD work 
 
Raufoss ASA has, since the autumn of 1997, been one of the core industrial members 
of the research programme, Productivity 2005 (P2005). This research programme is 
divided into three main projects, and my work has been done within the project 
“Extended Enterprises”. Both my Master’s thesis and this work have been carried out in 
this organisational context. The fact that Raufoss is one of the core industrial members 
in the project I am hired within has of course several advantages. One of the advantages 
is trust. The arena the “Extended Enterprise” represents has been useful in creating a 
good relationship with the firm’s representatives in the project and has also given me 
good knowledge of the firm. This has been very useful in my further introductions in 
the firm. The cooperation with Raufoss in P2005 has resulted in considerable 
information for my case. 
 
My first meeting with representatives from Raufoss took place at Raufoss back in 1997. 
In the summer of 1999 I finished my Master’s thesis with the title “From the Raufoss 
Ammunition Factory to Raufoss Industrial Area; An institutional approach to industrial 
development and a reorganisation process” (Nilsen 1999: My translation). This 
Master’s thesis was, as the title suggests, about the Raufoss Industrial Area and was 
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done in close cooperation with different firms at the Raufoss Industrial Area, among 
them Raufoss ASA. The Master’s thesis constitutes a foundation for my understanding 
of this industrial milieu in general and especially of Raufoss ASA. This background has 
been important in my further work in this field. My relationship with Raufoss has lasted 
for seven years, and I know the company fairly well. Due to the relationship that has 
lasted for some time, I feel that I am a trustworthy person from Raufoss’ perspective. 
This has of course eased my work with this thesis. To do such research in cooperation 
with the industry, trust is of high importance for the quality of the data material that you 
achieve.  
 
Developing seminars and lectures 
In addition to my connection to the Extended Enterprise-project, I have office space at 
Dragvoll Gård10, where researchers from Extended Enterprise and other similar projects 
have been co-located. As a result of being part of the interdisciplinary research 
community at Dragvoll Gård several interesting opportunities showed up. One such 
opportunity was given by the “Corporate University”11 who financed a project where 
the objective was to develop competence-giving courses for the industry. Raufoss ASA 
was willing to function as a laboratory for us in this project, and both Raufoss and I saw 
an interesting link between this project and the PhD work I was doing. The theoretical 
framework which at that time was the basis of my work became the central element of 
this course.  
 
From January to August 2002 a colleague and I worked on a series of seminars, and 
they were developed in close cooperation with the Global Organisation Management 1 
and the Canadian Management during this period (see chapter 9). In August 2002 we 
arranged two seminars in Montreal, which more or less became the kick-off seminars 
for the Canadian organisation, Raufoss Automotive Components Canada (RACC). Both 
the Canadians that were hired at that time, the Norwegian Ex-Pat Team and the Global 
Management 1 participated at these seminars. The first seminar was held in an 
outstanding environment in the boardroom of The Société Générale de Financement du 
                                                 
10 Dragvoll Gård is a separate building located 300 meters from the main campus at Dragvoll. 
11 “The Corporate University” was established by four big Norwegian education and research 
institutions. It was established in 2002 and the aim was to create courses for professionals and 
businesses. The goal was to become a commercial deliverer of such courses. This was not a success and 
the Corporate University was shut down in 2003. 
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Québec (SGF) (see chapter 9) in one of Montreal’s skyscrapers. This set a special 
standard for the start-up activities at RACC. The day consisted of a few lectures by my 
colleague and me but mostly the participants took part in teamwork that we facilitated. 
The professional aspects for this day were a rather broad passage in how technology 
transfer can be viewed. We talked about culture, about the role of place in a global 
setting, communication and how knowledge is developed. The participants were 
divided into groups and given tasks to solve in common.  The day ended with a dinner 
for all the participants in a good restaurant in the old part of Montreal.  
 
The next seminar was held outside downtown Montreal at Radisson Hotel Laval. If the 
first seminar was mainly to get to know each other, this seminar had more and better 
discussions, and the participants started to go into depth of central issues concerning the 
transfer of technology.  Some concrete results came out of this seminar that I will come 
back to in chapter 11. What is important to mention here is that the results of the 
teamwork, at both the seminars, was archived by me, and is used as part of the data 
material that this thesis is based upon. In summary, this material covers about 40 day’s 
work, there were 20 participants present at each seminar.  
 
We got very good feedback from these seminars. Two of the higher-ranking people at 
place in these seminars called the Executive Vice President of Raufoss in Norway and 
gave their honour to those who had contributed to this. We were very optimistic about 
the seminars to come. But in September when the next seminar was supposed to start, it 
had to be postponed. After several delays Raufoss had to withdraw from the contract 
because the workload of RACC was becoming too much. Their milestones were getting 
closer and they had to prioritise them12. At that time this was a bit surprising for us.  
 
 
                                                 
12 The manager for Global Organisation 1 resigned  after these seminars in Montreal. He was more or 
less the Raufoss project owner and that was most likely one of the reasons why the project ended this 
way. 
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The Global Sourcing project 
In the spring of 2003 my colleague and I were hired by Raufoss Technology13 to 
contribute in their development of a new Global sourcing strategy for the plants in both 
Norway and  Canada. During the spring we negotiated what the objectives should be 
for this work. And this gave me the possibility to combine data achievement for this 
global sourcing project and data achievement for this thesis. Another important issue is 
that the knowledge I had at that time and the data already achieved, corresponded to a 
large extent with the purpose of the Global Sourcing project, so in those terms it was a 
fruitful combination.  
 
Several interviews were completed in Montreal the following June. This project was 
mostly carried out in cooperation with the Norwegian and Canadian purchasing 
department, the management of Global organisation 2 and the Canadian Management. 
During this process we also carried through 6 interviews at Raufoss. The project was 
completed in December 2003 when the report was delivered to Raufoss Technology. 
 
 
7.3 Fieldwork 
 
Selection of respondents 
Reading other theses and research material there is often a description of how the first 
meeting took place and what expectations the researcher had for the people he or she 
should meet from the industry. This is not very relevant for me, for the obvious reason 
that my relationship with Raufoss was already established when this project started. I 
knew the dress code and I knew the key people. This is, the way I see it, an advantage. I 
could pick out my respondents myself. I knew who it was important to talk to at which 
point, and I also had knowledge of who it was strategically important to refer to when I 
introduced myself to new people. This is definitively an important advantage when you 
study industrial businesses. You have to know who is “in” and who is “out”, and if 
possible know it before everybody else knows it. This is important in getting access to 
information at an early stage as possible. When you do research in an organisation 
                                                 
13 Raufoss Technology was a result of a reorganisation process in Raufoss ASA. The management in 
Raufoss Technology was similar to the Top Management 2. So Raufoss Technology was more or less the 
official name of the Global Organisation 2. For further presentation of these units see chapter 9. 
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based on who the switchboard operator puts you in contact with, you run a risk of 
getting in touch with people who are either not important or do not have the knowledge 
that is important. Or you get in touch with people that nobody else wants to talk to, 
because they often have a very open schedule. Based on this reflection I will claim that 
to have good knowledge of the organisation at stake is important both for efficiency 
reasons, but also to ensure a strategical well-founded selection of respondents where 
you as a researcher are in full control of the selection.  
 
This last point is very important in my opinion, because by knowing the selection you 
also ensure a selection that is not picked for any other reasons than to contribute to your 
research. If you let others decide who to interview, you always run a risk of that they 
have their own interests in picking these respondents for you. They may agree too much 
in one direction or another. 
 
The interviews 
As already mentioned, I have partly based this study on interviews. These interviews 
have been done mostly by me and with only one respondent present. When there has 
been only me and a respondent present, I have used a tape-recorder. But several 
interviews have been carried out as preparations to the two projects mentioned, The 
Global Sourcing and the development of courses, as well, and when that has been the 
case, we have mostly been two researchers present. On these occasions we have not 
used a tape-recorder. No respondents have refused the use of tape-recorder and no 
respondents have refused to be interviewed.  
 
I have carried out 65 interviews in total during this project. 47 of the interviews have 
been with personnel directly involved in the project. The remaining 18 interviews have 
been with persons with either good knowledge to the automotive business or experience 
with technology transfer projects or with good knowledge of both Canadian and 
Norwegian businesses. I have mostly used an interview guide, but I have tried to make 
the interviews to become conversations where I have relied on this guide, rather than 
following the guide from point to point.  
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One issue concerning the interviews has been that of language. Not all of those I 
interviewed spoke English very well. On one occasion I had to bring the interview to an 
end rather quickly because it was more or less impossible to understand what the 
respondent was trying to tell me. I tried hard, but unfortunately I had to give up. 
Language problems were also the case at some stages where I walked around at the 
plant in Montreal small talking with the operators. But in general these small 
conversations were a valuable information source for me. They had an important role in 
putting things in a down to earth perspective, when my reflections were going in a too-
theoretical direction. But on some occasions when there were language problems, 
someone who was a native English speaker helped translate.  
 
The extent of the interviews has, as indicated varied a lot. The one that I had to 
terminate because of the language issue stretched over about 20 minutes, but the most 
extensive interviews lasted for over two hours. Most of the interviews lasted for one to 
one and a half hour.  
 
In addition to the interviews and the conversations with the operators I have got a lot of 
important information in other settings. As already mentioned I got a huge amount of 
important and well-founded information at the seminars. But it is also worth 
mentioning that I have achieved a huge amount of information by walking around at the 
plants in both Norway and Montreal. This includes walking around on the shop floor 
but also at the office departments. In addition to this I have got information from 
studying documents about the plans for the establishment of the plant in Montreal. 
These documents were given to me by Raufoss. 
 
To sum up, the data material has been achieved through working closely with the actors 
in this process. This includes working closely with the actors at Raufoss both in 
Norway and Canada. But in addition to this there have also been a lot of other 
contributors to my understanding of these processes. During my work I have also, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, worked with Fundo Wheels with the aim of contributing to 
their technology transfer from Norway to Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. I stayed in 
Høyanger at Fundo Wheels for about a period of six months. I stayed there irregularly 
for 14 days at each stay during this period. I had a flat at my disposal. But when they 
went into a financial crisis they stopped the plans for establishing an extended 
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production line in Bahrain, and there my project also stopped. Irrespective of the 
project ending, this was a very important experience for me and equipped me with a lot 
of experience and increased my interest in this field. 
 
Sites and dates of the data acquiring 
Listed below are the documented stays I have had concerning this project at Raufoss 
and in Montreal. In total I have visited Raufoss for 39 working days and  my trips to 
Montreal lasted for 26 days. 
 
When  Where What 
 
October 4th and 5th  
2000 
 
 
May 7th 2001 
 
October 10th 2001 
 
October 22nd 2001 
 
November 11th 2001 
 
November 21st- 22nd 
2001 
 
February 11th–13th 
2002 
 
March 20th – 21st 
2002 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
Raufoss 
 
Raufoss 
 
Raufoss 
 
Oslo and 
Raufoss 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
 
 
Project meeting The Extended 
Enterprise 
 
 
Meeting with key personnel 
 
Interviews and fieldwork 
 
Interviews and fieldwork 
 
Seminar and fieldwork 
 
Seminar at the Canadian Embassy and 
interviews/meetings at Raufoss 
 
Interviews/meetings fieldwork  
 
 
Meetings Plant Management Norway, 
Global Organisation 1 and Top 
Management 2 
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April 2nd– 3rd  2002  
 
 
 
 
 
April 10th– 12th 2002 
 
 
April 24th– 25th 2002 
 
 
 
 
May 14th – 15th 2002 
 
 
 
 
July 1st – 2nd 2002 
 
 
August 12th – 13th 
2002 
 
August 13th -25th 
2002 
 
 
August 26th – 28th 
2002 
 
September 10th – 
Oslo and 
Raufoss 
 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Oslo and 
Raufoss 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Raufoss  
 
 
Montreal 
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Raufoss 
Preparations for the seminars and 
meetings with Global Management 1, 
Expat Team, RTIM, Plant 
Management Norway and Top 
Management 
 
Meeting Global Management 1 and 
Canadian Management, and Interviews 
 
Seminar arranged by the Canadian 
Embassy and the Norwegian Foreign 
department, Meeting Global 
Management 1 
 
Preparation for the seminars in 
Montreal, Meeting with Global 
Management 1 and Canadian and 
Norwegian Plant Management 
 
Preparation for the seminars in 
Montreal, Global Management 1 
 
Preparation for the seminars in 
Montreal 
 
Interviews and preparations including 
guide tours at the shop floor, and the 
accomplishment of the seminars  
 
Project meeting The Extended 
Enterprise 
 
Meeting Global Management 1, Top 
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11th 2002 
 
December 16th – 17th 
2002 
 
 
February 25th – 26th 
2003 
 
 
June 12th 
 
 
June 13th - 27th 2003 
 
 
August 27th- 28th 
2003 
 
September 25th 2003 
 
 
 
 
Oslo and 
Raufoss 
 
 
Raufoss  
 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Montreal 
 
 
Raufoss 
 
 
Raufoss 
Management 2 
 
Presentation of results for the 
Department of Research  and meetings 
at Raufoss 
 
Meeting Global Management 1, The 
Canadian Management and Norwegian 
Plant Management 
 
Meeting Global Management 2 and 
Plant Management Norway 
 
Interviews and Meetings, in general 
fieldwork 
 
Meeting the Global Sourcing project, 
The Global Management 2 
 
Meeting the Global Sourcing Project, 
The Global Management 2 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Documented stays at Raufoss and Montreal. 
 
 
7.4 Theoretical and empirical considerations 
 
I use theory to enlighten the phenomena I observed in my cooperation with the 
industry. I have chosen to rely on several theories in my approach to this study, instead 
of relying on only one. For example I could have chosen to do a full Actor Network 
study in detail, by including every tool on the plant floor and every person in his 
interaction with both the tools and the other physical surroundings. To do this in detail 
makes you end up in a rather silly situation in my perspective. In addition you could 
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have ended up in a situation where you are in danger of just becoming a photographer 
and not a researcher. You end up describing what you see is going on, and this complex 
process leaves you without enough resources to analyse what you have been observing. 
Combining different theoretical perspectives gives you the chance to end up with an 
analysis that is more alive and captures more of what is going on, instead of trying to 
isolate what you observe into one theoretical perspective. Such a situation, like the 
example with the ANT perspective, will also very fast lead you into a more quantitative 
analysis and would not be in accordance with my research questions.  
 
What I have chosen to do is to construct a theoretical fundament that is carefully put 
together on basis of the empirical experiences I have achieved during the research and 
the research questions I have developed. The theoretical fundament reflects the 
challenges that are evident in the empirical material. And in this research process the 
analysis of what is found in the empirical study is examined with the theoretical 
fundament in mind, and upon this process analysis are presented and conclusions 
drawn. 
 
My approach has similarity with the type of approach that Alvesson and Sköldberg 
(1994) label abduction. According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) abduction is an 
often-used approach in case studies like my own. It can be seen as a combination of 
deduction and induction. In abduction the case that is observed or experienced is 
interpreted and related to the theory which then is seen in relation to the case. This 
means that this process goes from the empirical observable to a theoretical examination 
and consideration before these findings are presented in relation to the case.  During 
this process the empirical cases at stake are developed one after another, at the same 
time the theoretical framework is adjusted and developed further. According to 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) this approach differs from the deduction and induction 
in the way that it involves understanding to a higher degree, and it is particularly 
relevant in studies that include organisational change (Sköldberg 1991). The abduction 
approach can be illustrated in relation to deduction and induction as showed in the 
model below (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994:45): 
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Empiricism
Theory
Empirical 
regularity
Deduction Induction Abduction
 
Figure 7.1 Deduction, Induction and Abduction (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994:45) 
 
 
Being able to have an interchanging view of the theory and the empirical case has been 
very important for me in the work with this thesis. For example, it was originally not 
the intention to include institutionalism in my theoretical fundament, but as I have 
worked a lot with institutionalism before, I recognised that this was affecting my 
thoughts and reflection in relation to the empirical material. Therefore, I found it 
important to present this theoretical perspective as well. The main argument and 
justification of this is that this perspective to a large extent was affecting which 
empirical material I found interesting. When this happens, it is my duty to elaborate and 
present this perspective, so the readers are able to evaluate what I do and why I do it. 
 
 
7.5 The quality of the data achieved 
 
The presentation of my methodological approach shows that I have had extended 
access to get information and the data material I have required in this study. My seven 
year long relationship with the Raufoss ASA group has also contributed to a deep 
insight into the life of this organisation and also its background and its relation to the 
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local community at Raufoss. Further, this long relationship with the company has also 
resulted in personal relations that have been of great joy and value for me, both 
personally and professionally. Such relations have been very important for me because 
they have enabled me to get confidential information at a very early stage. This has 
meant that I have been able to manoeuvre my way in the organisation on the basis of 
up-to-date background information. This has allowed me to go deeply into the 
organisation’s challenges. I have become more or less a trusted insider in both the 
Raufoss ASA and RACC. To use Goffman’s (1959) terminology of “backstage and 
“frontstage”, I have been allowed to go backstage in the organisations and in this way I 
have been seen as a trustworthy insider. This has not been the case all the time; some 
have just wanted to show me the official stories and challenges (exposed theory see 
next page). When this has happened, I have most often been able to be invited in 
backstage after a while. This has been done after the person has found me to be 
trustworthy. Referring to other experiences I have had backstage or experiences of 
backstage content, have often eased the process of becoming invited backstage by 
people who at first wanted to keep me frontstage. Referring to the right people and 
stories is often important in the process of manoeuvring from frontstage to backstage. 
 
When studying a dynamic process such as this technology transfer, to have access to 
updated information is essential. Just as essential is to have access to up-to-date 
backstage information. If as a researcher you only have access to up-to-date frontstage 
information, you are in danger of becoming a rather silly participant in a mummery you 
do not understand. To get backstage information will also be important to get a grip on 
what is really going on. At a frontstage level you are in danger of studying exposed 
theory rather than real practice (Argyris & Schön 1996). But even if I as a researcher 
have backstage access in the organisation, it might be exposed theory that is expressed 
to me. By examine different sources of information, it is possible to discover 
differences between exposed theory and real practice.  
 
Taken into consideration the time I have spent with the companies and my access to 
backstage information during this process, in addition to the variety of information 
sources I have had access to, the quality of the empirical material must be considered to 
be good. But in addition to state that the data material is good it is also necessary to 
examine the validity or the trustworthiness of this material.  
 99
Technology Transfer 
 
 
7.6 Trustworthiness 
 
To say something about the value of the research it is important to examine the 
empirical material that has been achieved and also to say something about the value of 
the findings the study represents. Lincoln and Guba (1985) have created a set of criteria 
for evaluating the quality of the empirical material achieved. There are four basic 
criteria needed to establish what they call trustworthiness and these are: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. I will in the following go through 
these concepts in relation to what I have done in this study.  
 
Credibility 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) present several different sets of factors to satisfy the criteria 
of credibility. The first argument in their presentation is “Activities increasing the 
probability that credible findings will be produced”. In this relation they present three 
important activities, one of them is prolonged engagement. It is assumed that when the 
researcher has engagement over some time, this will contribute to increase the 
credibility by reducing the gap between the exposed theory and theory in use. When the 
researcher is able to differentiate between exposed theory and theory in use, he/she has 
become able to get under the skin of the organisation and its members. Another activity 
is sustaining observation, in my opinion a factor that must be seen in relation to the 
prolonged engagement. Both these factors have an element of time consumption. In my 
work I have studied the company for a period of seven years and the process of 
technology transfer for about four years.  
 
During this PhD-project I have stayed in Montreal for 26 days. This has been in two 
time periods; one, as mentioned, in August 2002 and the second in June 2003. I have 
also spent 39 days at Raufoss. In addition to these stays at Raufoss and Montreal I have 
been “present” not physically, but through communication on e-mail and through 
telephone. I had numerous telephone conversations with the Canadians to follow up on 
interviews or to gather information in one way or another. This was either done in 
relation to one of the other mentioned projects, or just for the purpose of this thesis. I 
think it is right to conclude that the time spent at these central places in this case is 
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enough, in relation to Lincoln and Gubas (1985) terms of prolonged engagement and 
sustaining observation.  
 
The second argument in Lincoln and Guba’s argumentation is triangulation. By 
triangulation they point at the need for the utilisation of several different methods, 
sources and theories to strengthen the findings in the material. In this chapter I have 
described the way the empirical material was achieved. From this description it is quite 
obvious that the empirical scope is founded on sufficient diversity, including 
documents, minutes, and interviews with both internal and external personnel, informal 
conversations and theories.  
 
Another important argument in this relation is peer briefing. This implies exposing 
oneself and the work you do to colleagues or others that might be qualified in one way 
or other to comment on what has been done. This can, as suggested, be colleagues or 
reflected members of the organisation at stake. In my opinion a combination seemed to 
be the most efficient, this secured relevant comments and examination both from the 
academics and from the organisation in question. To include members of the 
organisation you are studying into the peer briefing, is what Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
call members check. I have combined these two operations, and in my point of view this 
has been an advantage. I have got feedback from both academics working with these 
types of issues, and I have checked my findings with members of the organisation I 
have studied. This is essential in establishing credibility. Through this, findings are 
exposed to those who are taking part in the daily reality that is described and those with 
working on these issues from an academic point of view. In my opinion a combination 
of these two groups contribute to give this study credibility in both relations. 
 
A fourth argument Lincoln and Guba (1985) present is what they call negative case 
analysis. By referring to Kidder (1981) they argue that this is for qualitative data what 
statistical tests are for quantitative data. The objective of this is to continuously 
negotiate and renegotiate the hypothesis until it “accounts for all known cases without 
exception” (Lincoln and Guba 1985:309). This is and has been a continuous process 
during the four years of work with this thesis. Also in this process I’d like to address 
the advantages with combining this activity with the peer briefing and members check.  
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A fifth argument for achieving credibility is referential adequacy. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) argue for the use of video recordings or cinematography to document 
happenings and episodes. In my study the use of a tape recorder has been an example of 
assuring the referential adequacy. By doing so it is possible to examine criticism raised 
on basis of other sources. Further Lincoln and Guba (1985:313) argue;  
 
“Aside from the obvious value of such materials for demonstrating that different 
analysts can reach similar conclusions given whatever data categories have emerged- a 
matter of reliability- they can also be used to test the validity of the conclusions.”  
 
But as Knutstad (1997) pinpoints, this implies that the researcher presents the data 
material. If the data material is given under the promise of confidentiality, this becomes 
an unacceptable method. In my study the data material is not restricted by any other 
confidentiality than just the personal anonymity of those interviewed. 
 
Transferability 
In what sense a study like this is able to fulfil the demand of transferability is an 
important question, though it might be hard to answer. This study can be characterised 
as an example study (Schiefloe 2003) which implies focusing on one case to shed light 
on this transfer process. To what degree such a study can be generalized to others is 
dependent on the time and the context of the study. This means that the question of 
whether the findings in my study are applicable in another context or in the same 
context at another time, is as Knutstad (1997) emphasises, an empirical question. In this 
way it is difficult to evaluate this kind of research in accordance with the demand of 
external validity.  Lincoln and Guba (1985:316) address this challenge like this;  
 
“..he or she can provide only the thick description necessary to enable someone 
interested in making transfer to reach a conclusion about whether transfer can be 
contemplated as a possibility.”. 
 
What is recognised to be a thick description is not expressed clearly in the way I read 
Lincoln and Guba (1985). But what I interpret from this is that it is important that the 
case description is done in a comprehensive way, including substantial information 
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about both the historical dimension of the study and an up-to-date description of the 
situation based on different sources. The purpose of this description is twofold, first it is 
important to introduce the reader to the context the research has been applied in, and in 
this way make the reader able to access the case and its findings. Second, and of higher 
methodological importance is that the description “provide the data base that makes 
the transferability judgements possible on the part of potential appliers.”(Lincoln and 
Guba 1985:316). To make a judgement on whether it is transferable or not is as 
Knutstad (1997) states not my job, this is the job of externals. My job is to provide the 
database necessary to make the judgement possible.  
 
Dependability 
Dependability is another factor that Lincoln and Guba (1985) see as important in the 
process of trying to establish trustworthiness concerning scientific studies. 
Dependability is about to what degree the findings and conclusions are dependent on 
the researcher themself. Lincoln and Guba (1985:316-317) present several arguments 
concerning dependability and link it to credibility when they argue:  
 
“Since there can be no validity without reliability (and thus no credibility without 
dependability) a demonstration of the former is sufficient to establish the latter. If it is 
possible using the techniques outlined in relation to credibility to show that a study has 
a quality, it ought not to be necessary to demonstrate dependability separately.” 
 
Even Lincoln and Guba acknowledge that this argument is quite weak. It does not deal 
with dependability in principle, though it might be seen as a practical guideline. Either 
way from my point of view, the data and the findings of this research have been 
completed by me and must be seen as part of my point of reference. At some degree it 
will be hard to disconnect this from me, the individual. These data and findings must be 
seen as something that my respondents and I have achieved and constructed together. 
What I find important is to express my position, and in that way make it possible for 
others to evaluate my arguments and findings on the basis of that. Even though I have 
not given a wide discussion on different scientific positions and paradigms, I believe 
that I have presented a visible position of myself and my position. Either way some of 
the most important feedback concerning dependability is given by the organisations I 
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have worked with in this study. They have found my findings and arguments 
reasonable and recognisable. This should indicate that my analyses to some extent 
should be seen as reasonable. 
 
Confirmability 
When presenting different solutions for establishing confirmability, Lincoln and Guba 
link this to auditing. When presenting the audit trail they advocate a perspective where 
it is possible for somebody to go through the data material and reconstruct the findings 
done by the researcher, in this example, me. For me this seems like an odd perspective. 
As I have argued above, the material this study relies on has been achieved and 
constructed in a process with me and my respondents acting together. In this way it will 
be difficult to audit the material in a way that includes the process of achieving the 
material as well. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the material is achieved 
under the promise of confidentiality. This makes it even more difficult to accept this 
audit trail as a reasonable and credible way of confirming this study. I find it hard to 
hand over the material achieved in this study to anyone who wants to check the 
confirmability. Besides that, in my point of view knowledge is contextual, and it would 
be hard and impossible for the one auditing this to get into the context this knowledge 
has been created in, and therefore such an audit would not be worth much.  
 
My work with this thesis has been carried out over a period of four years. To 
reconstruct these years on an audit trail, seems meaningless to me. What is more 
interesting, like Knutstad (1997:146 my translation) argues, is whether  
 
“i) I have been able to tell a credible story about this process, ii) if the argumentation 
and conclusions are credible and recognisable and iii) whether this is written in a form 
that the argumentation and conclusions might have value in other contexts.” 
 
Whether I have been able to fulfil these criteria is not up to me to decide. My job is to 
try to make the data material as visible as possible given the promise of confidentiality 
and also provide a wide range of sources to support my argumentation and findings. 
But as already stated, this is nothing that I can judge, but I will deliver my arguments 
concerning these issues. 
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Is this trustworthy? 
Based on this discussion I will finally conclude that the material this thesis is founded 
upon must be regarded as trustworthy. The long relationship between Raufoss ASA and 
me as a researcher must count in this direction. This is an example of prolonged 
engagement that Lincoln and Guba (1985) see as important for the credibility of the 
data material achieved. This is even made stronger through my sustained observation 
over several years. The process of this technology transfer has been observed over a 
period of four years, while my relation to the company has a history of seven years. I 
have also used triangulation in different ways in my research, in the sense of using 
different sources in the search for information and data. Discussions with both research 
colleagues and colleagues at Raufoss ASA have been essential. But also the comments 
and the discussions with my supervisors have been important in this relation. This is in 
accordance with Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) peer debriefing and members check. 
 
When it comes to transferability I will rely in Schiefloe (2003), who states that this is 
dependent on the similarity between what has been studied and what it is suppose to be 
transferred to. As argued, dependability is inevitable, this thesis has been done by me 
and is my responsibility. Confirmability is a more difficult issue, first and foremost 
ethically, but also practically. Practically it is problematic concerning the impossible 
need for reconstructing the situations where the data has been achieved. 
 
 
7.7 Summing up 
 
In this chapter I have outlined the foundation for the data material and what this thesis 
relies on methodologically. I have done so by telling the story of how I was introduced 
to this field and how I came in contact with Raufoss ASA. This story also involves the 
first period where I was struggling to get the cases into the track I wanted (see chapter 
1). When I had agreed with Raufoss ASA about my case, I developed my scientific 
approach. 
 
The description of my relationship to the field also includes an outline of my own 
organisational context. This ends up into a close description of certain important 
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activities like the development of the seminars held in Montreal and the Global 
Sourcing project.  
 
Further I go into a discussion of the methodology and the research strategy and design. 
This is further taken into a presentation of the fieldwork and how the processes have 
been carried out. The selection of the respondents and descriptions of the interviews is 
important in this presentation. 
 
I end this chapter with a discussion of the quality and trustworthiness of the data 
achieved. This is examined in relation to Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) concepts of; 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
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8.  An overview of the automotive business 
 
My outline of the concept of globalisation has so far been mostly about the societal 
changes and the forces that are important in relation to this. This is important for the 
scale of my study, and I will come back to this issue later in chapter 14, where I will 
sum up some of the findings in this thesis. This chapter is an attempt to put some flesh 
on the bone in terms of what globalisation might be about at a concrete level. By 
describing different phases in the automotive business I will try to present a picture of 
what the process of globalisation might be like for this business. It is important to 
understand the background for some of the exogenous forces that are at play, and are 
more or less forcing Raufoss to take part in this development (or to choose to not take 
part).  
 
Different phases of the automotive business 
Roughly spoken, the international automotive industry has developed through three 
different phases from its start-up in the early 20th century. With Henry Ford’s 
introduction of the production line manufacturing, the industry became what is known 
as globally decentralised. This phenomenon was connected with the method of 
production that mass production entailed. This period lasted until approximately the 
1980s and was succeeded by a period characterised by the Japanese principles of 
organisation. This period has again been followed by a third period characterised by 
restructuring and increasing competitor collaboration (Haraldsen 1994). In the 
following each of the periods will be elaborated on. 
 
 
8.1 Global decentralisation 
 
During the period labelled global decentralisation, Ford’s introduction of the production 
line was a central element. There was focus on work processes (Taylor 1911) and 
improved organisation and operational management. In this period American car 
manufacturing was far more efficient than the European, which to a larger extent was 
characterised by smaller and less specialised companies. This gave the American 
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manufacturers a considerable lead over the European competitors. Towards the end of 
the 1920s the two large American manufacturers General Motors and Ford dominated 
car manufacturing with a combined market share of 90%. Ford developed its 
production from mainly concentrating on car assembly to an increasing focus on the 
production process. By carrying out a greater share of the production processes in-
house, Ford sought control over the majority of the production processes. During this 
period vertical integration reached its peak with the opening of the River Rouge factory 
in Detroit in 1927 (Lamming 1993). GM chose a different production philosophy even 
though it was mainly built on Ford’s production concept. GM introduced the multi 
divisional enterprise. The idea behind this was the establishment of more or less 
independent divisions operated as profit centres. Daily operations in the divisions were 
managed by the divisional management, while the divisions and allocation of resources 
between the divisions were controlled by GM’s headquarters (Williamson 1981). In 
Western Europe GM and Ford had to establish separate production units as a 
consequence of European protectionism. At this point GM had operations in 16 
countries, while Ford was established in 21 countries (Sadler 1992).  
 
After WW2 this situation changed slightly. The era of protectionism was over, and 
there were efforts to restart the European economy. The European car manufacturers 
went from being small production units to introducing standardised mass production 
based on the principles from Ford. At the same time the European manufacturers 
targeted other niches and worked more on product innovation than the Americans 
(Haraldsen 1994). The European automotive industry recovered fairly quickly, and the 
increase in production helped the European automotive industry catch up with the USA 
by the beginning of the 1970s. In the course of 20 years, from 1950 to 1970, the market 
share of the American car manufacturers dropped from 85% to 33%. This happened 
despite an increase in output from 7 to 7.5 million cars in the same period (Hoffmann & 
Kaplinsky 1988). Simultaneously the output from the Western European car 
manufacturers increased formidably, from 1.1 to 10.4 million cars, which brought their 
market share from 13.5% to 46% (Hoffmann & Kaplinsky 1988). During this period 
some of the European manufacturers, mainly Volkswagen and Renault, started 
establishing themselves on the American market (Haraldsen 1994). By the beginning of 
the 1970s the European automotive industry had a market share of 10% in the USA 
(Sadler 1992).  
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8.2 Japanese Principles of Organisation 
 
During the post-war period the European automotive industry was rebuilt on the 
principles of Ford. However, during the 1970s a new challenge arose. More and more 
Japanese companies started to capture market shares from the American and European 
manufacturers. Several possible explanations have been launched to explain how the 
Japanese were able to capture such large market shares. Since the 1950s the Japanese 
automotive industry had developed a form of mass production that can best be 
described as a transformation of Ford’s original concept of mass production. This 
transformation of the production concept points to an adaption to the specific techno-
economic and socio-institutional conditions in Japan (Cusumano 1985, Sayer & Walker 
1992). During the post-war period in Japan it was impossible to obtain the necessary 
economies of a scale necessary for mass production. Simultaneously the situation in 
Japan was characterised by expensive resources and limited space, which in turn 
contributed to the development of a production philosophy based on minimal wastage 
and minimal warehouse stock (Cusumano 1985, Sayer & Walker 1992). Toyota is 
perhaps regarded as the primary driver of the development of the Japanese production 
system, or what Haraldsen (1994) calls the Japanese transformation14. The Japanese 
production concept was to a large extent marked by the organisation principles of JIT. 
This production philosophy is based on a systems mentality in regards to both the 
process and products of technological development. The automotive manufacturers 
look for innovation skills that go beyond the company’s own skills and opportunities. 
In contrast to the Western and American supply- driven production philosophy, the 
Japanese philosophy is demand- driven. Through the exploitation of various 
innovations, both procedural and production technical, the production has become more 
flexible and able to keep up with changing trends in the market. The Japanese 
production system can perhaps best be described as flexible mass production 
(Haraldsen 1994). Another term used to describe the Japanese production system is lean 
production (Womack et al. 1990). 
                                                 
14 The Japanese transformation consisted of a series of innovations, both production technical and 
procedural, e.g. “Just in Time”, vertical disintegration, team collaboration (keirutsu) and increased use of 
technical appliances (Haraldsen 1994). 
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The Japanese car manufacturers’ entry and capture of large market shares from the 
American and European manufacturers shocked the traditional industrial communities, 
among others Baden Württemberg in south-western Germany (Cooke & Morgan 1994). 
Womack et al.’s book “the Machine that Changed the World” from 1990 has become a 
classic in understanding the Japanese transformation and the secret behind its great 
success. The book became many Western industrial executives’ hope in a complex 
situation. In Germany alone more than 50 conferences, in the period from 1990-92, 
where based on this book. Prominent industrial enterprises like Daimler Benz, 
Volkswagen and Robert Bosch each purchased 1000 copies of the book to use it as a 
manual for its top management (Cooke & Morgan 1994). 
 
As mentioned, the West-European and American automotive industries were exposed 
to increased international competition, which coincided with an incipient stagnation in 
demand, and diminishing returns. This put several car manufacturers under 
considerable pressure towards the end of the 1970s (Hoffman & Kaplinsky 1988). 
Japanese car production had increased from 165 000 units in 1960 to 3 178 000 units in 
1970 (Hoffman & Kaplinsky 1988). The entrance of such an actor on the arena 
naturally caused considerable challenges for the established market, with the 
introduction of cars at substantially lower prices on a market in stagnation. 
 
 
8.3 Restructuring of the European Automotive Industry and 
increasing cooperation  
 
The Japanese entrance and formidable growth had impacts in the form of lay-offs and 
shut-downs, not only at the American giants GM and Ford, but also on European 
manufacturers. At the start of the 1980s there was an obvious need for substantial 
changes, especially in the European industry (Haraldsen 1994). A considerable increase 
in productivity in the automotive industry was necessary, and various strategies were 
chosen to meet the new needs. Common for all the strategies was that they were 
inspired by Japanese production philosophy. 
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In an attempt to respond to the Japanese challenges, Ford and GM tried a “world car” 
strategy. The goal was to build a global car that would be sold on all the markets in the 
world. By their estimates there would be considerable economic gains from integrated 
production of the global car. However, making one car model popular in every market 
proved both expensive and difficult. These immediate responses were eventually 
replaced with more long term and well-considered changes. Hudson (2000) outlines 
five distinguishable approaches that can be seen as resulting from the changes: 
 
- First of all there was an attempt to acquire knowledge on lean production, and to use 
this knowledge to develop adapted versions of lean production. Organisational changes 
were carried out in the direction of more teamwork and more extensive use of contract 
work, in addition to a reorganisation of the supplier networks. The reorganisation of 
supplier networks must also be seen in light of the reduction of in-house production. 
Cooke & Morgan (1994) describe the development in the German automotive industry 
where, during the 1970s, there was a steady increase in the amount of in-house 
production. Up until 1978-80 in-house production increased rapidly, succeeded by an 
equally rapid drop in the following years. By the start of the 1980s the European car 
manufacturers had between 1 000 and 2 000 suppliers per car model, compared to 
Toyota’s 310-400 suppliers. The changes in supplier networks not only involved 
reduction in numbers but also in the way they were managed. Suppliers became more 
involved in product development15, which required more R&D competence. Price was 
an important competitive factor but eventually other factors were given more 
significance, e.g. delivery precision and quality16. 
 
- Secondly, attempts were made to find a new production method not based on Ford 
that could handle high volumes (strategies were developed based on dynamic flexibility 
and mass customisation). The aim was to combine large-scale production with solutions 
that could ensure flexibility and ability to handle swift shifts in customer wishes and 
preferences. This approach required new investments in technology in order to 
automate work processes, a capital intensive strategy. This would work well in areas 
                                                 
15 First and second tier (reference and model) 
16 Hodson & Schamp (1995) argue it is mainly the relationship between car manufacturers and first tier 
suppliers that has become more long term and thus reduced the importance of price somewhat. At the 
same time suppliers further down the supply chain are still mainly chosen on price,  
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with shortages in labour supply, like Japan, but not in areas like Europe, where there 
was a surplus of labour. 
 
- The third strategy designed to respond to the Japanese challenge has been based on a 
geographic reorganising of production locations. This strategy involves a reorganising 
of the automotive manufacturers’ internal division of labour. Manufacturers have 
chosen to move the standardised part of production to more low-cost European 
countries, while keeping management, marketing departments, R&D and production of 
luxury models in their own country. This process is generally called Europeanisation 
and has contributed to a European division of labour in the automotive industry 
(Hudson & Schamp 1995). 
 
- The fourth reaction one can see is that non-Japanese car manufacturers have entered 
into strategic alliances with Japanese manufacturers. The aim and reason for such 
cooperation has been that the non-Japanese wanted access to Japanese production and 
technical expertise. In return, the Japanese gained access to markets and distribution 
networks. Honda, for instance, gained access to the European market (EU) through an 
alliance with Rover. Another example is the cooperation between Volvo and Mitsubishi 
in the Netherlands. And in 1984, in an attempt to learn from the Japanese companies, 
GM entered into a joint venture with Toyota. 
 
- The fifth strategy has been to form strategic alliances between European and/or 
American based companies. The intention of this strategy has been to reduce R&D 
costs, spread risk in product development and to share knowledge on best practice in 
production. One example of this development is the cooperation between Ford and VW 
on the development of the new Volkswagen in Portugal. Another is the cooperation 
between the European manufacturers Renault and Volvo (Haraldsen 1994). 
 
Strategy four and five are characterised by increased cooperation between different 
companies. This describes a major part of the development in the automotive industry 
over the last few years. The industry today consists of six giants; GM, Ford, Daimler-
Chrysler, Toyota, Renault-Nissan and VW. In addition, it is worth noting that BMW, 
Honda and Peugeot/Citroen still operate independently. 
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As we can see, the automotive industry is characterised by increased integration and 
cooperation among the different car manufacturers. However, this development is not 
only seen among the car manufacturers; the suppliers have also been affected by the 
changes in the automotive industry. The car-component manufacturers have not 
surprisingly gone through many of the same changes. As previously mentioned, one of 
the most significant changes in the Western automotive industry has been the changes 
in the supplier networks, which have obviously affected the car-component 
manufacturers. A reduced number of suppliers and their entry into new markets are 
perhaps the most visible changes the industry has gone through. There are now fewer 
suppliers that deliver to other geographical markets than before (Amin & Sadler 1995, 
Sadler 1999).  
 
In other words, we find that many of the same processes that affected the car 
manufacturers have also taken place among the car-component manufacturers. This 
parallel restructuring has been marked by more or less the same processes. There has 
been a series of mergers, acquisitions, joint-ventures and shut-downs. Companies have 
sought to cooperate with Japanese companies to learn from their technology and 
production processes. In the European part of the industry there has been a tendency 
towards Europeanisation as production has been moved from the large centres to more 
remote parts of Europe where production costs are lower.  
 
History shows that suppliers have traditionally competed for price. Typical European 
suppliers have had to contend with an abundance of relatively small companies that 
have been in fierce competition with each other. As a consequence the quality of 
deliveries has suffered. This is in sharp contrast to the relationship between car 
manufacturer and supplier in Japan, where a structure based on using a group of 
preferred and privileged suppliers, so-called first tier, has been developed17. These 
suppliers are at the top of a supplier hierarchy that consists of various second and third 
tier suppliers etc. The relationship between the car manufacturer and its first tier was 
based on long-term cooperation and trust, as opposed to short-term competition based 
                                                 
17 The first tier suppliers mainly deliver complete systems rather than a single component. Second and 
third tier supply components to the first tier that puts everything together before delivering to the car 
manufacturer. 
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on price18 (Hudson 2000). The European system of suppliers faced considerable 
challenges when Japanese car manufacturers established themselves in Europe. The 
change processes at the suppliers accelerated at this point in time. The European 
suppliers that wanted to deliver to the Japanese companies in Europe were exposed to a 
different philosophy than the price-focused philosophy they were accustomed to19 
(Hudson 2000). 
 
As a consequence of the competition the Japanese companies represented, the non-
Japanese companies were forced to make changes to stay competitive. From 1988-1992 
Ford reduced their list of suppliers by 15%, to 900. They had intentions of reducing the 
list further, down to 600 suppliers, and this would still be a much larger number than 
the Japanese companies in Europe were operating with. GM faced the competition in a 
somewhat different manner, by insisting on a full renegotiation of supplier contracts 
where the goal was to reduce prices (Hudson 2000). This response held clear parallels 
to the earlier strategies and represented more of an intensification of the previous 
strategies rather than a change. 
 
The European car-component manufacturers have not only moved production within 
Europe. There is also a quite considerable process of globalisation in progress. This is 
often a consequence of the car manufacturers’ wish to establish themselves on new 
continents, which gives the suppliers an opportunity to gain contracts in different parts 
of the world. This is, of course, provided both the car manufacturer´s and the supplier´s 
wish to continue the cooperation. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Despite a focus on other factors than price in these relationships, price is not insignificant in the 
relationship between car manufacturer and first tier, as Hudson (2000:149) points out: ” It is, however, 
important to stress that the continuing renewal of such relationships was and is by no means 
unconditional but dependent upon the attainment of agreed targets for increases in labour productivity 
and quality”. 
19 In Toyota’s supplier evaluation there were four important criteria: 1. Management’s attitude and 
ability. 2. Production facilities and investment in new technology. 3. Philosophy and systems for quality 
control. 4. Ability to Research & Development. Only when the companies had been evaluated and found 
interesting according to these criteria did price become an issue (Hudson 2000). 
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8.4 Summing up 
 
The automotive industry has developed from a starting point as a national industry that 
evolved through what we can call a global decentralised industry to become a global 
integrated industry. This development has happened during a period of less than one 
hundred years. Today the six big automotive businesses co-operate with companies all 
over the world and are established more or less everywhere. But as this chapter has 
shown, there has also been a process of regionalisation during this development. The 
strategy Hudson call europeanisation serves as an example of the regionalisation 
process in this industry, where there has developed a spatial division of labour in the 
European car manufacturing industry. One characteristic feature of this is the “car 
manufacturing districts” that have clustered around the assembly plants of the car 
manufacturers.  
 
These general development trends and strategies of the car manufacturing industry are 
reflected when looking at Raufoss ASA. Raufoss ASA bought a producer of 
commercial vehicle systems back in 1998. Through this acquisition Raufoss expanded 
in the European market. We can also see that the first strategy of involving the 
suppliers more directly in the product development has had a direct impact on Raufoss 
ASA. It is Raufoss ASA that has developed the technical solutions for their products, 
that later have been approved by the car manufacturers. Also the fifth strategy that 
Hudson has identified has had direct consequences for Raufoss ASA. Raufoss ASA had 
strategic and long term cooperation with SAAB, and when SAAB was acquired by GM, 
this cooperation continued. The consequence for Raufoss was that the cooperation with 
GM represented a much bigger market potential, and the contracts with GM were a 
direct consequence of this cooperation. We see that the changes in the automotive 
business have had consequences for the car component producers. This is the backdrop 
for much of Raufoss ASA’s development and a direct reason for their establishment of 
a new production plant in Montreal. 
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9. The background of the case 
 
 
In this chapter I will present the background for the case I have studied. This includes a 
presentation of some glimpses of Raufoss’s history, both as a place and as a factory. 
Such a presentation also includes an introduction to the industrial environment at 
Raufoss. Then I will gradually turn the focus onto the case study of the technology and 
knowledge transfer to Montreal, Canada. This includes a thorough introduction to the 
product, suspension arm in aluminium, and the production lines. I will also present the 
plant in Montreal. I will end the chapter with a presentation of important actors that 
have been actively involved in the transfer process.  
 
 
9.1 The Automotive Community in the Forest 
 
If one considers that Raufoss ASA is located in the forests of Toten, in the municipality 
of Vestre Toten, one does not immediately think of a high-tech industrial community 
competing in one of the fiercest industries in the world - the automotive industry. 
However, this has been made possible because the industrial community has been 
allowed to develop with strong state support and commitment. Through history an 
industrial community has been built, broad enough to contribute with considerable 
innovations with a wide range of products. This has contributed to the existence of a 
rich and varied industrial community in the Raufoss industrial park since the 
restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s (Nilsen 1999). 
 
Today there are approximately 3000 people employed within the industrial park,  at 
five main companies: Hydro Automotive Structures, Hydro Profiler, SÄPÄ AS, 
Nammo AS and Raufoss ASA. Three of these companies have specialised in different 
parts of automotive parts manufacture. Hydro Automotive Structures manufactures 
bumpers in aluminium for the European automotive industry. The Swedish company 
SÄPÄ supplies plastic caps for bumpers on customer demand. Lastly, and as 
mentioned, Raufoss ASA is a supplier of aluminium suspension arms to General 
Motors though Raufoss Chassis Technology. In addition, the German company 
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Steertech manufactures aluminium steering columns. In other words, the automotive 
environment in the industrial park can be regarded as prominent. In addition to these 
automotive companies, the ammunitions company Nammo and the aluminium 
company Hydro Aluminium Profiler are significant contributors to the industrial park. 
 
These companies, together with a range of smaller technology companies and various 
support companies, form a highly competent technology environment in the forests of 
Toten. None of the automotive companies are located in close proximity to their 
customers. The localisation of this technology community can therefore seem 
somewhat disadvantageous in relation to traditional localisation factors like proximity 
to market. 
 
 
9.2 The Story of Raufoss 
 
From farmland to matches 
If we look at the area where Raufoss Industrial Park is located today, it is a quite 
extraordinary industrial milieu seen in accordance with Norwegian scale. Among 3000 
workers earn their living in this industrial milieu in the deep forest in eastern Norway. 
A few hundred years ago this area was in general, farmland mainly consisting of 
forests, with no proper roads. In fact there were a few kilometres of forest road in the 
area, but in general the infrastructure was poor. Even though it has been reported that 
back in the 16th century there was a local smithy in the area (Nilsen 1999). This is the 
first industrial or craftsman’s activity that is reported from this area. Later there was a 
match factory employing about 70 people for a while. This factory was established in 
1873 but the establishment was rather optimistic, and the factory went bankruptcy after 
six years. But new owners started it up again and kept it going until the mid 1890s. The 
match factory was internationally orientated. It arranged sales tours to the Far East and 
was rather successful with exports to both China and India. But on the 1st of May 1895 
the match factory was shut down, and its property was taken over by the state.  
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Towards ammunition 
In the 1890s Norway was in Union with Sweden. The political situation was rather 
tense with a gradual Norwegian desire for total independence. In this situation it was a 
disadvantage that the national ammunition factory was located at Akershus Fort in Oslo 
(Christiania at that time). The Norwegian authorities were afraid of that in a possible 
Swedish invasion, the ammunition factory would fall into Swedish control at a very 
early stage. Oslo was too accessible in a war situation. The conclusion was that the 
ammunition factory had to be moved to a more inaccessible location than Oslo.  
 
The choice fell on Raufoss which is 120 kilometres north of Oslo and sheltered by Lake 
Mjøsa from Swedish attacks from the east. 
The decision to move the factory was not 
warmly welcomed by the workers who 
were used to living in the urban Oslo. Now 
they had to move to the rather rural area of 
Raufoss. They received quite good 
economic compensation and kept their 
income, which was a good offer in light of 
the lower living costs at Raufoss. Even 
though this was a social experiment at that 
time. 
LAKE MJØSA
 
      
Mechanical and pyrotechnical skills 
Even though the existing ammunition factory in Oslo had skilled personnel, it is 
reasonable to believe that the milieu at the match factory was an important factor in the 
decision process of where to locate the ammunition factory. The mechanical and 
pyrotechnical skills at the match factory were related to the activities in the ammunition 
factory and in that way the existing skilled employees were important in the start up 
process at the new ammunition factory. This transfer started with moving experts and 
leading technical personnel from Oslo to Raufoss. Together with the workers from the 
match factory, who already were at Raufoss, they started establishing the factory. This 
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was the start of both a new factory and activity at Raufoss, but at the same time it was 
also the start of a whole new society at Raufoss. 
 
 
9.3 Raufoss; a factory and a society 
 
In 1896 Raufoss had 132 inhabitants. When the Raufoss Ammunition factory was 
established, this number  started to grow. During the start of the 20th century both the 
factory and the local community expanded. The factory became more than just a 
production place; it was also an important contributor to the local community. The 
factory built a school and contributed to a new water supply and water station,  and also 
to the establishment of the local hospital. After a while the cinema and library were also 
established in cooperation between the factory and the local authorities. The factory 
also contributed to several sports stadiums. All this gave the factory a lot of public 
credit, and if we look at it in accordance with today’s standards this was an important 
contribution. But we also have to remember that this was in a different time than we 
live in now. It was more or less expected that the factory should be such a contributor, 
and it is also worth remembering that the factory was state owned and was one of the 
Department of Defence’s important tools. But either way, this contribution was creating 
tight bonds between the factory and its employees and therefore with most of the 
people living in this small society. The borders between the local community and the 
factory were rather diffuse, and it was experienced that the factory “was everything”. 
Like one of the respondents in the study for my Master’s thesis expressed it (Nilsen 
1999:96, my translation):   
 
“We were drinking the milk of the factory’s cows, we were riding its horses, we were 
chopping our logs in its forest, and we were living in its houses. Of course this has left 
its mark on us; everything used to be the Factory!” 
 
In my Master’s thesis , in addition to the above, I present several other examples of the 
tight bonds between the factory and the local community. The loyalty in critical periods 
and the attitudes towards fluctuating employment rates and the acceptance of these 
fluctuations are examples of these bonds (Nilsen 1999, Dale & Nilsen 1999). This 
illustrates that the factory and the local community were developed in common and 
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were both very important features in people’s lives. The history of Raufoss continued in 
this way throughout the 20th century, both the factory and the local community in 
general created Raufoss to be what it is today. The red thread during the 20th century is 
cooperation both internally at the factory but also cooperation with external companies. 
The local community and the factory are built on cooperation during the century where 
Norwegian social democracy is having its most important time. Both the factory and 
the Raufoss society were based on the production of ammunition, but during the 20th 
century this ammunition dependency was, as we shall see, supposed to be changed.  
 
Towards the civilian market 
Even though the factory was an ammunition factory that produced defence products for 
the Norwegian defence ministry, by the early 20th century, the union and the workers 
had already expressed a wish to the production of products for the civil market. This 
was based on the fact that they were dependent on state budgets decided by politicians. 
These budgets could vary considerably from year to year. Years with low budgets 
meant high unemployment. And by expanding into more private markets they hoped to 
avoid unemployment. But in spite of these attempts and wishes the products for civilian 
markets did not become of any substantial size before the 1950s. They then got an 
agreement with the Volvo Company of mounting their new military vehicle. This was 
their first engagement with what later would become the important vehicle business for 
Raufoss.  
 
Aluminium the new material 
In the 1920s, aluminium was already seen as an important forthcoming product that 
could be interesting in industrial terms at Raufoss. But it wasn’t until the 1970s that 
they got their first contract of importance. They then signed a contract on delivery of 
safety bumpers to Volvo. During the 1960s they had developed a bumper in aluminium 
that reduced the casualties in car accidents. This bumper was able to absorb a lot of 
energy in a possible crash and in that way reduced the damage on the rest of the car and 
the passengers. The safety element was one of the important effects of this bumper. 
Another important feature was the fact that it was made of aluminium and thus a 
lightweight product. The car manufacturers were becoming increasingly aware of the 
negative environmental affects of driving cars, so one strategy for coping with that was 
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to reduce the cars’ weight. The safety bumper became a success, and even more car 
companies were added to the list of customers during the 1970s. Even if the civilian 
products were increasing, it  still took nearly twenty years before they were to be equal 
with the defence products, economically. 
 
Aluminium suspension arms arriving at SAAB  
The success of the safety bumper inspired the Raufoss engineers to further work with 
aluminium. They tried to identify and develop other parts of the car where their 
knowledge on aluminium could be useful. This resulted in the development of steering 
columns in aluminium that further developed to become a stand-alone business area 
and even an independent company some years later20. But it also resulted in the 
development of suspension arms in aluminium. The business unit that was responsible 
for the suspension arms won contracts with SAAB, which produces cars in the high 
price segment. SAAB sells a lot of cars based on its reputation for developing high 
technology and for the latest and best solutions available. Even though these contracts 
were of limited volumes, they were contracts that were of importance as all contracts in 
the car industry are. Such contracts gave the possibility to further development of the 
product in close cooperation with SAAB’s engineers. This was both a challenging and 
important possibility for the technological milieu at Raufoss. It was one corporation 
among others in the car industry that gave Raufoss important credit and experience. In 
the years to come this close cooperation with SAAB was supposed to give substantial 
results for Raufoss.  
 
A test driver’s love 
The cooperation that started with the Swedish SAAB back in the seventies continued 
during the eighties. But as mentioned in chapter 8, the car industry went through a 
consolidation phase in the nineties. This consolidation phase had important affects on 
SAAB so much so that in the nineties it was acquired by the American company, 
General Motors (GM). For the Raufoss this was an exiting development. Would their 
thirty years of cooperation with SAAB continue under this new regime, or was this the 
end for the Raufoss-SAAB cooperation? An end, due to Raufoss’s size was not an 
                                                 
20 See page XX about Steertech Willie Elbe AB 
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unimaginable outcome. But the engineers at Raufoss continued to develop their 
suspension arms, and they tried to win new contracts. One of the challenges was to get 
the price low enough. The technical content of their product was more than good 
enough. In fact the technical solutions in their suspension arm are so good that it is said 
to be the GM’s test drivers at Russelheim that demanded GM to go for the Raufoss 
solution. This was solely based on their experience of this suspension arm’s 
superiority21.  
 
The result was that GM entered into a contract with Raufoss. The news of this contract 
was publicly announced on December 20th 2000, as mentioned in chapter 1. This 
contract was far more extensive than the contract Raufoss had previously with SAAB. 
Now the contract was based on GM’s new platform Epsilon. Such a platform is one of 
the car industry’s strategies to reduce costs. The cars are produced in a way so that as 
much as possible is the same on every car. So what differs are basically the look and 
the equipment inside the car such as the effect of the motor and seats and other 
furniture. This meant that the contract Raufoss achieved included several models on 
GM’s European Epsilon platform. The volume of this contract was in other words of 
another proportion than the contract Raufoss had with SAAB before. 
 
Summing up the history 
The development of Raufoss as an industrial centre commenced towards the end of the 
20th century. What started out as one ammunition factory in 1896 has evolved to 
become one of Norway’s leading and largest industrial areas. The area and local 
community of Raufoss have evolved together with the former Raufoss ammunition 
factory. Over its 100-year history the activity has gone from production of ammunition 
for military purposes to an ever-increasing share of production for civilian purposes. 
When considering the activity that takes place within the Raufoss industrial area today, 
one finds that since the mid 1980s there have been more people employed within 
civilian than military production. The place of Raufoss has expanded with this 
industrial activity. Over the years a social environment that supports the industrial 
activity has evolved. This environment possesses expertise in many areas that 
                                                 
21  This story is hard to get confirmed, even though this is a Raufoss story, and it shows the pride in their 
technology - even if   unconfirmable.  
 124
Context and case description 
contribute to the continuous development of this industrial environment, and it was 
within this industrial environment that the wheel suspension in aluminium was 
developed. Based on the fact that the product was developed here and the necessary 
expertise and competencies are present at Raufoss, there is little doubt that Raufoss 
would be the most rational choice of localisation of production for the EPSILON 
platform (See chapter 1). To serve GM’s European production the only requirement 
from GM was that the production had to be done in Europe, so Raufoss was an 
acceptable location. 
 
 
9.4 Raufoss ASA  
 
From the mid 1980s and up until 2004, Raufoss ASA has gone through major changes. 
From being a division of a state company, the company today is listed on the 
Norwegian stock exchange and organised as a holding company. In the autumn of 
1990, the state company was partly privatised and listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
This marked a milestone in the history of Raufoss ASA, as the state which had 
previously had sole proprietorship now opened it up to other owners. For Raufoss ASA 
this marked a change.  
 
In 1997 Raufoss ASA sold off its bumper operations that the company had been 
developing since the end of the 1960s. At that time the bumper operations constituted 
half of the company. This considerable part of the company now became part of 
another state company, Norsk Hydro22. Around the time of the sale Raufoss also had a 
new Chief Executive Officer 23(CEO). From 1997-1999 a range of investments were 
made in the Raufoss Group as the sale of the bumper operations had provided the group 
with more scope for manoeuvre.  
 
The major changes Raufoss went through during the 1980s and 1990s were 
characterised by changes in ownership and fission processes. Previous divisions of the 
state company gradually became separate public companies under the listed holding 
                                                 
22 At the time of the sale Norsk Hydro was considered a safe and good place of employment, under 
indirect state control. Even though Norsk Hydro was not fully state owned, it was known for treating 
workers well, which was considered important at Raufoss. 
23 Bjarne Gravdal retired and Nils Erik Skarsgård took over. 
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company, Raufoss ASA. In February 1999, this was the situation: A new CEO is hired 
after the previous CEO had to resign due to conflicts with unions and other vital 
stakeholders at Raufoss24. The new CEO faces the following situation: the company 
had recently bought a utility vehicle manufacturer, United Parts, with operations in 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany. The company had spent most 
of its financial strength on this acquisition, so the remaining financial means were 
reduced. The company’s industrial structure was diverse and not very focused. The 
activities ranged from various defence products like ammunition and missiles, to 
civilian products like couplings for trucks and various automotive parts in aluminium. 
Thus the situation facing the new CEO in 1999 was an industrial company with 
operations in a range of different industries and markets, and very little industrial focus. 
His main challenge would be mapping out the company’s future focus areas. 
 
The group management then met to determine what would be Raufoss ASA’s future 
focus areas. An essential part of this process was to find good alternative solutions for 
the areas that were considered non-essential in Raufoss ASA’s future strategy. At this 
point it still had a considerable amount of production for the defence industry, 
organised in the Nordic ammunition company Nammo AS. It quickly became apparent 
that this was not an area the company wanted to develop within the organisation. The 
chosen solution was for the state, the original owner of the ammunition factory, to take 
over Raufoss ASA’s ownership in Nammo AS.  
 
After the acquisition of United Parts in 1997, Raufoss ASA was left with a range of 
companies around Europe, producing various parts for the utility vehicle industry. 
These companies were defined to not be a part of Raufoss’ future core business and 
were prepared for sale. The diversified nature and products made it necessary to sell the 
operations off in several stages to different buyers. Towards the end of September 2001 
this process was more or less completed. 
 
What remained in Raufoss ASA after the fissions and sell offs were essentially four 
operational companies. In the following, a brief description of the four companies is 
provided (per.2004). 
                                                 
24 For further analysis, see Nilsen 1999, Dale and Nilsen 2000. 
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Raufoss Industrial Tool AS (RIT), the group’s tool factory. The company 
manufactures and adapts industrial tools for the various other companies in the group as 
well as for other customers. This is an important skill base for Raufoss ASA. Tool 
adjustment and maintenance are of great importance for the group companies and thus a 
skill defined to stay as a part of the group in the future.  
 
Raufoss Technological and Industrial Management AS (RTIM) is a company that 
brings together all the group’s laboratory services, training, human resource services, 
skills development and material technology centre. This company is under joint 
ownership, where Raufoss ASA is the principal shareholder with 66% and Sintef 34%. 
RTIM’s role is to assist the other companies in the Raufoss Group as well as external 
customers with the above services. 
 
Raufoss Fluid Technology AS (RFT) is a company that mainly delivers various types 
of couplings to the utility vehicle industry. Coupling systems involve, among other 
things, brake pipe couplings and coupling systems for gas feeding of vehicle fuel. The 
operation also contains a business area that to a large extent is based on the Isiflo 
coupling, an essential invention at Raufoss, and which supplies products to the water 
and gas market. 
 
Raufoss Chassis Technology AS (RCT) manufactures aluminium suspension arms for 
the automotive industry. This activity has a 30-year history in Raufoss and is based in 
the environment that has worked with aluminium solutions for the automotive industry. 
Both front and rear wheel suspensions are manufactured at a fully automatic production 
line at Raufoss. The suspension arms are delivered to GM’s EPSILON platforms in 
Europe. Together with the sister company Raufoss Automotive Components Canada 
Ltd. (RACC), this company form the main case in this dissertation. RACC carry out 
the same processes as RCT. A more thorough description of these two companies and 
their production processes will be provided later in this in chapter. 
 
During 2004 and especially during the autumn, there had been some considerable 
changes in the business structure at Raufoss. Raufoss ASA has been dispersed as a 
company. Raufoss Fluid Technology has become a part of the Kongsberg Automotive 
Group. Raufoss Industrial Tools has also been taken over by an external company. And 
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Raufoss Chassis Technology and Raufoss Automotive Components Canada have been 
taken over by the Austrian company Neuman. Since these changes so far have been 
limited to the ownership structure and the fact that these are recent changes I have 
chosen not to make this a big issue in this thesis. 
 
These automotive companies at Raufoss have gone through different phases since the 
beginning of the 1920s when four cars were manufactured in Raufoss. The environment 
has gone through major changes in the course of the last 30 years. This development 
has been characterised by continually increasing market share and continuous product 
innovation. Simultaneously, the automotive industry has throughout history been an 
industry that has often gone through various changes in its choice of localisation (see 
chapter 8). 
 
 
9.5 From Europe to North America 
 
After signing the contract on the Epsilon platform for the European market, Raufoss 
ASA and GM started to look at potential areas for developing the cooperation. When 
Raufoss ASA had developed new technology that was found competitive for the 
European market, they hoped to gain more income on their investment by also winning 
contracts on more or less the same models for the North American market. The good 
cooperation with GM continued and resulted in a new contract, now for the American 
market and their American platform. This contract was of the same extension as the 
European contract both in length and in economic terms. The product’s length was set 
to be seven years and should give a yearly revenue of 350-400 million NOK. This 
meant that Raufoss was now both a contract partner and a development partner for GM 
in Europe as well as in North America. These contracts were of a much higher volume 
than they had been used to from previous contracts. Huge challenges were ahead in 
both continents. But Raufoss ASA had of course made plans for how to cope with these 
challenges.  
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A totally automated production line 
The production line that Raufoss ASA had for the SAAB contract was quite old. This 
line demanded a high degree of manual power, and the automation degree was low. A 
high proportion of the cost on this line was labour; the investment in capital was thus 
rather sparse. This line had to be replaced. The Company had developed plans for the 
establishment of a new, wholly automated line. Norwegian blue-collar workers are, 
from an international perspective, far too expensive and to be competitive in the 
international car industry Raufoss ASA had to reduce the cost of the workforce. They 
had to increase the yield per employee dramatically in relation to what has been the 
standard in Norwegian industry25. To reach this goal the new plant had to be automated 
in a totally different way than had been seen before in the Norwegian metal industry.  
 
By increasing the degree of automation of the production line, the need for relatively 
well skilled and paid workers was dramatically reduced. The production process is 
highly complicated, and the products have to go through several stages of different 
processes to receive the desired characteristics. The production line consists of two 
basic different processes; one for the front suspension arm and another for the rear 
suspension arm. In addition, for both the front and the rear arm there are several sub-
processes. I will now give an introduction to the two production lines. 
 
The Front Line:  
The front suspension arm is mainly a product of forging. The front line is a highly 
complicated process. For the frontline these processes include heating, forging, 
bending, cooling, machining and mounting. At first the aluminium is cut into defined 
bolts. These bolts are then transported through an oven and heated up to a certain 
temperature degree. Then the concrete forming process of the product starts. First the 
bolts are pressed into a defined form, and then they go into an intermediate heating 
oven to ensure the right temperature once more. Then the bolt is forged and bent into 
the right angle in a two-step process, and then the edge of the bolt is cut. Now the bolt 
has been turned into something similar of the final suspension arm. But it still has a 
long way to go. The next step is the machining. In the machining there are drilled holes 
                                                 
25On average a Norwegian industrial worker is responsible for a yield of approximately 1 million NOK. 
Raufoss in their new plant had an ambition of reaching approximately 6-7 million per employee. 
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in the suspension arm and burr edges are polished very sharply and precisely. When the 
machining is done, the aluminium has gone through all the processes it needs to receive 
the desired characteristics. What remains now is the assembly line. At the assembly line 
several bushings and a ball joint are assembled onto the suspension arm.  There is also 
oil added to some of the moveable parts; this is a very complex process. The amount of 
oil has to be very exact; in fact it needs to be to the exact defined gram. When all these 
different parts are assembled to the suspension arm, the production process has come to 
an end. The suspension arm is now packed into boxes defined by General Motors. Then 
they are ready for transportation to GM.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Front Suspension arm. 
 
 
The Rear Line:  
The rear line processes include: heating, bending, cooling machining and mounting. At 
first glance this might look very similar to the description of the front line, but the rear 
suspension arm is produced through a completely different process. While the front arm 
goes through a forging process, the rear arm is going through several stages of 
stretching and bending. Here the process starts with an aluminium quarter hollow. 
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These are bought and delivered as quarter hollows with specific characteristics. At first 
the aluminium is heated in an oven for several hours to reach an exact temperature and 
to get the desired aluminium structure. Aluminium is a material that has ‘memory’ 
according to the specialists, and according to this the heating process is important for 
how the material will function in the future. When the material is taken out of the oven, 
it is ”cooled” down in a water tank with a temperature a few hundred degrees below the 
temperature in the oven. When the aluminium is cooled down, it goes through a three 
step process. In this process it is at first stretched and bent. Then it is cut into two and a 
few holes are pressed into the aluminium piece. After this process it goes through a 
short machining process compared with the front line. Then it goes through the 
assembly line and  is packed into boxes and ready for transportation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Rear Suspension arm. 
 
All these processes are at different levels and stages. They both start with a piece of 
aluminium and end up with the piece of aluminium transformed into a suspension arm, 
ready to be mounted onto a car. One important aspect is that the production lines, in 
principle, can produce the products without human contact. As I have presented the two 
different production lines, I also now present the differences between the Norwegian 
and the Canadian production lines. 
 131
Technology Transfer 
 
Differences of the production lines in Norway and Canada 
In principle both the front line and the rear line in Montreal are copies of the front and 
rear line at Raufoss, even though there are some differences. One difference is that the 
physical surroundings are different so then the different machinery and processes are 
arranged in different places inside the factory. But this doesn’t mean that there are any 
sequential differences. In addition to the difference in placement that gives a different 
first impression when you arrive at the two factories, there is also a quite substantial 
difference in the amount of automation. At the Raufoss plant the amount of automation 
is quite substantial. In principle the aluminium stays untouched by humans from the 
moment it arrives at the production line until it is packed in the boxes ready for 
shipment. The assembly line at Raufoss is, in other words, fully automated. This is not 
the case in Montreal. Concerning the front arm, the process is fully automated when it 
comes to the forging and machining process. The assembly line in Montreal is done 
manually. The situation is more or less the same when it comes to the rear line. In 
Montreal this process is fully automated except for the last and final assembling and 
also the fill-in at the start of the line, which also is done manually. In addition there is 
another difference between the two production lines and that is their energy source. The 
Raufoss plant gets its energy from electricity, while the Montreal plant is based on gas. 
The reason for this is cost, gas is a more cost effective alternative in Montreal than 
electricity. 
 
Establishing the plants 
When the contracts were signed, Raufoss ASA had to get the process going quickly. 
They had 30 year’s experience of more or less manual production of suspension arms. 
The challenge now was to transform this experience into a brand new production line 
and also a new way of producing suspension arms in aluminium for private vehicles. 
This was a quite comprehensive challenge.  
 
The contract with GM’s European platform had start of production before the North 
American contract; initially this was set to January 2002. The delivery to the European 
platform should be served by a plant located at Raufoss and the location decision was 
already made. The location decision was important for the management at Raufoss. The 
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technology and the whole concept of this production method were developed at 
Raufoss. Raufoss was the one place in the world with most knowledge on this 
technology. The logistical challenges of serving the European market from Raufoss 
were practicable and Raufoss ASA had a lot of experience concerning this issue. The 
planning and work with this plant were started when the contracts were signed. They 
had a very experienced staff of operators from the manual line, and they had also an 
experienced administrative and technical engineering staff. The challenges were now to 
put all this knowledge and experience into the new production line and get it working. 
This was a substantial operation because the ways of working were now supposed to be 
done in a totally different way. Processes that earlier had been manual were now put 
together in series of automated processes. 
 
In parallel to the preparations going on at Raufoss for the start of production for the 
Norwegian plant, the management had, to focus on the North-American project as well. 
This meant that they now started the work of putting together a well-experienced team 
to lead the way in the further process. The top management hired personnel who earlier 
had participated in previous establishments with Raufoss. In 1987 Raufoss had 
established factories in Gent in Belgium and Uddevalla in Sweden. And much of the 
same staff had also worked together with Norsk Hydro when they transferred 
technology from Raufoss to Michigan (US) in 1995. In this way they created a team 
that knew each other and had been engaged in processes like these together before. 
They pointed out a strategy for how to carry out this establishment and how to reach 
their obligation concerning the contracts with GM. 
 
The American alternatives 
Concerning the contract for the American market, Raufoss had to establish a production 
plant on the North-American continent. As already mentioned, this was included in the 
contracts terms. This meant that there were three country alternatives, Mexico, USA 
and Canada. These three countries are all included in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). The delivery address for GM would be in the USA. In general 
this meant that even if they should decide to establish the plant in either Mexico or 
Canada, it would not be negatively affected by any international trade regulations. 
Mexico could have been an alternative regarding their low costs and the proximity to 
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the USA. It could also have been an alternative to locate the factory inside the USA. 
Central areas in the USA are well known in the automotive history and have long 
traditions in car manufacturing. In the next chapter these different alternatives will be 
elaborated on further. The decision fell on Canada and Montreal, the capital of Quebec, 
which is the French speaking part of Canada. More specifically, the decision fell on 
Boisbriand that is located 30 kilometres north-west of Montreal. Montreal is close to 
the American border and is a highly modern western city. Greater Montreal has 
approximately 3.4 millions inhabitants (Lonely planet 2001).  
 
The plant 
While searching for the right location in the Montreal area they found it reasonable to 
search in the outskirts of Montreal city. Both the logistics and the general availability 
are much easier when you go some ten minutes by car outside of the central areas. 
Boisbriand is an area with high industrial activity, and the plant’s location is close to 
one of GM’s huge plants. This GM plant was not a plant that RACC was supposed to 
deliver suspension arms to. It was producing the Chevrolet Camaro model, but was shut 
down during autumn 2002. In the area there were other well known high tech plants in 
addition to General Motors, like Bombardier for example. When searching for 
alternative sites, they first found a greenfield establishment in Boisbriand. When they 
considered this alternative they realised that the ground consisted of clay. This is a poor 
solution for heavy industrial activity, including heavy presses going up and down. So 
they searched for a new alternative and found a location that was fit for the purpose. 
This was not a greenfield establishment, but it included the physical resources 
necessary for the purpose and has relatively new office buildings.  
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Figure 8.3 The plant in Montreal Canada. 
 
A Canadian Partner 
In the search for good location alternatives in the American market, Raufoss came in 
contact with several different regional promoting organisations. For the Montreal area 
they came in contact with Investissement Quebeq (IQ) and The Société générale de 
financement du Québec (SGF). IQ is a government owned company that  promotes the 
Quebec region to foreign companies. SGF is an investment company which enters 
investment projects as a local partner for foreign companies. In the establishment of the 
Canadian organisation, SGF wanted to take an active part and become a substantial co-
owner in cooperation with Raufoss ASA. SGF wanted to control 49% of the shares in 
the new company. However, it was important for Raufoss ASA to be in charge and 
have full control of this process. They owned the technology and knew what such a 
process demanded. From their perspective an industrial partner could be valuable for 
the company in the long run so this resulted in an agreement where SGF got 20% of the 
shares in the Canadian company; Raufoss Automotive Components Canada Ltd. 
(RACC). 
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9.6 Presentation of the actors active in the transfer process 
 
The story of this transfer process is complicated. It is complicated in a variety of ways, 
both chronological, such as what happened when, and chorological, in terms of what 
happened where. Before going further I would like to present some of the actors that 
have been prominent in the described process. This is to avoid any misunderstandings 
concerning who is who and who is responsible for what. The management on different 
levels has been changed several times during this process, and so I find it necessary to 
try to give an overview of those who have been involved in one way or another. Where 
those presented have been involved at several stages. The intention of this presentation 
is to clarify who has done what and at what time. 
 
 
Top Management 1:  
Top Management 1 was the group of people in Raufoss ASA who initiated this 
project on suspension arms.  In 1997 the top management were hired and had no 
previous relationship to Raufoss, either as a place or as a company. I regard this 
Top Management 1 as the group of management who were in charge including 
the CEO and those he relied on. They started an acquisition strategy and had the 
ambition of gaining growth through gaining size. This was a much-criticised 
strategy and after a dispute with the unions, the Top Management 1 had to resign 
in February 1999, after just two years in office (Nilsen 1999, Nilsen & Dale 
1999).  
 
Top Management 2:  
These are the replacements for  Top Management 1 after the resignations in 
February 1999. At first this was a temporary solution, but after a while it became 
permanent. This group had long relations to both Raufoss the place, and the 
company. This change was warmly welcomed by the community (see Nilsen 
1999 for further discussions). The Top Management 2 were in office until spring 
2003 when they was replaced. Top Management 2 then became the Global 
Organisation 2, see below. 
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Top Management 3:  
Top Management 3 were hired to find a financial solution for Raufoss ASA and 
to deal with the ownership questions. In 2003 it became clear that Raufoss was in 
serious financial trouble and had to find a new ownership structure. This process 
was going on in the summer of 2003, and the crisis was at it most critical point 
when GM had to intervene and guarantee Raufoss economic engagements the 
next 6 months.  In July 2004 the crisis came to an end when the Austrian 
concern, Neuman, took control of Raufoss Technology, as already mentioned. 
They are now part of the Neuman Group and is continuing its business areas 
there. 
 
 
 
Global Organisation 1(GO 1):  
The first global organisation was more or less the operative management for Top 
Management 2 concerning automotive issues like RCT. This Global Organisation 
1 was active and among the main contributors in the planning of this technology 
transfer and the establishment in Montreal. Global organisation 1 was 
responsible for both the plant at Raufoss and the upcoming plant in Montreal, so 
they had a coordinating responsibility for both the plants. In addition to this they 
also hired the first of the Canadian employees and the Canadian management. 
The Global Organisation 1 was closed or shut down in the early autumn of 2002. 
The intention of ending the Global Organisation 1 was partly economical and 
partly so that the plants themselves should coordinate the activities that were 
intended to be common for the two plants. 
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Global Organisation 2(GO2):  
The Global Organisation 2 was established during the spring 2003. This 
organisation was supposed to be support for the administrative and technical 
activities at both the Norwegian and the Canadian plants. Global sourcing and 
logistics are among some of the issues that this global organisation works with. It 
also had intentions of function as a coordinating link between the two plants. 
Both plants report to the Global Organisation 2.  The Global Organisation 2 
reported to Top Management 3.  
 
 
Plant Management Norway 1(PLMN 1):  
The first plant management at Raufoss was a mixture of the project team that had 
the responsibility for the establishment of the factory and the incoming 
permanent management for the plant. The Plant Management Norway 1 was in 
office from the hand-over of the project in 2001 until summer 2002. PLMN 1 
reported to GO 1.  
 
 
Plant Management Norway 2:  
Plant Management Norway 2 was engaged in the summer 2002 and is still in 
place. PLMN 2 reported to TM 2 until TM 2 resigned in spring 2003 and became 
GO 2. After spring 2003 PLMN 2 has been reporting to GO 2. 
 
 
Plant Management Canada:  
The Plant Management Canada was hired in during spring 2001. The plant 
 138
Context and case description 
management has been the same during this period, even though there have been 
some minor changes in the management group. This management group includes 
some of the senior engineers and also include the managers for Human 
Resources and Finance  
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004
Top management 2 Top management 3
Global organisation 1 Global organisation 2
Plant management Norway 1 Plant management Norway 2
Plant management Canada
 
 
 
 
Operators Norway:  
The Norwegian operators of the new production line at Raufoss are mostly an 
experienced group. A lot of them had previous experience from the manual 
production line that produced suspension arms for SAAB. At the most there have 
been approximately 100 employed at the new Raufoss production line. The 
original plans were for about 60 employees. Most of those who did not come 
from the SAAB production line are recruited from other companies in the 
Raufoss Industrial Park.  
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Operators Canada:  
The Canadian operators were hired in the period between winter and autumn 
2002. Several of them have experience from the automotive industry, some have 
experience from other mechanical industries and others from food industries. 
Those who were hired first have now advanced into foremen. This group of six 
employees has been established in relation to the establishment of the factory. It 
has been a time consuming process to get this organisation in place, and at the 
same time the organisation has expanded step by step over a very short period. 
 
 
Project organisation:  
The project organisation is the innovative group of Raufoss engineers that have 
developed the new technology and modelled and developed the new production 
line. This group is split between product and process. The development of the 
product has been carried out by one part of the group and the development of the 
process by another, but mostly this is done in common between a group of 
innovative engineers. As I have argued before (Nilsen 1999), this innovative 
milieu of engineers can been seen as representatives of what I, inspired by 
Cooke’s (1994:93) notion, have argued to be a “Proud engineer” tradition at 
Raufoss. 
 
 
Ex-Pat Team:  
The Ex-Pat Team is the group of Norwegian representatives in Montreal that are 
responsible for the technological issues and establishment of the factory. This 
group of engineers is formally a support to the Canadian plant management. 
Their mission has been to support the Canadians in the best way possible. At the 
same time they are the ones with the most advanced technological knowledge 
and experience at the plant. This group consist of four experienced engineers 
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with separate specialisation areas.  
 
 
The technical actors: 
In this transfer process there are also several important technical actors in 
addition to the actors I have outlined above. The most important technical actors 
in this process are of course the production lines presented earlier in this chapter. 
One of the important and main issues for actor network theory in my perspective, 
is to equalise the technological artefacts and the human actors. By using 
technical actors I will try to contribute to a more equalised perspective in this 
analysis. On the technological artefacts and actors on the human actors we 
maintain this distinction. I will like to use the term ‘actors’ for both and rather 
distinguish where it needs to be distinguished, namely that humans are reflective 
actors.  
 
 
 
9.7 Summing up  
 
In this chapter I have tried to present some important aspects of the history of Raufoss 
and argued that the history of the Raufoss local community and the factory should be 
seen in relation to each other. Then I have presented the background for the 
development of suspension arms in aluminium. I have presented the story of how the 
test drivers at Russelheim played a vital role when GM decided which solution they 
should choose for their new Epsilon platform.  
 
In the section from Europe to North America I have presented the product and the 
production processes. Presenting the production process has included an introduction to 
the front line and the rear line and the differences between these two production 
processes. This section ends with a short introduction of the American alternatives and 
the plant in Montreal. 
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I have chosen to end this chapter with a presentation of what I have recognised to be 
important actors in this transfer process. This is done to try to clear up in a complicated 
landscape of actors in a process that has been going on for several years. 
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10 The transfer of knowledge and technology 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to explain how the process of technology and 
knowledge transfer from Raufoss to Montreal has been carried out.  I will present the 
different steps in this process in chronological order. 
 
This implies that I will start with the phase of preparation and planning and try to 
understand how this has been carried out and what have been the challenges and the 
consequences of the choices made. The next phase I will focus on is what I have called 
the transfer phase. I will come back to the definition of this phase later in the chapter. 
However, I will   mention here that this transfer can also be seen as a minor process 
including the time from when the decision is made until the equipment is in place in the 
new plant. This particular section is much more concrete about this physical transfer 
than the whole transfer process.  
 
Towards start of production is the third phase I will analyse in this chapter. This phase 
covers the period from when the equipment arrives at the plant towards the time of start 
of production. This period represents a critical phase of the process where the pressure 
on the organisations is increasing. The date when General Motors are expecting 
delivery is getting closer and closer. The organisational temperature is increasing as 
they are going into a period of comprehensive testing.  
 
 
10.1 The phase of Preparation and Planning 
 
When Raufoss ASA developed their new production line for suspension arms, they had 
been searching for a way to increase the volume in order to increase their yield and 
earnings on the invested money. It is hard to be exact on the amount invested in this 
technology during the years, but it is a considerable sum. When Raufoss ASA had 
captured the European contract with GM in 2000 , it was a natural step to start looking 
at the North American market. Establishing a production line in North-America was a 
natural development. This could happen in several different ways. They could either 
outsource the production to someone else, they could take over another company in the 
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business, or they could establish themselves in this market on the North-American 
continent. They chose the last alternative and started to look for attractive places for 
production of suspension arms in aluminium. In this section I will mainly concentrate 
on the considerations done in relation to the choice of location. Then I will briefly 
discuss some economical and analytical perspectives. 
 
Search for attractive places 
In the search for attractive locations there were, as already mentioned in chapter 9.3, 
only three realistic alternatives. These were Mexico, The Detroit area in the USA and 
Canada, represented by the Province of Quebec. 
 
Mexico 
Mexico was one alternative because of the low cost. This alternative was rejected rather 
quickly because of internal analysis at Raufoss, but also on recommendation from GM. 
GM saw the Mexican alternative as an impossible idea. GM had already found that 
establishing a high technology plant in such a low cost country was a very demanding 
process, both concerning human resources and technology wise, and therefore also 
financially. The knowledge level was seen as too low, and so was the industrial 
experience in the region. The cost level in Mexico was tempting, but it could not 
counter the other factors mentioned. Even if Mexico was an interesting possibility in 
economic terms, it was rather quickly refused as a serious alternative. An additional 
argument is that in the automotive industry a hint from a car manufacturer like GM is 
taken very seriously, you must deliver good and strong argumentation to challenge their 
opinion. 
 
The Detroit area, USA 
On the Raufoss staff there were, as mentioned, several people with experience from 
North America, concerning the earlier process of technology transfer from Raufoss. 
Establishing a new plant in Holland, Michigan had imparted knowledge that was 
important in the ongoing process. By working in Michigan they had experienced central 
areas of the American car manufacturing industry. This implied experience with 
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working in an American environment including the formal legal system but also the 
more informal cultural aspects of American business society.  
 
Based on this I will claim that Raufoss had first hand knowledge of American society in 
the area of current interest. This gave them a solid foundation for considering this area 
as a potential production facility. But their experience from Holland, Michigan was 
rather poor. Several of the people involved expressed negative experience with working 
with an American organisation. First and foremost American individualism was pointed 
out as a negative feature. In their eyes it was hard to trust Americans because it was 
more important for the Americans to brag and give a positive impression in meetings, 
than it was to fulfil what they had promised and perform in accordance with what was 
expected from them. Personnel from Raufoss found this to be highly problematic. It 
was seen to be in opposition to the values that were important for those from Raufoss. 
In their development of technology and their general approach to technology, 
predictability and seriousness are among the core values. These core values were in my 
opinion regarded as threatened by the American way of bragging and the continuous 
struggle to give a good impression rather than focus on producing good technological 
results. These factors were important in Raufoss’s decision not to establish the plant in 
the Detroit area. But the relatively high cost and wages in this area were also 
contributing factors for this decision. 
 
Montreal, Canada 
When it comes to Montreal, the Norwegians were welcomed and came in contact with 
the already mentioned The Société Générale de Financement du Québec (SGF) and 
Investissement Quebeq (IQ). Here they were taken good care of and helped in their 
search for a location for their high tech aluminium production. They visited for 
example, technical-schools and potential companies for cooperation. During their stays 
in the Montreal area they also got the impression that the people were very similar to 
Norwegians and this was also seen in relation to the climatic and topographic 
conditions (I will return to this issue in the next chapter). Because of this they felt some 
kind of familiarity with what they were presented with. In addition the wages in the 
area are more competitive than the Detroit alternative. This point in my opinion seems 
to have been of importance. But the decision was not only made on this issue. All the 
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factors mentioned must be understood as the foundation for the decision, but the 
competitive costs and the professional handling by SGF and IQ must also be viewed as 
very important. 
 
When the decision to establish the plant in Montreal was taken, it was then time to find 
the right site to locate the plant. As mentioned earlier (see chapter 9) there was also a 
history, about the ground consisting of clay, in front of the final decision of establishing 
the plant at the special site in Boisbriand. But in addition to that, it is worth mentioning 
that the physical infrastructure around the plant in Boisbriand is rather good. It is close 
to Highway 15, a central communication route in Montreal and also a few hundred 
metres from a railway line (although currently Raufoss do not use the railway). It is an 
industrial area as already mentioned, close to the, now closed, GM plant. The Montreal 
region is ranked 2nd concerning the density of jobs in aerospace in North America. It is 
ranked 4th concerning the density of high tech jobs, 8th concerning density of high tech 
companies and 14th concerning the population density (Investissement Quebeq). In 
other words, from a global perspective, Montreal is a region of high quality when it 
comes to the density of what is seemed to be of vital importance in a western high tech 
industrial perspective.   
 
The economic focus 
In a process like this, it seems to be a more or less a natural reaction by managers and 
decision makers to start with the cheapest country or region when they start thinking of 
an alternative location for their business.  This was my impression at Raufoss as well. 
When they started to argue for their Canadian decision they very soon assure you that 
they had also thought of Mexico because of its low costs, but that it had to be rejected 
because of uncertainty related to more quality related issues. The interesting point is 
that in their construction of the world, the world related to business consists of various 
spots with different prices. To navigate in this business landscape you always start 
looking at the cost level and orientate yourselves from that.  This does not mean that 
they do not find qualitative issues important, but it is not the first thing that comes into 
their mind concerning these issues. This way of perceiving the world reminds me of 
Hartshorne (1939) and his fascinating mosaic of places (see chapter 3). 
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Technological preparations 
At this stage, around 2000, the factory in Norway was under construction. The work 
was organised as a project. The experienced project team was responsible for the 
planning of the production line and purchasing the equipment necessary. The design 
and engineering of the production line was partly outsourced. What Raufoss ASA had 
done was to construct a suspension arm in aluminium. Based on this they had a vision 
of how to get this suspension arm into production. But like someone in Raufoss 
Automotive Components Canada (RACC) put it:  
 
“The vision was there and the vision was clear, but it was only a vision though” 
 
By this he was pointing at one important aspect of the project of putting the suspension 
arm into production. There were plans of how to do this, but it was only a plan and not 
based on concrete experience. When they started to implement the plans, they had a lot 
of surprises as you always do in such an industrialisation processes. In such a situation 
it is important to be able to undertake problem solving with the relevant personnel or 
expert groups. Even though the planning is done in a linear way and it seems that is has 
to be so, the practical work is done in an interactive way like Pinch and Bijker (1987) 
argue (see chapter 6). So being able to have interactive problem solving with the 
different social groups, in this case different engineering milieus, seems to be one of the 
most important skills in the implementation phase. 
 
Indtech and APT 
A lot of the up-front engineering26 was outsourced to a local engineering company at 
Raufoss called Indtech and also to the international firm APT (Automation, Presses & 
Tooling) . These two companies were responsible for a lot of the up-front engineering 
of the front and the rear line. APT was mostly working with the technical solutions for 
the production line, while Indtech was mainly working with the total design of the 
production line on an aggregate level.  In this sense it can be seen as a technology 
transfer process from these two companies to Raufoss ASA in the first place. I think it 
                                                 
26 By up-front engineering I refer to the engineering and planning of the technical issues that are done in 
advance of the implementation. 
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is an interesting point, but I won’t outline it more than necessary in this thesis. My 
objective is the transfer of technology from Raufoss to Montreal.  
 
The up-front engineering 
Like the statement above concerning the vision of this process, several of those 
involved were surprised of the status of the up-front engineering. Someone at RACC 
put it this way: 
 
“What has surprised me the most is how much of the engineering that was left to the 
launch. We launched the equipment and then we set up the parameters, the temperature 
and the time etc. and we did a lot of testing in example on temperature at 530’C instead 
of 525’C and that surprised me. It should have been adjusted to 525’C; you do not play 
with that. We had bought the oven because it is 525’C. And we get the equipment to run 
we do not do process parameters set up. That surprised me. I was not used to that. This 
should have been developed before. I have seen it done at a plant close to this and it 
has been done before, and it requires a much bigger team than this. ”            
 
This statement is an indication of the frustration that became prominent when the 
launch was getting closer. But it is also, as it explicitly says, a critique of the lack of up 
front engineering or at least what those involved from RACC experienced it to be. It is 
also an indication of some disappointment among RACC concerning the expectations 
they had of the project. To be honest, the Canadian organisation had high expectations 
of the Norwegians bringing their cutting edge technology to Montreal. They more or 
less expected them to have everything set or have at least well founded solutions for the 
technical challenges ahead. When such a problem as the oven example above showed 
up, it lead to frustration and at a certain degree of disappointment in RACC. The 
Canadians became insecure because they were relying on the Norwegian Ex-pat Team 
and when they did not know what to do or did something wrong, the Canadians became 
scared and frustrated. The reason for their frustration will be elaborated on further in 
chapter 10. Right now I will limit this analytically by stating that the Canadian had high 
expectations and devoted themselves very much to this job. 
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10.2 The Phase of Transfer 
 
When the location spot was decided, Raufoss ASA started the work of establishing a 
new plant. As we have seen, the plant was being located in a highly modern area with 
the best premises for industrial activity. When these factors were in place the next issue 
for Raufoss ASA was to ensure they benefited from this solid foundation for industrial 
activity, namely by hiring talented employees to reach the company’s goals. 
 
The emergence of Raufoss Automotive Component Canada (RACC) 
In the search for qualified personnel Raufoss bought services from a local consultancy 
firm. This company was assisting Raufoss in most of the practical issues and gave 
advice on how to proceed in the further search for new employees. In many ways this 
consultancy firm can be viewed as “translators” for Raufoss ASA in the new context in 
Montreal. Literally spoken, they translated the local conditions to the Norwegians in a 
social and cultural way. The company presented what they wanted, and together they 
developed a strategy for how to do this.  
 
These consultants contributed with local knowledge of both the legislation and of the 
local workforce. When they found a group of potential candidates, Raufoss ASA 
carried out the interviews necessary to evaluate the candidates. During spring 2001 four 
people were hired, this group included the Plant Manager and two engineers. When 
these three were hired, they flew to Norway and had several stays at Raufoss. This 
Canadian management team started to hire operators and other technical personnel. At 
first they hired five operators that were planned to become key operators on the shop 
floor. These operators were immediately sent to Norway for a six month period to learn 
and work with the Norwegian organisation that was estimated to be one year ahead of 
the Canadian plant. At this stage there were eight people hired in Montreal. They were 
now in a phase of starting to build the Canadian organisation.  
 
As mentioned, the Société Générale de Financement du Québec (SGF) and the 
consultants Raufoss had used in this early process had been to some extent functioning 
as “translators” for Raufoss. At the point of hiring their own Canadian employees, they 
were also hiring their own translators. By this I mean that those that were hired and 
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then sent to Raufoss became well known within the Norwegian organisation, and in this 
way they became important translators as well. In this context the new organisation 
Raufoss Automotive Components Canada (RACC), was becoming the main focus for 
Raufoss ASA. In the previous phases of the process the company had orientated 
themselves towards the SGF and the consultants to get information that could help them 
in their efforts to understand the Montreal area.  
 
Hiring process 
In the process of hiring new personnel, Raufoss ASA hired people to the organisation at 
the same time as they hired the manager. This seems to me like an odd situation. One 
person was in fact hired before the manager. Through this engagement process, this 
person was given authority by the Raufoss management. He was hired by the owners of 
the company, and not by the manager. This seemed to lay the ground for a legitimate 
conflict between the manager and his organisation. Canadian organisations tend to be 
more hierarchical than the situation is at Raufoss, and position seems to be more 
important than the contribution or what the person is really doing.  As one of the 
Norwegians in Montreal expressed it;  
 
“Here in Montreal your position is very important, when you move from the shop floor 
and into a position in the office section, then you become a hot shot or a high stepper. It 
seems like you are becoming someone by working in the offices. In fact it seems like it 
becomes more difficult for them to communicate with the shop floor afterwards.”  
 
One way to analyse this is to claim that Raufoss ASA gave authority to another person 
than the top manager. This was done within a system where position and authority is 
much more prominent than in Norway. Here the company was creating a highly 
dangerous situation. This was a situation that almost asked for him to challenge the top 
manager. But why did the very experienced and qualified management at Raufoss make 
this mistake? First of all maybe they trusted their consultants too much and their ability 
to translate the requirements Raufoss ASA had and the profiles of the applications they 
had received concerning the jobs available. This is one option. Another possibility is 
that they were not aware of the political tension in Canadian organisations and the 
authority that could be interpreted in a situation where a person was hired before the 
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manager. It is worth mentioning that this person stressed the fact that he was the first 
hired to me several times. It was clear that this was something that was important for 
him and that he tried to use it politically in the RACC organisation. Another 
explanation might be that they were aware of the hierarchical structure in Canadian 
organisations and even the implications and the importance of positions in such a 
structure. But even if they were aware of this, it is not the same as understanding all the 
possible consequences this would have. Another way to put this is that they understood 
the spoken organisational structure and consequences, but they did not understand the 
meaning this organisational form had. Expressed in a model, inspired by Hannerz 
(1992), this can be put like this:  
 
 
 
 
 
Cultural meaning 
attached  
 
The expressed 
situation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1. The difference of what is expressed and the meaning it expresses. 
 
This means that the expressed situation within a Canadian organisational structure 
seems to be more hierarchical than in a Norwegian organisation. This is something that 
the Norwegians can recognise; they have some understanding of what hierarchy is 
about, so they nod acknowledgeable. But even if they know the word hierarchy, it is not 
the same as them knowing the Canadian meaning of this term. This means that the 
Canadian interpretation of hierarchy might be something different from the Raufoss or 
Norwegian interpretation of the word.  
 
In this particular situation I find hierarchy in the Canadian way to have a meaning of 
great individual possibilities. Hierarchy is in this way seen as a tool for the individuals 
to achieve something for themselves and their career. This is, as I see it, quite far from 
the Norwegian way of looking at a hierarchy or any organisational form. For 
Norwegians this is to a much higher degree seen as a tool for achieving something in 
common with others. The collective way of looking at things as Norwegians have a 
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tendency to do, is something quite different from North American individualism. In my 
opinion this is within the core of the challenge in this situation. 
 
This leads me to the conclusion that if the Norwegian management in cooperation with 
their consultants together had used time and tried to interpret and search for potential 
differences, it might have improved the situation. If this had been done they might have 
uncover differences between their understandings of what they, in this situation, 
understood by hierarchy. This could have helped to avoid this situation. If they had 
gone the whole way from what was being expressed and also tried to interpret what 
meanings this implied for the Canadians and the Norwegians, it would have eased the 
situation. But this means that they had to include the interpretation of the cultural 
meaning implied in the expressed notions, and thereby construct an understanding of 
what this meant and eventual consequences of this. This means that the model has to be 
extended to include these important assets: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Interpretation and understanding as important features for the construction 
of meaning. 
Interpretation 
Understanding 
 
Cultural meaning 
attached 
 
Expressed situation 
 
Travelling Canadians 
When the Canadians were engaged, one of the conditions they agreed upon was 
extensive travel to Norway. This was a clear strategy from the Raufoss management. If 
the Canadians should be able to handle their own factory based on technology 
developed at Raufoss, they had to stay at Raufoss to see how they operated the 
technology and thereby achieve experience of the technology before it was put in place 
at the plant in Montreal. Therefore several of the Canadians got to know each other at 
Raufoss. As already mentioned, the five key operators spent six months at Raufoss 
working with the Norwegian organisation. This gave them a lot of time to get to know 
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the Norwegians, Raufoss society and the Raufoss industrial area. Although it varied a 
lot whether they spent much time trying to get to know Norway as a country, or 
whether they concentrated more on the job and spent the weekends close to the plant 
where they stayed. Some of them used the days off to travel extensively around in 
Norway and Scandinavia. But all of them got lot of experience. They got to know a lot 
of the operators in Norway, and not least, they got to know some of the specialists in 
the Raufoss Industrial Area that were more or less the brains behind the development of 
this product and the production lines. This increased their self-esteem and also gave 
them a lot of authority when they got back to Montreal to establish their own plant.  
 
In addition to the operators, the Canadian Management also stayed at Raufoss for much 
of the time the operators were there. This was a very intensive period for the Canadians. 
They did not have their own office in Canada and they travelled a lot to Norway and 
stayed there, away from their families, in an ever-changing environment where they 
were supposed to learn something new all the time. So while the operators worked 
among the Norwegian operators and learned how to operate the production line, the 
management worked together with the Global Management 1 and the Plant 
Management Norway 1. They focused on the more organisational, economic and 
management issues that needed to be learned and coordinated. This was for example, 
discussions of how dependent the Canadian organisation should be and who was to take 
decisions about issues that affected both plants. It was clear that the Top Management 2 
had the final word if anything came to be problematic, but in accordance with 
Norwegian business life culture in general, involvement and negotiations are among the 
core values.  
 
Start up in Norway 
At the same time as they were building up an organisation in Canada, the Norwegian 
organisation was close to the point of start of production. This was a stressful situation 
for the Norwegian organisation and the temperature was increasing. The important 
technical resources were working very hard at the plant at Raufoss to get the production 
lines to function properly. This was a highly complicated process that demanded a lot 
of resources. For the Canadians to be part of this process was very good experience for 
them, even though at times it was also difficult. The Norwegian focus was mainly on 
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their own launch, and therefore at times it could be problematic for the Canadians to get 
the attention and focus that they wanted. But in general it can be summed up as a period 
that was very important for the Canadians. Both the Canadian Management and the 
operators got to see the launch that they were supposed to carry out 12 months later.  
 
Preparing for production activities 
During the time the Canadians were in Norway, they were preparing themselves for the 
challenges ahead, and step by step they were also trying to establish the organisation 
that were going to carry out this launch. Some of the operators were, as mentioned, 
hired, and gradually this was to be increased. In addition to recruitment, they had to 
coordinate the suppliers that were going to have a crucial role in Montreal as they had 
at Raufoss. One important aspect in the effort to establish more or less the same 
production line in Montreal, was to use more or less the same suppliers and machinery. 
So after installing the equipment at Raufoss, the main suppliers went to Montreal to 
install the same equipment over there. This meant that the Canadians to some extent 
had already developed a relationship to the suppliers they had met in Raufoss before 
they started to work together in Montreal.  
 
Start up activities 
In August 2002 the organisation was together all at once for the first time, at the plant 
in Boisbriand, including the Ex-pat Team. This marked the start of the establishment of 
the plant. In this start up period a colleague and I developed some introduction seminars 
in cooperation with the Global Organisation 1 and the Canadian management (see 
chapter 9). During the winter and spring of 2002 we had developed a course together in 
what was named coordination management.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 9.2, in August we spent two days with the entire RACC 
organisation including the Ex-pat Team and the Global Organisation 1 management 
(see chapter 9).  Our main objective was to contribute to the establishment of RACC 
and to set some common objectives for the organisation. It was therefore important to 
get the organisation to talk to each other outside of the stressful situation at the plant, so 
this was arranged at SGF’s premises in downtown Montreal. We spoke on how we can 
view the world as being socially constructed and which implications there might be on 
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such a transfer of technology, from Norway to Canada. The main issue for us during 
these days was to create an arena for trust so that the participants could have some 
important open minded discussions of important issues at the plant. The first day was a 
general introduction to those of us who had arranged the course and the other 
participants. We gave a few lectures during these two days, but mainly our intention 
was to start a reflection processes of how those involved could contribute to a 
successful transfer. Establishing the organisation as a group was one of the main issues.   
 
The most important result of these two seminars was, in my perspective, that the 
organisation started to talk together and the organisation more or less started to 
establish themselves as a group. So in that way we succeeded. During this process they 
identified some threats to the organisation and the process in general. The main threat 
they agreed to take action on was the language issue. The first time I visted the plant 
there was a mixture of Norwegian, French (or more precisely Québécois) and English. 
The organisation found this problematic and agreed on that the language at the plant 
was suppose to be English so everyone could feel included. 
 
 
10.3 Towards start of Production 
 
During autumn 2002 most of the equipment was in place at the Montreal plant. This 
marked the start of a new and critical phase of the establishment. Now all the 
equipment was going to be mounted together and tested in different ways to ensure the 
RACC organisation, the Raufoss management and GM that the organisation was ready 
to start production and that the suspension arms would be produced in time and with the 
required quality. But the test of the equipment included also testing the personnel and 
the organisation. This was a demanding test period for RACC where the pressure was 
raised dramatically. At the same time it was also a demanding and critical learning 
period for RACC.  
 
In the automotive industry there are several quality systems that are jointly developed 
by the big automotive organisations. One of the systems is QS 9000. QS 9000 is now 
being replaced by another system called TS 16949. But what these systems have in 
common is that they prescribe a way of how to implement a new production system. 
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There are set milestones that the organisation has to fulfil in the effort to become a 
qualified contractor. Another reason for this system is so that the automotive 
corporation can monitor the subcontractor’s performance in the very early stages. I will 
present three of the most important milestones, namely; Production Part Approval 
Process (PPAP), Run @ Rate (R@R) and Start of Production (SoP). 
 
Production Part Approval Process (PPAP) 
PPAP is documentation which every supplier using the QS 9000 quality system must 
show to their customer. This is done to document that they are able to produce the 
product they have agree upon. The test documents that the processes they have 
described are functioning and that through these processes they can produce the product 
to the desired quality. In principle what is required is that you use the equipment to 
produce one product as you have specified. If the product you have produced is verified 
to be in accordance with the specifications, you have passed the test. This is the first 
step for both Raufoss Chasis Technology (RCT) and Raufoss Automotive Components 
Canada (RACC) in the process of assuring GM that they were capable of delivering 
their product in accordance with the specifications and that they are a trustworthy 
partner. 
 
Run @ Rate (R@R) 
To do a R@R is to measure that the equipment that you have tested earlier through the 
PPAP is able to keep the speed it promises in the documentation you have given the 
contractor. While PPAP is documenting that the equipment you are using is capable of 
producing the parts you have agreed upon, a R@R is documentation that you can 
produce these parts at the speed or rate that you have described and promised your 
contract partner. So while PPAP is more of a quality check, the R@R is more like a 
quantitative check. These two tests are important milestones for every supplier in the 
automotive industry. When you pass them, you have showed that your equipment is 
capable of producing both the estimated quality and quantity. 
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Start of Production (SoP) 
The next important milestone when you have passed both the PPAP and R @ R is Start 
of Production (SoP). This means the point when you are going to deliver the product to 
the automotive assembly line. When looking at the practical side of it, the production 
starts before this date, and then you produce stock to be sure that you can deliver the 
product, even if something unforeseen happens. So at the date of SoP you are 
contracted to start your delivery, even though you have already had a period where you 
have ramped up your production. 
 
Increased pressure and a few tactical blunders 
The Ex-pat Team was in charge of all the testing of equipment at the plant. But all the 
testing was done with the whole operational staff at place. This meant that this period 
of hard testing and continuous search for defects and faults were done with staff present 
who were inexperienced in this kind of processes. This was a stressful situation with 
very high psychological pressure on the staff. For example they spent days searching 
for the reason for the production line was not functioning, without finding the cause. At 
the same time they knew that the day for the final test was getting closer and closer. 
This ‘stressed’ the inexperienced Canadians a lot. One of the Canadians expressed it 
this way:  
 
“We were not ready for this, we were too inexperienced, it was really hard times.”  
 
The winter of 2002/2003 was a tough winter for the inexperienced Canadians. Both 
PPAP and R@R were done during this period. They lived with the uncertainty of 
whether the plant, that they had put so much effort into, would pass the tests they 
worked so hard to reach. The Ex-pat Team and the more experienced Canadians, who 
had gone through such processes before, were much calmer and worked determinedly 
towards the objectives. But even though the more experienced personnel were calmer, 
this situation was a tough test for RACC, both individually and as a group. Both the Ex-
pat Team and the Canadian management regarded the experiences from this to be on 
the furthest edge of what an organisation is able to handle. They now both regard the 
decision of letting the operators take part in this process to be wrong. To underline the 
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pressure they experienced, here is a quotation from one of the Ex-pat Team members 
indicating the extent of this pressure:  
 
“During that period I several times had to take walks with some of the employees, we 
walked around the factory in the snow, and they were on the edge of a totally 
breakdown, when you experience grown up men crying because they do not think they 
will be able to reach the goals for the plant, it has gone too far. The operators should 
not have been there in the first place, it stressed them too much, and we had to canalise 
energy towards taking care of them in a situation were we needed concentration on 
problem solving” 
 
Individuals at the edge of breakdown were one situation that increased the stress levels 
and had an impact on the organisation. Another and just as important situation was the 
increased conflict potential that occurs when the pressure rises in such a way as the 
situation was here. And the conflict that was aroused was mainly between Canadians 
but also between Canadians and the Ex-pat Team. In frustration, conflicts between the 
Canadians emerged, but mainly the frustration was directed to the management and the 
Ex-pat Team.  
 
“When you launch at the plant you do not need an army, you need 3-4 key people and 
you launch the plant, you do not need much support, and the support will cost you 
more.” 
 
What is expressed here is that the Ex-pat Team discovered that to have the Canadians 
present on the shop floor during these hard testing periods was to be very stressful for 
both the Ex-pat Team and the Canadians. Their experience was that this would have 
been much less painful if the Ex-pat Team had done this by themselves, without having 
to take care of and involve the Canadians at the same time. This experience is from my 
perspective highly relevant and important, but the regret of letting the operators take 
part in this processes is not without implications. The learning potential in these 
situations is huge, and in my opinion excluding the operators from this could also have 
long-term consequences. Through participating in the launch the operators learned a lot, 
at the same time they became very frustrated. During this period they achieved first 
hand knowledge of the plant’s machinery and equipment.  
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10.4 Summing up 
 
In this first analytical chapter I have combined being analytical at the same time as I 
have described some important features of the process of transfer of knowledge and 
technology. I have spilt the transfer process into three different sub-phases; the phase of 
preparation and planning, the phase of transfer and finally the phase towards start of 
production. 
 
The phase of preparation and planning is mostly considering the search for attractive 
places to locate the production lines. Here I have presented the different alternatives; 
Mexico, the Detroit area in USA and Montreal in Canada. I end this discussion by 
relating the dominance of economic focus in such processes to Hartshorne’s concept of 
place as a fascinating mosaic. Then I have turned the focus onto the technical 
preparations. Here I focus on the outsourcing of the up-front engineering and some of 
the frustration evident in RACC because of what they saw as a lack of preparation. 
 
In the phase of transfer I turn the focus onto the way the Canadian organisation was 
established. An important aspect of this is the hiring process. In this relation I analyse 
some of the first glimpses of cultural differences. Inspired by Hannerz (1992), I come 
up with a model that I find very important to be aware of in a process like this, where 
the first impression might be that there are no cultural differences. This model 
emphasises the importance of interpreting and understanding the cultural meaning 
attached to what is expressed, when what is expressed is for example the same spoken 
words. The meaning behind these expressions might differ, and this is the main focus of 
this model. I end this section with a presentation of some startup activities as an 
introduction to the next section. 
 
The last section in this chapter is dedicated to the phase towards start of production. 
Here I present some important industrial milestones for RACC. These are the 
Production Part Approval Process (PPAP), Run @ Rate (R@R) and Start of Production 
(SoP). Based on the experience from these processes I discuss the pressure the 
organisation experienced.  
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Whilst the present chapter has been both a description of the technology transfer 
process and an analysis of this process, the next three analytical chapters will answer 
the first three research questions that were presented in chapter 1. These were further 
elaborated through the theoretical chapters in the section three: transformation 
processes. 
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11. Culture 
 
The main purpose with this chapter is to analyse in what way the historical 
trajectories at different places, understood as cultural or institutional aspects, are 
affecting the process of technology transfer? I will discuss how culture and 
institutions has affected the process of technology and knowledge transfer. I 
will start with some reflections and considerations Raufoss made at the 
beginning of the project, concerning the cultural issues. I will then analyse the 
consequences of these considerations. Further I will present some basic cultural 
differences between the Norwegians and the Canadians, and how these 
differences have affected the cooperation especially at the plant in Montreal. At 
the end of this chapter I will analyse how language as well as body language has 
been important issues in the process of technology and knowledge transfer. 
 
 
11.1 A potential challenge 
 
Raufoss ASA’s decision to locate their plant in the Montreal region was 
founded on a range of different considerations. One of the issues that were 
being discussed up front was cultural issues. The experienced staff at Raufoss 
had realised that cultural differences often could be an obstacle in processes like 
this. At the same time, in discussions with me, they were not very precise as to 
what culture was. They used the notion more or less as a container for whatever 
that might be different between two organisations and societies. Anyway it was 
an issue for them, and they were aware that this could be a potential problem in 
some way.  
 
The cultural considerations 
In the localisation process Raufoss considered several different alternatives as 
described in chapter 9 and 10, but as we know, they ended up choosing 
Boisbriand just outside Montreal. When we discussed the reasons for this 
location, the discussion was quite soon spinning around the cultural issue. What 
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was rather interesting about their arguments was their tendency to mix the 
natural surroundings and the human behaviour. The argumentation turned out to 
be of a quite nature deterministic character.  One of the people involved in this 
process put the arguments of why Montreal was seen as a good alternative this 
way : 
 
 ” I do not think that Montreal is such a stupid idea. They seem to be very much 
like us Norwegians. They got mountains and fjords, and the climate is pretty 
much the same, just a little bit more cold in the winter time, but they even got 
cross country ski tracks, so they seem pretty much like us. I do not think we are 
so different from each other culturally” 
 
I could not believe what I heard. This was probably the most environmental 
deterministic statement I ever had heard in a serious discussion. The connection 
between  nature and climatic conditions on the one hand and the cultural on the 
other that is prominent in this quotation was at first surprising for me. In the 
history of the discipline of geography, and in my view, such a nature 
deterministic logic was rejected over 100 years ago. I chose to see this quotation 
as an expression of an expectation of the similarities of Norwegians and 
Canadians. In addition, this quotation also represents a construction of place that 
is interesting concerning the expectations people from Raufoss constructed and 
carried with them in their meeting with Montreal. By looking at the physical 
surroundings this person in a way reduces the complexity of the place Montreal 
to be similar to what he knows best, his homeland.  
 
At first glance there are definitely a lot of similarities. The way I see it is that 
people at Raufoss, including the person quoted above, had a need for an 
explanation of these similarities, and they found it in nature. So I interpret this 
statement as an attempt to understand why these similarities seem so evident. 
Through this construction of Montreal as a place, they make it understandable 
and familiar. This is also a way to make it into something that they can talk 
about. In this perspective, it can be seen as a start of getting to know Montreal, 
by reducing this place to something familiar, thoughts that can be shared with 
others. By talking of Montreal in this manner internally, they made it into 
 164
Analysis and Conclusions 
something that they felt that they could handle. Montreal became to something 
familiar through their constructions. In a very early stage of the transfer process 
when more or less everything was uncertain and chaotic, it was of course 
important to try to make the challenges possible to handle. In this way the 
physical similarities became the confirmation of the similarities between 
Norway and Canada. In fact, they are not just seen as a confirmation, but they 
become the evidence of that what they see and experience in the interaction with 
Canadians, is true. This is confirmed and constructed into evidence by nature 
and the physical surroundings they experience when they visit Montreal. And 
they did not just relate it to nature but also to the activities the Canadians carried 
out in nature. Like cross-country ski tracks as mentioned in the quotation above. 
This anticipation of the cultural similarities could be analysed in relation to 
Hannerz’s (1992) contribution elaborated in chapter 4. In Hannerz’s three-
dimensional model he points at three important aspects of viewing culture, that 
is: 1.Ideas and modes of thought, 2. Forms of externalisation and 3.The social 
distribution of these phenomena in a population. What Raufoss did here in their 
analyses was to forget or not recognise the importance of the ideas and modes 
of thought, in their attempt to understand the culture in the Montreal area. On 
the basis of what they saw, the forms of externalisation, they anticipated that the 
ideas and modes of thought behind these activities, in example cross country 
skiing and way of behaving, were the same as in Norway. And secondly, they 
anticipated a generalisation of the social distribution of this as well. Such a 
generalisation based on a few visits and being in contact with a limited segment 
of mostly English speaking people, is a too narrow foundation for concluding 
that the Canadians are more or less the same as the Norwegians. 
 
The consequences of these considerations 
Because of the experiences they’d had before, Raufoss ASA was aware of the 
potential challenges connected to cultural differences. So when they 
experienced Norwegians and Canadians to be very similar, and then had this 
interpretation confirmed by the physical surroundings, they felt reassured 
concerning the cultural challenges. In their understanding, the cultural 
differences would be at a minimum. The situation was, in their perspective, that 
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they were supposed to establish a plant in a western society and country located 
in a natural environment that reminds them of Norway. Both Canada and 
Quebec have social democratic features, in opposition to the more market 
liberal USA. This issue was put forward during several gatherings I participated 
in at the Canadian Embassy in Oslo during the winter and early spring of 2002. 
During these sessions the similarities between Norway and Canada were 
repeatedly underlined, for example that we very often vote the same way in the 
United Nations. This was seen as an evidence of a common value foundation in 
these two countries at either side of the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
The impression from the sessions at the embassy contributed to an 
understanding of two countries with a very common view of the world and with 
a common belief system, and very few, if any, cultural obstacles. In my point of 
view, this is a very pragmatic treatment of reality. But, to sell the country for 
foreign investment and tourists is more or less the job of an embassy. Those 
who receive this information have to be highly critical in my point of view. At 
these gatherings there were also representatives of Raufoss ASA present. The 
reason for their presence was both to learn about Canada and to present their 
project in Montreal at a very early level of their experience with the Canadians. 
The experience the company had with the Canadians at this point was rather 
scarce and limited to a certain group mainly consisting of high-level officials.  
 
At one of these gatherings a representative from another prominent Norwegian 
firm with wide experience from Canadian industry, spoke about this experience 
from Canada. This representative, who at this time was the Senior Vice 
President of this company and was born in Canada, focused mainly on one 
issue; Canada and Norway seem to be very similar, but there are cultural 
differences, and it is extremely important to be aware of these differences. I 
noted this statement, but my impression at the end of the day and in the 
gathering after the lectures was that it was the similarities that had been focused 
on, the differences could be there, but they were possible to overcome.  
 
To sum up, Raufoss at an early stage of the process found Canada and Norway 
to be very similar. There were given warnings that there were differences to be 
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aware of, like there very often is in such situations. But the main impression 
was that the cultural differences were more or less absent, so it was not 
necessary to direct many resources in that direction.  
 
Cultural implications 
Whatever was expected at an early stage, in the end it seems to differ from what 
was experienced during this process. It is often difficult to foresee what is 
coming and what kind of knowledge it is important to express for the 
participants in such a situation. This become clear for me after a meeting I 
participated in April 2002. At this meeting was the Norwegians who were most 
involved in the process present. This was more or less a kick off meeting for the 
technology transfer. I was invited for two reasons, partly as a preparation for the 
seminars that were going to be held in Montreal (see chapter 10.2) and partly as 
a PhD Student.  Here I addressed several issues that they might be aware of, 
among these I made a point out of Gertler’s (1997) finding that Canadians have 
a quite different approach to industrial problem solutions and behaviour than 
what is common in Germany and, according to my knowledge, at Raufoss as 
well. This was noted by the participants, but at the same time I felt that this 
message did not reach them, a feeling in direction of; “okay, that might be right 
and interesting, but we do not think that will be a problem for us”. During this 
meeting and afterwards I was, on my own, starting to question the findings of 
Gertler and their importance and relevance for this situation. I think that this 
was a relevant question to ask myself at that time. It is important to evaluate the 
theoretical issues you carry with you in a situation like this. To ask this question 
was in my opinion right, but to doubt the findings of Gertler’s relevance turned 
out to be wrong, as I will show in the next section. 
 
 
11.2 Some basic cultural differences 
 
One of the issues that have turned out pretty clearly during my work with this 
project is that more or less everybody experienced a latent conflict or tension 
between those involved in the transfer process. The reason why I call it latent is 
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that on the surface the situation seems stable and without confrontation. But just 
beneath the surface it smouldered. My impression though, of differences 
between representatives from two countries that are supposed to be quite similar 
is stunning. This is also experienced by one of the Norwegians involved :  
 
“Before we arrived we talked about how similar we were, and that turned out to 
be right, we are very similar. But the small differences that is present gets very 
big. This is such basic attitudes that do not get evident in the daily work or that 
you really do not care so much about them. But when it starts to get hot they 
also become evident!!” 
 
As it is pointed out in this quote there are some differences that became visible 
when the pressure rises. This means that these differences are difficult to get a 
grip on in daily life or in ordinary situations. They had to be set under some 
kind of pressure to become visible. These differences are in my opinion of a 
very fundamental character. Like one Norwegian told me:  
 
“What has surprised me the most is ……That I discovered how incredible 
important it becomes what your mother and father have been teaching you 
during your growth. And all what this little things effect what you do in your 
daily activity.” 
 
Here it is pointed at a substantial factor in human interaction, namely what has 
been given to the individual by their surrounding and in this example by the 
parents who are often seen as the closest ones. In the situation this was said 
there was no doubt that this person was pointing at how important it is what 
Norwegian parents tell their children, and how important it is what Canadian 
parents tell their children. He is pointing at national differences that arise and 
are reproduced by impulses given during childhood. The person quoted above is 
a skilled and an experienced engineer, having in my opinion an engineer-based 
view of life. And that was partly also the reason why this quotation was the one 
that surprised me the most during this study. The surprise was not that 
somebody would, at some stage, express themselves in such a way, but that this 
particular engineer would put it this way. This is also giving an indication of the 
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important learning processes that have been evident in the transfer process, 
learning processes that go beyond the technical specifications, and I will come 
back to this in the next chapter.  
 
Another way to analyse this quotation is to understand it to be a confirmation of 
the effects of social construction. This person is realising the effects of being a 
product of different social constructions and how this is visualised when you 
meet people with different backgrounds. He anticipates his social construction 
to be a product of what has been given to him by his mother or father. I do not 
want to interpret his statement literally, because the way I analyse it is that he 
points at something that is rooted deep inside you from the very early days of 
your life. He uses the metaphor mother and father to describe the construction 
he has been a part of from his early years. This is a description of how 
something inscribed into a person at the early years of life, affects his 
interaction with others today. The effect of these inscriptions from early years 
was a quite common issue during my stay in Montreal in June 2003. The reason 
for this is to find in the challenges they had been through during the launch this 
winter. 
 
Different problem solution attitudes 
In April 2002, when the first Canadians had been at Raufoss for a while, I spent 
some time there. I found it interesting to get a glimpse of how the first meetings 
between the Canadians and Norwegians turned out. One of the Norwegian’s 
reactions came like this:  
 
“The Canadians seem to be ok. They are eager and want to learn, they want to 
understand this technology and get into depth of it. But they can turn too eager, 
when the line stops they want to fetch the sledgehammer and more or less attack 
the line at once without analysing the situation. That is a little dangerous, we 
can’t act that way” 
 
Those who have developed this technology have realised that it is a very 
immature technology that goes through phases of troubleshooting, where the 
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only way to handle this is to be systematic in the problem solution activity. In 
short terms they want to know why the line stops before they get it started 
again. This is a very important issue for the milieu at Raufoss that has clear 
features of being very influenced by developmental values. It is in general a 
development and innovative milieu rather than a production milieu (see chapter 
9). This is at least very evident in what I earlier have labelled “the technology 
culture” at Raufoss (Nilsen 1999, Dale & Nilsen 2000). One of the features 
characterising the technology culture is a close cooperation between the 
development department and the production line. This was expressed to me in 
this way: 
 
“Yes it is important with close cooperation between the researcher and the 
operator. If we look at the new plant now we have Mr.XX in example that is dr. 
engineer in metallurgy. He is one of the persons who has knowledge and 
competence on this issue and has thought about these issues for a while and 
have a clear opinion of how things are functioning. And then you got team 
leader Ms. YY in example at the forging line. When she is going to make some 
adjustments on the temperature or something like that she has to contact Mr. 
XX and they have to coordinate this all the time. It has to be a short distance 
between theory and practice.” 
 
This gives an indication of the tight cooperation between the development 
department and the operators at the Raufoss plant. At the same time it says 
something about the positions the engineers and the development department 
have in this industrial milieu. The development department and its engineers 
have an informal dominant role. Therefore the production line accepts and is 
used to analyse the situation before starting up the line, and often this is done in 
cooperation with the development department. This acceptance and way of 
doing it can be labelled to be an analytical approach to problem solving. This 
can be seen as a cognitive institution mentioned in chapter 4. This way of 
working, in accordance with the analytical approach, has become “the way we 
do it”. At the same time it can be seen as a cognitive institution with normative 
aspects. To work this way is important for the milieu at Raufoss, and this way of 
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working is infused with value. It is not just “the way we do it”, but also the way 
it is expected to be done. 
 
This situation has remained through the whole process of establishing the plant 
in Montreal. The Canadians are eager to get the production line going, while the 
Norwegians prior to analyse the situation at first. An explanation to this can be 
found in Gertler’s argumentation. Gertler (1997) suggests that there is another 
institutional structure of the Canadian Capital versus European Capital. I like to 
add here that from my perspective, we can most likely talk about North-
American Capital versus European Capital. The institutional explanation that 
Gertler suggests is that the North-American Capital is far more short term than 
the European. The capital demands a higher earning per invested dollar, and a 
consequence of this is that the production line has to be running. When the 
production line is not running, the earnings decrease, and this is not acceptable 
for the Capital.  
 
Gertler’s argumentation is illustrated by the fact that the Canadian workers are 
eager to keep the production line running because the Capital demands so. The 
result is a production-oriented attitude, where the important issue is to keep the 
line going. This has some consequences as Gertler points out, for example for 
the maintenance area, where equipment is not maintained in a satisfactory way, 
and in Gertler’s example, the German way. This institutional attitude explains 
the action and behaviour in the production. It leads to the construction of a 
production culture where to get the production line going and keep it going 
became the core values.  
 
This is, as I see it, also the case in my story. The operators are very eager to get 
the production line going and keep it going. In this relation it can be argued that 
there are two different institutions that meet and are in conflict in this situation, 
the Norwegian based institution of analytical approach and the Canadian based 
institution that is production oriented.  I find Gertler’s reasoning and conclusion 
in this case to be relevant to a large degree and in accordance with what I have 
been seeing in my study. But I think that there can also be other explanations, in 
relation to Gertler’s, that should be put forward. The situation at the plant in 
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Boisbriand was rather tense because of this different way of behaviour. 
Although the picture is more complex and nuanced than the explanation given 
above, I will go into more depth of this issue to get a more holistic 
understanding of the situation. But first I will elaborate more on the differences 
between the Norwegian focus on quality and the Canadians production oriented 
attitude. 
 
Quality versus production orientation 
While quality is the main focus at Raufoss, the Canadians have a different 
perspective. As already said they are more production orientated. One of my 
informants expressed this about situations that occurred when the production 
line was stopped:  
 
“You know we Canadians get frustrated, not because of the equipment or the 
way the Norwegians act, but we just want to run the machines and operate the 
lines, you know that is why we are here…”  
 
The frustration that it is referred to here is related to what happened when the 
production line was out of function. In those situations the Canadians felt 
useless and became frustrated. This caused a lot of tension and stress at the plant 
in Boisbriand in particular. The Canadians production orientated attitude has 
already been mentioned, and trying to explain this and their eagerness to keep 
the production line going, one of them put it this way:  
 
“…..if you are responsible you want to work harder, …it does not look like you 
are working, you are not earning your money. And now I can earn my paycheck 
and that is important. So that is what I see it that way with the guys, they want 
to earn.” 
 
Another one put it in a much more to the point way: 
 
“ We just want to earn our paycheck” 
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This is fairly in opposite to the technology culture of Raufoss that is more 
concerned about whether the production facilities are functioning perfectly or 
what can be improved. The representatives for the technology culture at Raufoss 
are very quality orientated, in a way that reminds me of the expression used by 
Cooke and Morgan (1994:97) about the German car manufacturing industry; 
“proud engineer tradition”27. The product quality is the first priority whatever 
the situation is. Quality is prior to cost, and that is a clear feature of strong 
engineer dominance. This was put this way in a meeting:  
 
“…the quality is above all importance, if we let go on quality we lose, Raufoss 
as a brand is quality”  
 
For the Canadians it is very important to do the job they are set to do. In fact, 
the Canadians feel obliged to do this job, and therefore they get frustrated when 
they are prohibited from doing what they are paid for. In relation to this, it is 
important to mention the work-systems in Canada that are quite different from 
the Norwegian. In Canada you can quit your job on Friday afternoon and start 
with a competitive firm across the street the following Monday morning at 
seven o’clock. This is also a privilege of the employer. You can be fired just as 
quickly as well. In Norway the system takes much more care of the employees, 
and there is most likely three-month quarantine before entering a new job. In 
addition, you are ensured pay for three months from the day you are given 
notice. 
 
The quality focus that Raufoss ASA emphasis can be seen as a cognitive 
institution that has been developed through their long experience with the 
automotive industry. Through this experience they have learned that the lack of 
quality has consequences, this has infused this cognitive institution with value 
and has given it a normative character as well. Concerning the Canadian 
institution of production orientation it is clearly that this institution has 
normative aspects. This is due to what they feel is expected of them. The origin 
of this institution is hard to point at, but maybe it has turned out to be the way 
                                                 
27 Raufoss can maybe be seen as more German than German industry; one story at Raufoss says 
that German customers are often impressed by the order at the plant at Raufoss (Nilsen 1999). 
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we do it, or it may be a result of the regulations of the labour market. If so, it is 
what I would address as a regulative institution. 
 
Individualism versus Collectivism 
Underlying the differences in attitudes already mentioned there are some other 
fundamental differences. This difference is also hard to identify at first glance 
during the daily activity. I find much of the difference to be related to what can 
be called the North-American individualism in opposition to the Norwegian 
collectivism. The North-American individualism can be identified through the 
American dream, characterised by the individual rights and that everyone, in the 
end, is dependent upon themselves. The Norwegian collectivism, characterised 
by solving problems in common, is based on social democratic ideals especially 
developed during the post-war period. When it comes to differences between 
the Norwegians and the Canadians, they seem to be very much rooted in this 
distinction. This is a fundamental distinction that affects a lot of the actions that 
are carried out in the transfer process. And it is like the informant mentioned 
above said:  
 
“these are such basic attitudes “. 
 
When building a plant from scratch to Start of Production (SoP) within a period 
of a year, these different ways of behaving and acting become quite important. 
If we think in a sequential way, that the Norwegians are going to establish a 
new plant in Montreal and the Canadians are supposed to learn how to operate 
this plant, these differences do not seem very problematic. What makes them 
problematic is when we see the interactive picture of these actions, where the 
Norwegians and the Canadians have to work closely together within the same 
offices and shop floor, and under a time pressure that becomes substantial. Then 
the situation becomes more complex than what it seems like when all these 
elements are artificially separated from each other in a sequential way.  
 
My argument about the American individualism versus the Norwegian 
collectivism, as important factors in this, has to be elaborated further. How did 
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these factors come into play in this process of technology transfer? The most 
evident situation occurs in problem solving, when Norwegians from the Ex-Pat 
Team for example should discuss a problem with Canadians. As one of the Ex-
Pat Team put it: 
 
 “It is impossible to discuss an issue with the Canadians, with the aim of coming 
to a solution through that discussion. The problem is that when I try to 
elaborate the problem and discuss different solutions with, for example, three 
Canadians, all three of them are sitting there thinking to themselves that they 
know the answer, but in the discussion they say” oh now this was a very difficult 
issue, I am not really sure if we can manage to solve this”. But at the same time 
they are thinking on their own; ”Okay, now I know the solution, when the 
meeting is over I shall go out and fix this issue, that will make me a hero.” So to 
be able to have good discussions here is more or less impossible.” 
 
Another informant underlines this experience by this expression:  
 
“It is not possible to have enough good discussions here. It seems for me more 
like theatre.” 
 
The Norwegians experience the Canadians to only be concerned about how to 
put themselves in a good light and how to promote themselves and their 
knowledge and skills. This is in many ways completely different from what the 
Norwegians are used to, and it also differs from what they see as proper 
behaviour. This produces frustration, as expressed in the next quotation: 
 
 “Over here it is like that everyone who discovers a problem, is supposed to fix 
it themselves, and afterwards they will tell the rest of the organisation that we 
had a major incident, as you surely have heard of, but I have fixed it. It was a 
very big job, I had a hard time, but it went well” 
 
The Norwegian Ex-Pat Team interpret these events as a confirmation of the 
individualism present in North America. This interpretation of the Canadian 
behaviour ends up in a negative way, because of the fundamental differences in 
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how to behave in a proper way. This can be seen as a conflict based on different 
normative institutions, where the values of the Norwegian collectivism meet the 
values of the Canadian individualism. The self-bragging attitude is in strong 
opposition to the Norwegians’ values and what the Norwegians experience 
themselves to do, namely to contribute to the best of the whole group and not to 
promote themselves or their own interests. This is important for them because 
they are sent on a mission for not only their company, but also it can also be 
seen as a mission for the whole Raufoss society. Everyone in the Raufoss 
society knows about the plant they are establishing in Montreal, and most of 
them know at least some of those who are the Raufoss representatives in 
Canada. This is of course a burden the Ex-Pat Team is aware of, and it is also a 
mission they have put their honour into. They know that they are dependent on 
the different knowledge the members of the Ex-Pat Team are in possession of, 
and therefore this strengthens the team spirit of the Ex-Pat Team.  
 
The strong internal unity in the Ex-Pat Team put those that are outside this 
team, and are divergent from this, in a critical light. This contributes to show the 
differences more clearly. The individualistic focus of the Canadians becomes 
very visual for the Norwegians. The honour they have put to their mission is 
escalating their frustration of this individuality. I think this is an important point 
in this story. The cooperation between the Canadians and the Norwegians has 
coming under an enormous pressure that has surely affected the situation. This 
means that the situations that had occurred during this hard period of PPAP 
(Production Part Approval Process) and R@R (Run at Rate), has been a very 
special situation that have challenged the organisation in a very special way. 
How representative this situation will be for everyday life is hard to say at this 
point. The way I see it however, it is likely that with such a reaction pattern, 
conflicts are likely to arise when the organisation is going through hard and 
challenging periods. 
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11.3 Language, an issue 
 
During interviews and work I did with the participants at Raufoss at an early 
stage, there was a relaxed attitude towards the language issue. It was realised 
that Montreal and thus Boisbriand was in French Canada and that French was 
the first language. However, they also had found that English was fairly well 
spoken. This was put this way:  
 
“….yes, but even if French is the first language, I believe that they also speak 
English fairy well….”  
 
This was said at a point of the operation where Raufoss had hired the staff and 
the key-operators. And their experience was that these people spoke English, 
even if their first language was French. All those hired at that time in my point 
of view speak English excellently, much better than the Norwegians did. But 
this was a group consisting of only 10 people. They had overlooked the point 
that not everyone in Montreal speaks English perfectly, and not everybody even 
speaks English. Montreal is the biggest city in Quebec, and with its 3.6 million 
inhabitants, it has approximately 50% of Quebec’s population. Inner Montreal 
has approximately 1 million inhabitants, and about half of them speak both 
French and English, 400,000 speak only French and 100,000 only English 
(Lonely Planet 2001). This underlines the point that the language is not a 
straightforward issue where you can anticipate that everybody will understand 
English. But if we extrapolate these numbers from inner Montreal to greater 
Montreal, we find that 1,440,000 (40%) speak only French and 360,000 (10%) 
speak only English. From these numbers we can also anticipate that 1,800,000 
are bilingual. If we add those 360,000 that speak only English we find that 
2,160,000 people in the greater Montreal speak English. That is a very high 
number, probably not so far away from the number that speaks English in 
Norway.  
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From these figures it was hardly any reason to make the language issue into a 
problem in advance of the process. But with knowledge of Quebec and its 
reputation as French Canada and the nationalists’ fight for independence, it 
should maybe been a reason to pay attention to the language issue.  During my 
stay in Montreal in June 2003, I found that a lot of those hired at that time were 
rather poor in both understanding and expressing themselves in English. Fairly 
early in the process the Canadians expressed to me that it was only a matter of 
time before there would be people hired who were rather poor English speakers. 
This was still not an issue for the Norwegians, and the impression I was left 
with was that this was an internal Canadian issue. The Canadian Management 
was seen as those responsible to communicate with those who did not speak 
English.  
 
During the seminar we arranged in August 2002, one of the main conclusions 
the participants got was an agreement of English as the only language to be 
spoken at the plant (see chapter 10.2). This was because they had experienced 
uncomfortable events and situations related to language issues. One of the 
Norwegians that had been in Montreal for two weeks before this seminar, 
expressed this frustration at the other participants at the seminar like this: 
 
“I am not very happy with the situation right now, to be honest; my stomach 
hurts, we have a long way to go. It is necessary that we communicate in this 
process. If we do not we will fail. It is hard for me to understand French and I 
am sure that it is difficult for you to understand when we talk Norwegian.” 
 
There were also Canadians addressing frustration related to language issues at 
that time. This situation was not only because of the French, it was also in 
relation to Norwegian. The effect of the decision of English as the only 
language was on short term a better atmosphere at the plant and a more 
inclusive experience for those involved. I was in close contact with the 
participants after this seminar, and the feedback was clear on this issue. For an 
organisation that was at a starting point in its development, a common language 
was of high importance to gain trust among those involved. One of the more 
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basic needs concerning building trust among people must be that everybody are 
capable of understanding what the others are trying to communicate to them. 
 
During the winter 2002/2003 the organisation was, as shown in chapter 10 put 
under enormous pressure during the launch. They also had to hire people who 
were more or less only French speaking, because it was more or less impossible 
to get only English speaking operators. The feedback from this period shows 
that language continued to be an issue at the plant, and as the temperature 
increased, the reactions on how communication was made also became more 
focused. This resulted in a change in the language politics at the plant. The 
agreement on having all meetings in English more or less came to an end during 
the winter, based on among others the following experience: 
 
“Well if we do a meeting with the Canadians and you assisted, we can do one in 
English and then 15 minutes in English and 15 minutes in French, with all the 
employees, we do that sometimes. When we do it 15 minutes in English, it will 
last 15 minutes. When we switch to French, it last half an hour. We got lots of 
questions. We get everybody much more at ease. We can communicate a lot 
more right with the people.” 
 
This was one of several occasions that contributed to a change in the language 
politics at the plant. But the most important happening in this regard was the 
following incident, that underlined the drama and power in this issue:  
 
“At one point we got a warning, that the boys were about to call the protection 
of the French language office. We have that here, it is an official government 
office. Because they were tired of seeing English everywhere. And it is a Quebec 
law that your are not allowed to be in English, you have to be in French.” 
 
This was a dramatic situation. RACC was launching the plant, and there was a 
lot of testing going on. The pressure and expectations on the organisation was 
high. A quarrel with the French language office was not what they needed at 
this time. The Canadian Plant Management gathered the operators in groups and 
tried to work out a solution to this situation. The morale of the operators was 
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down, and organisation wise the situation was tense. The Canadian Plant 
Management was concerned of what signal such a situation would send to the 
Norwegians, both the Raufoss ASA as the owners and the Ex-Pat Team as 
colleagues. Reconstructing the dialogue with the operators, one of the Canadian 
Plant Management put it this way:  
 
“And they just said that they have no problem with the Norwegians and that we 
do this in English, they said that is fine, even the documents, just make sure 
when you can that you translate in both English and French, the common 
memos and in meeting you could do it in English and French. They said: some 
of us speak a bit of English but we do not really understand what you are all 
saying. So that was the problem. As we were getting more and more employees, 
the employees are not catching everything we say in English. So any way that’s 
what happened. They did not complain, no.” 
 
So, in the end there was no complaining to the French Language Office. But in a 
rather dramatic way both the Canadian Plant Management and the Norwegians 
had been aware of that there was a potential language conflict. This potential 
conflict could in the next stage have other consequences that could have a 
dramatic outcome. When the operators did not understand what was being said, 
it could have severe consequences on both the learning process and not least, 
the security in the plant. A situation where a certain and increasing proportion 
of the staff do not understand the language that is communicated is one thing, a 
situation where the management is not aware of it is something far worse.  
 
Language is in Hannerz’ model a form of expression. The French language 
represents an expression of the French Canadians’ historical relation to France. 
It is also a way of distinguishing themselves from the rest of the English 
speaking North- America. Their fight for independence is also an example of 
this. The relation to France and their history as French Canadians is of high 
value for them. Several of those working at RACC had studied in France. In this 
way the language is an expression of this relationship and can be seen as a 
normative institution that is valuable for them and is also regulated by law. 
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Body Language 
The challenges concerning the oral language have, as shown above, been a 
central issue throughout this process of technology transfer. But the 
communication between people goes beyond the spoken words. One addressed 
it this way:  
 
“When you work you read body language, you do not only read the words” 
 
We communicate a lot just by our presence and the way we move, the way we 
look at others or the way we talk, if we talk hard or slowly. This is important in 
understanding how we understand others as well. What do we read from a 
person that seems to be in control, and how do we interpret this person to be in 
control? This is making the language issue far more complex than just the oral 
words. The way we act might be depending on how you are as a person or 
whether you are raised to be emotional or calm. Several of the people at the 
plant in Boisbriand were very concerned about this issue. When talking about 
culture, one of the Canadians expressed himself this way: 
 
“This is about the way the Canadians are and act compared to the Norwegians. 
You know we are Latin-blooded, the Quebecois, French Canadians are Latin 
Blooded, they are emotional, they are short. If they are not in control, then arms 
and legs28 . They want to be in control. The Norwegians are different, they are 
calmer and more like what I would like to call like a poker face. Even if you are 
not in control you may not show it. It seems important to look in control, that 
does not necessary mean that you are, but you physical do not show it.” 
 
Here this Canadian is pointing to something crucial, namely how the 
Norwegians and the Canadians act and differences in their unspoken behaviour. 
The Canadians’ impatient behaviour is experienced to be strange for the 
Norwegians, and at the same time the Norwegians interpret this behaviour to be 
sending stronger signals than what is in fact the case. By this I mean that an 
                                                 
28 “Then arms and legs” is more or less jargon for chaos or chaotic circumstances. This is most 
likely to be a Raufoss made jargon, which means something is out of control and are not into the 
systematic frames it should be. Maybe this is also normal jargon in industries in general but I 
think that it is only at Raufoss I have heard this used. The Canadians seem to have adapted this. 
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emotional outbreak by one of the Canadians is not to be understood to be as 
dramatic as it seems. In the opposite way the Norwegians do not have 
everything in control all the time even if they look calm and in control, and 
have, as the Canadians put it, poker faces. One of the Canadian managers was 
also concerned about this issue: 
 
“A percentage of my job is trying to keep the Canadians calm. Because the 
reaction of the Norwegians being calmer and not knowing, give the impression 
that they are not moving, that they are slow in reacting, because they are not 
moving their arms and legs. To the Canadians it is stressful because “If we have 
a problem, we have to solve it, are we not going to solve it, or what is going 
on?” So it affects the moral, it effects how the people work together. In stressful 
times a part of my job has unfortunately been to try no.no.no.no (calm the 
Canadians down) by giving them the feedback that they are not getting.” 
 
The interpretations these two groups have made of each other during this 
process have been based on both what has been said, but also on what has been 
done and how they have acted. This has contributed to increase the tension in 
stressful times, but it is hard to say that this is the main reason for what has 
happened. It is more relevant to view the body language as a factor that 
contributes to increase the tension that is already there. The body language is 
therefore not to be seen as a triggering factor. I would rather describe it as a 
contributing factor. When the situation is uncertain and it is problems with the 
equipment, and you do not get the machinery to function the way it is supposed 
to, then you start to look around, and what you see are people acting the 
opposite way from what you expect. This most certainly will contribute to 
increase the frustration already in place, however it is not the triggering factor. 
 
The way we express ourselves is most certainly dependent on our social 
background, and may also depend on personality. What is interesting in this 
relation is that it represents different ways of exposing the emotional status. 
This may lead to confusion when the emotional status (modes of thought) is 
expressed different (forms of expressions) in different social contexts. In this 
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process of technology transfer this has lead to frustration and had direct impact 
on the process. 
 
 
11.4 Summing up the cultural issues at play 
 
From a starting point where it was anticipated that the cultural challenges 
should be at a minimum, it has been realised that the cultural implications have 
certainly played a role in the process of getting the plant in Boisbriand to be at a 
satisfactory level. The process of getting to know each other’s reaction-set and 
way of acting in interaction with the others has been an important and 
completely necessary process for the plant and the actors to go through. The 
Norwegians and the French Canadians, “The Quebecois”, are presumably very 
similar, but as I have outlined here, there are some important differences to be 
aware of. The main cultural trap to fall in is to believe that there are no 
differences whatsoever. The differences are clear and they have consequences. 
 
The differences in attitudes towards problem solution are, as argued, of 
importance and have clear consequences for both the morale and the way the 
production is done at the shop floor. The Canadians’ eagerness to solve 
problems right away, versus the Norwegians’ analytical attitude has turned out 
to be one of the main differences. And it should be added that this difference 
has led to several situations where it has become very visible. The same is also 
the case for the difference in orientation, where the more traditional engineering 
environment at Raufoss represents a more quality-concerned perspective, and 
the Canadians are more eager to have the production line going all the time. 
Both these challenges can be traced back to Gertler’s argumentation of the more 
short-term capital in Canada. And as I have showed they can also be 
characterised as cognitive institutions with normative aspects. 
 
Individualism versus collectivism is, as I have argued, another issue that has 
been important in this process. This is experienced by those involved, to be 
differences in “such basic attitudes”, which have effects on the cooperation in a 
wide term. Discussions are effected by these differences, the Norwegians 
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complain about the problems they have in trying to establish good problem 
solving discussions. But it is important to remember that this is a two-sided 
sword. The Norwegians express their dissatisfaction about this situation and at 
the same time the Canadians are frustrated with a situation where they meet 
resistance in their way of handling challenges. And their frustration is just as 
important as the Norwegians’ reactions. But there is also a possibility that the 
pressure the Canadian experience of increasing the cooperation might also 
increase the diversity in the way of reacting. This must be seen in relation to the 
way they react in the first place. This is the reaction pattern they are familiar 
with and when the pressure increases it is a possibility that they return to this 
way of reacting.  
 
In addition to this, language has without doubt been an issue, both the spoken 
and the unspoken word. This has been dealt with in different ways, from 
banning Norwegian and French to a more flexible adjustment where the 
importance of informing the employees became the main point. During this 
process, the differences in expressing themselves have been put on the agenda 
in a lot of forums. The way I see it, this has been important because these 
discussions have helped create understanding for each other’s challenges 
concerning both language but also other cultural issues, and last, but not least, it 
has helped them in expressing their common challenges. 
 
The way the Norwegians and the Canadians have been trying to analyse and 
adapt to each other can be seen as a process of creolisation. But my study has 
stopped before this has become very evident. Despite that I see indications of a 
creolisation process also at the stage where I studied this carefully. The analyses 
the Canadians and the Norwegians have done of each other during this period is 
a way of relating and adapting to each other where the objective is to work out 
solutions that can take their cooperation further. When adapting and relating to 
each other they are creating an environment where they are trying to understand 
each other’s behaviour and behave in a way that makes sense for the other ones. 
This is in my perspective an essential factor in what can be called a creolisation.  
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12. Learning 
 
 
In this chapter I will analyse how learning is perceived in this process of 
technology and knowledge transfer. Through this analysis I will also examine 
how this was carried out in practical work. I will show how the perspective of 
learning slightly changed through this process from a one dimensional to a 
reciprocal perspective. The dilemma in prioritising between the socio-cultural 
learning and the technical learning will be elaborated, and so will also the 
consequences of the priorities made. In the end of the chapter I will discuss the 
role of place in relation to the learning processes of the actors involved. 
 
 
12.1 From a one dimensional to a reciprocal perspective 
 
“ At this time we first of all have to get the project organisation at the GME29, a 
little more in the background in Europe, but still enable them to get the needed 
experience from GME and then put them on at the GMNA30….. We have to do 
that now with a little more push than before….. and also to get the project 
management over there integrated in the local management in some way or 
another, this to ensure some ownership and to get the best learning as 
possible… This will be a project with European competence and at the same 
time we have to try to getting the Canadians to accept that it is their project at 
some extent as well… to make good learning and to reach them in the start and 
to see how much competence we need over there for the start up…. Yes we more 
or less do a search process in parallel with the build up of the plant.” 
 
The interview that this quote is taken from took place at Raufoss in October 
2001 and was given by a high-ranking manager and highly central person in the 
transfer process. The impression I got from this interview was that they have 
realised that to get the Canadians to know the equipment was to some extent 
                                                 
29 GME refers to Raufoss ASA’s contract with General Motors Europe. 
30 GMNA refers to Raufoss ASA’s contract with General Motors North America 
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important, but as expressed in the quotation, the project was supposed to be 
mainly driven by competent Norwegians. But learning would anyway be an 
important issue in one way or another. The focus was at this time quite one 
dimensional, like the following quotation could be an example of:  
 
“It is important to get the Canadians to understand the more fundamental sides 
of this and what it demands, and the competence behind this, not only what is 
obvious at the first glance but try to get them to understand the mechanism 
behind.” 
 
What I refer to as one dimensional in this, is the focus on who it is that has to 
understand something and who is expected to learn something. It is a 
predetermined cast in this situation. Norwegians have the competence, and the 
Canadians have competence, but not the right competence. They are going to 
learn the right competence from the Norwegians. This is more or less the 
“scene” before the show starts up.  
 
I do not try to argue here that the Norwegians had a superior view of themselves 
and a condescending view of the Canadians, because that was not the case. But 
the focus for the Norwegians was to establish the plant in Boisbriand and 
provide the skills and knowledge necessary to build up and operate this plant at 
Start of Production (SoP). Their perspective on which skills and which 
knowledge this process requires was rather one dimensional or at least vague. 
When talking of knowledge and learning, their point of reference is more or less 
consistent on the technology that they have developed and are going to start 
production with. Even when I, during interviews, ask them to tell me what 
technology is, most of them give me an outline based on that it is more or less 
everything. It is at least more than the technical artefacts; it is knowledge, skills 
and competence. It is also values and attitudes. So in their perspective 
technology is a very wide concept ranging over a wide spectre of factors. This is 
when they are directly asked to define technology. When they are seen working 
in their daily life and observed in relation with others, this perspective is, the 
way I see it, questioned.  What I see and experience is that even if they know 
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that this is a transfer of so much more than technical artefacts, it is hard to 
reflect that in action.  
 
When it comes to what is being focused on concerning learning, we are on a 
concrete technical level. Knowledge and competence are notions directly tied to 
the technical artefacts and are in that sense easy to handle. But when it comes to 
values and attitudes, it is much harder to grasp and handle in a constructive way. 
These notions are diffuse and abstract and therefore difficult to make 
operational. So to sum up my point in this section, to me the Norwegians 
seemed too one-dimensional when it comes to the skills and knowledge 
necessary to build up and operate the plant. In this section this will be 
elaborated upon further. In addition I will show that there is also a gap between 
what is defined as technology by those involved, and how it is handled to be in 
their daily work. 
 
An essential part of the process of technology transfer has been learning. In this 
chapter I will analyse learning on different levels in this process. This involves 
the learning that has taken place at Raufoss and how it is transferred to Montreal 
and RACC. The learning process at RACC will therefore be very important in 
this chapter. The way I see it, learning is a process going on between people 
either directly or through the inscriptions (see chapter 6) of the machines. 
 
A development project 
As already mentioned several times, the technology that was to be transferred 
had roots about thirty years ago at the Raufoss Industrial Park. The skills and 
knowledge available at Raufoss were in a high degree of a historical and tacit 
character. Despite this, the projects, both at GME and GMNA must partly be 
seen as development projects. They are both industrialisation projects, but at the 
same time they are also development projects. My argument in this relation is 
that there is continuous development going in the production lines. There is 
always room for improvement, but just as important; there are always some 
adjustments going on based on incidents that occur.  
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This has some implications for both what to expect from the projects and how to 
carry them through. If you plan a project that you have developed at the drawing 
board and have calculated with a tight plan and schedule, there will not be room 
for much development. In such a project incidents will be regarded as 
disruptions and noise. Incidents like this happen all the time in both the 
Norwegian and Canadian factories. From that perspective I claim that the 
establishment of the factories both in Norway and in Canada have to be viewed 
as development projects, even if this is most likely not in accordance with the 
economical perspectives that the decision was founded upon. By declaring the 
projects for development projects means that they must be seen as learning 
projects. Developing includes testing and searching for new solutions. This 
search for new solutions contributes to creation of new knowledge, and it makes 
it an essential point in the learning process. When new knowledge is achieved, 
the project is progressing, and those involved are learning. 
 
The visualisation project 
As a preparation of the learning programme for the Canadians and the Canadian 
operators in particular, a digital programme was developed that visualised the 
production line. This was done in cooperation between the Global Management 
1 and a Canadian student. The student undertook the job on the initiative of the 
Global Management 1. The purpose was to give those not familiar with the 
technology and the production process, a preparatory glimpse of what this was 
about, both in advance of their first visit to the plant but also in advance of their 
first visit to Norway. Thus they could start to anticipate what was expected of 
them, and what their job would be like when everything came in place. The 
visualisation was very good and had a pedagogical layout. It gave a good view 
of the production lines and showed the different machines pressing the product 
into its right shape and so on. I believe this to be an excellent tool for its 
purpose.  
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The technical trap 
However, there is a “but” to be mentioned here. Is this a sufficient visualisation 
for transferring technology? Yes, if we reduce technology to only be about the 
technical artefacts and how to operate these artefacts, it should be a sufficient 
and in my opinion excellent visualisation. But as I have tried to argue and as I 
felt agreement on with those involved in the process, technology must be seen 
in a broader perspective. So this visualisation programme was superior 
describing the technical issues and the technical aspects of the process, but at 
the same time it obscures the situation by its reduction. This programme leads 
the attention towards the technical issues; we fall into the technical trap. And it 
is so obvious that we did not even think about it. When I say we, I include 
myself, because when this was shown to me, I was stunned and overwhelmingly 
impressed. Now I realise that the trap closed behind me. The technical issues 
and the learning of the production line became the dominant issues.  
 
The way I experience it; it was never their intention to reduce technology to just 
technical artefacts and how to operate them. They ended up this way because of 
the logic of the technical artefacts. It is easy to absorb the logic of the concrete 
technology when it is visualised. The socio-cultural issues are much harder to 
absorb and get a grip on. The abstraction level is much higher when it comes to 
socio-cultural issues, and they are often also much harder to visualise in an easy 
and available way. Another important point in this relation is that it is the 
technical issues these engineers and operators are trained to handle. This is what 
their education is based upon.  
 
Raufoss ASA was very conscious about the tacit aspects of the knowledge they 
were suppose to transfer to Montreal. The visualisation project had the best 
intentions and was seen as a tool to ease the process of socialisation; from tacit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). But as stated the 
effect was not as intended. The focus became on the technical and visual 
aspects, and not at what they were intended to be about, namely the more 
abstract knowledge that was related to this visual presentation. In my 
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perspective, what caused the technical trap to occur is a lack of ability to 
question their own practise. This is what I understand as Argyris and Schön’s 
(1996) double loop learning. They did not question their own practise, or in 
Argyris and Schön’s terms (1996:21): “ the theory in use”. If they had been 
more capable of questioning their own practice they may have been able to 
avoid the technical trap. 
 
 
12.2 Two processes seen as one 
 
I will argue for splitting the learning process in two main directions, the one 
following the socio-cultural part and the other one following the technology. 
These two processes cannot be understood in the same way. It is important to 
recognise that both these processes are of vital importance for getting the plant 
operational. However, they are two different learning processes that have to be 
handled in different ways. In my opinion these learning process should be split 
already in the planning of the establishment of the plant. And during the transfer 
process they should have been handled separately, but at the same time they 
should have been seen in relation to each other. This means that coordinating 
the two learning process would be of vital importance.  
 
At some point there has to be equilibrium between these two learning processes. 
It is impossible to understand the technology from Raufoss without 
understanding the people and some of the social aspects at Raufoss. And in the 
same way you cannot understand the Ex-Pat Team in place in Montreal without 
understanding the technology, which is the reason why they are there. This 
means that the main objective for Raufoss ASA, namely to have an operative 
plant in Boisbriand at the date of Start of Production, is dependent on two main 
aspects; learning each other’s social system, and in common learning the 
technology and construct the new plant. This can be expressed as in a Figure 
12.1.  
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Figure 12.1.The two most important learning processes the operational plant is resting 
upon are learning the technique and learning the Socio-cultural aspects. 
 
In Wengers (1998) terms this can be understood as participation and reification 
(see chapter 5). Through participation they had to relate to each other. They had 
to relate to people from different social practises, that means learning from each 
other’s social systems. Secondly they had, in common, to relate to and learn the 
technical systems, which in Wenger’s terms is reification. This means to relate 
to the abstractions the technical system represents and to objectify the 
abstractions through the technical machinery. 
 
Learning the technique 
The technology developed at Raufoss is the foundation of the whole transfer 
process. To learn the production processes which this technology is based upon 
and all the associated technical issues is therefore obviously and very logically 
of importance. This means to learn how the machines operate, at which 
temperature, pressure and so on. Learning the metallurgical issues behind the 
characteristics of the product will also be included in this. This includes a lot of 
engineering knowledge like formulas, electricity, pressure, temperature and 
metallurgy. The engineering knowledge required for these two production lines 
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is enormous and based on the uniqueness of the product. There is also unique 
knowledge required to produce this product.  
 
For learning this knowledge several actions took place. One of the actions was 
the visualisation project, whose mission was to give the operators an impression 
of what this was about. All the operators have gone through this visualisation of 
the production process. Also the rest of the technical staff at RACC has gone 
through the visualisation program.  
 
In addition to this, the RCT has hired in expert personnel from RTIM (Raufoss 
Technology and Industrial Management) in different steps of the production 
process. The experts have then taught the Canadians about the production 
process and especially about aluminium and how aluminium is different from, 
for example, steel. This is important knowledge when working with aluminium, 
because it has extremely different characteristics from steel, which often is the 
reference point for average engineers. These classes were arranged mainly in 
Norway and were mostly concerning metallurgical issues and such issues 
related to the production process. As an organised activity this was ensuring 
some basic levels of knowledge about the most important aspects of what was 
going to be the core technology of the upcoming plant in Boisbriand. It was of 
course important to give classes on these issues, even though this was rather 
basic and not of any impressing extent. 
 
Despite the classes given in the basic core technology, most of the learning 
about technical issues has been done on the shop-floor. As one of my 
respondents expressed it:  
 
“Okay I can give you an example how we train a new operator, we can have a 
structured training program, with some theoretical, some at the floor very 
structured, very efficient. That is not what we did. We did it the other way; when 
you put an operator with another or beside another who know the job, and you 
hope that they are going to talk about the work and learn through it. And they 
will do, and some times they do not realise that they are learning. It takes three 
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times more time to learn what you could have done if you were efficient……We 
did it the hard way, the expensive way.” 
 
Based on this, the conclusion is that the learning of the technological issues has 
been done in two ways. One has been to arrange classes for the operators with 
hired experts from RTIM as the main lecturers. The other part concerning 
technical learning, has been done through “learning by doing” (Schön 1985)  
under informal supervision of more experienced operators. These experienced 
operators have been operators at Raufoss, and this learning has first and 
foremost been carried out during the Canadian’s stay at Raufoss, but also under 
supervision of the Ex-Pat Team in Boisbriand. When I was talking to the 
operators, they were not very concerned about the classes that were arranged, 
they did hardly seemed to remember and it had certainly not been a very big 
issue for them. What I draw out of this is, what also the quotation above 
indicates, that the main learning has been done through “learning by doing” on 
the shop floor. It has not been very structured and as the quotation indicates, it 
has been the hard and expensive way, but the operators have learned.  
 
There is one point about this way of learning that I find important to comment 
on. When putting two operators beside each other and more or less telling them 
to learn, the result of this learning process might be dependent on the people 
they are and the chemistry between them. What I saw and observed with the 
five operators that went to Norway for about six months, is a variance in what 
relations they have made with the Norwegian operators and what they have 
learned during their stay. Some are more eager to get in touch with new people, 
and some are not, maybe they are a bit shyer or that there are other personal 
matters. However, the result from such a learning process is more or less 
difficult to measure, or at least it is difficult to foresee the result of your 
investment.  
 
This observation indicates a need for a more structured learning program. My 
argument for the need for this is that the way learning was carried out at the 
plant in Montreal, including the preparations where some classes in the core 
technology were held, was neither sufficient nor effective enough. The 
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operators were hardly able to reconfigure the classes they had attended in 
Norway. This indicates two important issues. Firstly, there was a time delay 
between the time these classes were held and the time the operators started to 
work at the plant in Boisbriand. Secondly, there was not a systematic approach 
to the learning situation as for instances Nonaka & Takeouchi’s (1997) 
knowledge spiral indicates (see chapter 5). A more systematic approach would 
have utilised an improvement potential in relation to create an effective learning 
of tacit knowledge through learning by doing (see chapter 5). They tried to 
implement learning by doing, as the quotation above indicated, but the operators 
was not equipped with a tool or a program of how to learn or how to interact 
with each other. Such a program could be raised to ensure the quality of the 
learning and to reduce the dependency of personal chemistry and relationship. I 
will soon get back to my thoughts of such a program, but first I will go through 
the learning of socio-cultural issues, or the way I experience it to be in the world 
of technicians: “learning the rest….” 
 
Learning the rest…… 
As already indicated, learning the technical related knowledge does not seem to 
be enough to fulfil the process of technology transfer. The non-technical related 
knowledge is surely also of importance concerning this process. In my terms 
this involves learning behaviour and learning about the background of the 
people you work with.  Socio-cultural issues are of course a central element in 
this. What this is pointing at is an understanding of the social situation where 
the technique either is developed or shall function. And it seems to be important 
to have good knowledge of the socio-cultural conditions at both places. One 
argument is that you cannot move the technology out of its social context 
without any consequences. This is underlining the importance of a learning 
process that does not include only the technical issues, but also the social 
aspects. To learn a social system and its values, norms and different aspects is 
demanding, and most likely it is not done in the same way as technology is 
learned. Some basic knowledge of the background of the people you are 
working with will ease the interaction and the interpersonal communication, 
which is important in these kinds of learning processes.  
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One of my respondents expressed himself this way about what is important in 
order to get a successful technology transfer:  
 
“ I think it all comes down to get people to work together…. To establish a 
group that can handle the challenges it meets…..Technology I think has 
something to do with people, it has less to do with the technical artefacts….. it is 
all about putting together people that can cooperate, the most sure way to 
bankruptcy is when people starts to quarrel, it is surely the fastest” 
 
This points at an important and problematic issue when talking about learning 
the socio-cultural situation and setting; namely how to put together a group that 
you can be sure do not want to quarrel. That requires a lot of knowledge and 
insight into both the background of the people and their characteristics. It also 
points at the difficulties concerning being able to communicate at a high 
abstraction level and the lack of evident solutions concerning cultural 
understanding. There are probably one thousand possible reasons to start a 
quarrel, and therefore it is also more or less impossible to eliminate all these 
possibilities. But with knowledge of the background of the participants and an 
experienced project management you might be capable of eliminating the most 
obvious problems that might arise. This is knowledge of socio-cultural factors 
that are abstract and hardly available, and it might also be said to be available in 
a different way than how technical knowledge is. Therefore it is also harder to 
get a grip on in a technological perspective. If the Canadians and the 
Norwegians could have had knowledge of each others ways of reacting as 
analysed in chapter 11, at an earlier stage, it would have eased the learning 
process a lot. 
 
Learning the socio-cultural setting must be seen as a process of constructing 
meaning (see chapter 4). The construction of meaning that is taking place at 
RACC is a two- fold process. First of all the Norwegian Ex-pat Team is trying 
to construct meaning in the Canadian organisation together with the Canadians, 
and also vice versa; the Canadian’s are constructing meaning out of what they 
experience from the Norwegians. In sum this is a very complex situation where 
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both Norwegians and Canadians are trying to get a grip on what the others are 
like and how to relate to them. This is a time consuming process involving a lot 
of interpretation (Berger and Luckmann 1966), translation and negotiation 
(Latour 1987). Both the Norwegians and the Canadians have to interpret what 
the others are saying and expressing. During this process they translate and 
interpret both what is being said orally and also what is being expressed in other 
ways, for example by body language (see chapter 11). By interpreting I mean 
that they are transforming information they get from others into their own 
understanding, and by translation I mean expressing this interpretation to others. 
These processes of continuous interpretation and translation is also a situation of 
negotiations, where the meaning is constructed in common with others.  
 
The time consuming aspect of this process is interesting concerning how such a 
learning process can be structured to be as effective as possible. In chapter 14 I 
will examine possible alternatives for the two learning processes described. But 
first I will give some reflections on learning in a wider perspective concerning 
the two places involved in this process, namely Raufoss and Montreal. 
 
 
12.3 Learning places through learning actors 
 
In the theory chapters I have given an outline of how place is an important 
dimension and an extension for organisations in the global economy. I also 
argue that people as actors carry or are embodied by places, and at the same 
time they effect and contribute to the continuously construction of places. This 
means that when people move in the global economy, they move as 
representatives for places, and they contribute to the ongoing construction of 
places that they drop into. This is important for the following arguments, 
namely that the learning taking place in a technology transfer project has to be 
seen not only as two different learning processes, but also as learning processes 
that contribute to the continuously construction and reconstruction of places. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, in early phases of the planning 
of the transfer project the attitude at Raufoss was that they should teach the 
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Canadians about their technology, and the Canadians should carry out the 
production based on instructions from the Norwegians. There existed a 
conception of a one-dimensional learning process where the Canadians were 
those learning and the Norwegians had a supervisory role. This attitude is 
completely understandable seen in the light that this was a parallel 
industrialisation process, where they were setting up the plant in Norway just a 
year ahead of the Canadian plant. To feel that these objectives were able to 
overcome, they had, in my perspective, to reduce the challenges “to keep 
floating”. But even if this was an understandable and explicable reaction, it was 
not right to think that way. By thinking in terms like this, they closed several 
development directions for the project at a too early stage. In the same way that 
we have path-dependency as a notion when we talk of technology, I will claim 
that we also can talk of path-dependency at some extent in this project as well. 
By closing the possibility of a reciprocal learning process at an early stage, the 
minds in the organisation were set to this view, and it is then reasonable to 
believe that this also affected the interaction between the Norwegians and the 
Canadians at an early stage.  
 
During the project there was a gradual change towards a more reciprocal 
approach. This was very much because of the Norwegians working closely with 
the Canadians and finding them to be knowledgeable and experienced operators 
and engineers. Gradually actors from Raufoss found that there were things to 
learn from the Canadians that slowly turned the cooperation into a better track. 
The way I see it, the situation concerning learning between Norwegians and 
Canadians is improving, but it is not and will most likely not be an equal 
relationship in the near future. The knowledge and the technology is most likely 
too embedded and rooted at Raufoss to achieve equality. But there are several 
other areas where Raufoss ASA can and has learned a lot from the Canadians. 
Business wise and regarding cost orientation are some of the areas where 
Raufoss ASA has learned and experienced a more or less different world from 
what they have been used to. This was evident for me when working with the 
global sourcing project, where the Canadian’s economical approach had some 
differences from what can be claimed to be the Raufoss way of thinking. It is no 
magic solution that the Canadians are suggesting, but more a result of looking at 
 197
Technology Transfer 
the world from Canada and a Canadian perspective. For instance they know the 
American continent better than the Norwegians in Raufoss and they also have a 
more extended network of the American continent. Therefore they are able to do 
things in a different way. Suggesting other business solutions is also a part of 
and a result of this. The experiences Raufoss ASA has had during their transfer 
project have, in this perspective, made them more open for learning from other 
actors. That is important learning and an important experience for a company 
that is entering the global arena. The reciprocity in the learning mentioned here 
can be characterised as what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1997) calls combination; 
from explicit to explicit. The Norwegians have experienced that the explicit 
knowledge that the Canadians posses, for instance about the American 
continent, has been fruitful to combine with the Norwegians’ market 
knowledge. This combination of Raufoss market knowledge and the Canadians 
knowledge of North-America has created new knowledge on how to utilise 
these opportunities. 
 
According to my introduction to this chapter, the individual actors are important 
concerning learning in this project. That includes also learning between places. 
Those learning on behalf of the places are the individuals. During this transfer 
there has been substantial travel between Norway and Canada, both the 
Norwegians and the Canadians have been travelling a lot. This exchange of 
people across the Atlantic has mainly had one purpose; learning. When the SGF 
joined Raufoss as a partner in this project they had a goal on behalf of the 
Quebec province and Montreal as a place, namely to attract knowledge to the 
region and thereby to increase the knowledge present. Someone learning 
something increases knowledge. The plant has now entered production and is 
going quite well. This can be seen as a conclusion of that learning has been 
taking place. The knowledge level has without doubt been rising at the plant in 
Boisbriand through what the individuals employed at the plant have learned by 
interacting with the Norwegian Ex-pat Team for example. And the other way 
around when, for instance, the purchasing department at Raufoss learned that it 
is possible to reduce the transportation time for deliveries from Ohio to Raufoss 
by almost six weeks by knowing the transportation system and having the right 
contacts and experience of the American continent. This makes Raufoss and 
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Montreal two better industrial places. Even if this knowledge only rests upon 
individuals, the knowledge that is important, and contributes to something new, 
will be spread when those individuals who have learned it, talk to others about 
their experiences. In this way the individual learning across places is important 
and contributes to the construction and reconstruction of the knowledge base at 
each place. 
 
Technology and the Socio-cultural: Differences in how to 
learn? 
What I have been suggesting above is that it may be useful to view learning of 
technology and learning social behaviour as two different learning processes. At 
the same time I believe this to be a dangerous path to follow based on my 
argumentation that the technology and the social aspects are closely linked 
together (see 12.2). As I already have mentioned concerning learning in 
technology transfer, it is necessary to have a wider focus than technology-wise.  
 
When this project started, Raufoss was very conscious of who should be in 
charge of the process and why. They (the Norwegians) should of course be in 
charge of the process because they had the knowledge and skills required for 
their technology. They saw themselves as the leaders of the process based on 
their knowledge and skills concerning this technology. In the Top Management 
1, one underlined the importance of Raufoss in a leading role by saying:  
 
“We are going to hold the control of this process and we are going to hold hard 
as damn” 
 
In their construction of this process they, as technicians, saw the importance of 
teaching the Canadians the technology as priority number one. Learning about 
the people and behaviour and so on was at best included in this or most likely 
came as a second priority. As mentioned in chapter 9, both the front and the rear 
lines are fully automated at Raufoss31. For the Raufoss people the product is not 
                                                 
31 As also mentioned the production line at RACC is not so automated as the one at Raufoss but 
it was of course the production line at Raufoss that was the reference point for the Raufoss 
engineers. 
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touched by human hand from the point the aluminium is delivered on the 
production line until the finished product is at the end of the line. It is the 
machinery that does the job. Then it is of course easy to draw the conclusion 
that in this process, what is important is to know the machinery. It is the 
machinery that makes the product, the natural conclusion when it comes to 
learning is then obvious. Learning is about learning the machinery. The 
technical trap closes again. 
 
One essential issue is how can and should these two learning processes be 
carried out. For me this has been a recurrent question throughout my study. Is 
there a good way to suggest how it can be carried out in a generic and fruitful 
way? Before I carry on with this outline of how to do it, I’d like to address again 
that my main argument of separating the learning into the two processes 
technical and the socio-cultural, is that I find it incredibly important to focus on 
the socio-cultural learning. The best solution would be to integrate them, but as 
I have shown, the technical trap snaps shut before you know it.  
 
The problem of entrance cost concerning learning 
At first glance learning technology and learning the socio-cultural seem to be 
two very different learning processes where technology is a representative for 
the nature science and its concrete knowledge. This is seen as a type of 
knowledge that is measurable, and where you can estimate outcome based on 
the inputs you give. On the other hand as already argued, the socio-cultural 
aspects are more abstract and less available. You cannot measure and estimate 
this in the same way as you can estimate the capacity of a heating oven. In this 
way it is easy to conclude that the knowledge structure of the technology and 
the socio-cultural factors are so different that the learning system also must be 
quite divergent from each other. In my perspective this is doubtful. There are 
some differences in the knowledge structure, but in the overall picture the 
knowledge structure is quite similar. The difference is related to what I will call 
the entrance cost of the knowledge. By the entrance cost of the knowledge I 
mean how much it requires of those that are going to learn something, to learn 
the knowledge at stake. For a person that is trained in an engineering way and 
 200
Analysis and Conclusions 
tradition it is most likely easier for him to acquire new knowledge that is related 
to his background. And in the other way around for a, for example, social 
anthropologist, it is relatively easy to learn about new cultural systems, because 
he already knows a lot about culture. The entrance cost is for him relatively low.  
 
The logic of this reasoning is that there are relatively high entrance costs for an 
engineer to acquire knowledge that he is unfamiliar with, for instance socio-
cultural knowledge.  The entrance to socio-cultural knowledge has to be made 
in some different way. This represents some of the core challenges in the 
technology transfer project. Those working in the organisations involved are 
trained for the technical work and not for the transfer (or learning) of this into 
another cultural setting at another continent. On the other side, a social 
anthropologist or perhaps a geographer will have problems with understanding 
the complexity of the technology and that would also represent a problem. In 
chapter 14 I will come back with a proposal about how the learning could have 
been carried out in this transfer of technology.  
 
 
12.4 Summing up the learning aspects 
 
The learning carried out in this transfer project has of course been of both 
explicit and tacit knowledge. Due to the substantial time some of the Canadians 
spent at Raufoss they were able to learn a lot about the Raufoss society and 
Raufoss ASA, including the technological aspects of both the society and the 
organisation. But as stated in this chapter, the “learning by doing” together with 
a skilled colleague, was done the “hard and expensive way”, which I have stated 
to be dependent on personal chemistry between those involved. Anyway this 
way of working can be viewed as a way of learning tacit knowledge both 
according to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Wenger (1998). There were also 
arranged classes to learn the explicit knowledge necessary to operate the 
equipment. This was as stated just partly experienced as important among the 
operators.  
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This analysis shows that the learning process at first was perceived in a one 
dimensional way, where Raufoss ASA was seen to have the knowledge that the 
Canadians was suppose to learn. This however gradually changed, especially 
among the Ex-pat team that experienced the Canadians to be competent and 
having a lot of knowledge to contribute with to the Raufoss organisation. 
 
Even if their conceptualisation of technology, what was at stake learning wise, 
was in accordance to the theoretical conception I have put forward, consisting of 
both knowledge, skills and attitudes, this was not followed up in the practical 
work. When it came to the practical work the technical trap snap shut too 
commonly. When they had to prioritise between the abstract aspects of social-
cultural relations and the concrete technical issues, the technical issues got 
priority. When that is said, the plant performed well, but the learning process 
could have been more efficient and have resulted in less frustration if it had 
been carried out differently. 
 202
Analysis and Conclusions 
13. Enrolling the human actors and the technical 
actants 
    
In this chapter I will demonstrate that the process of technology transfer also is 
a process very much related to reconstruction of an actor network. I will analyse 
how this reconstruction has taken place and what effect it has had on the 
process of technology transfer. This will mean I will analyse how the 
reconstruction of the actor network is done in praxis and what implication it has 
brought into the process. Central in this analysis is to elaborate whether the 
enrolment of actors and actants is regarded as equally important in this 
technology transfer. And whether they are treated differently or not, I will 
elaborate on why is it so? I have chosen to first analyse the organisational 
enrolment and then how the technical actants are enrolled into this actor 
network. 
 
 
13.1 The organisational enrolment 
 
 
Starting enrolling a network in Montreal 
At a conference in Germany  in 2000, a representative from Raufoss ASA was 
talking to one of their suppliers. During this conversation some of the 
challenges facing Raufoss were mentioned, in particular the new contract with 
GM, and the forthcoming establishment in North America that was necessary to 
fulfil their contract. The representative for the supplier mentioned Quebec as a 
potential region and Montreal as a potential area for such an establishment. 
Both Investment Quebec (IQ) and SGF (The Société Générale de Financement 
du Québec) (see chapter 9) were mentioned as professional organisations that 
could be helpful to contact in this regard.  
 
This is said to be the introduction for Raufoss ASA to the potential of Quebec 
and the Montreal area. One of the core actors of their industrial network was the 
one that tipped them off about the potential in Canada. Raufoss ASA, which at 
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this time was on the search for a location for a plant in North America, 
contacted SGF and Investment Quebec, and this was in fact the start of 
enrolling their network in North America.  
 
The enrolment of a network at a new location that the company did not have 
much knowledge about was an important process. The entrance of a new region 
meant a critical learning period, where they had to take a lot of decisions based 
on information of and from a region that they were not familiar with. This 
meant a lot of interpretation (Berger and Luckmann 19966) and translation of 
meaning and negotiation (Latour 1987) concerning what were seen as important 
factors for their purpose.  
 
When Raufoss ASA entered a completely new region, they needed support 
from somebody who could help them through the jungle of information. In this 
perspective the SGF and Investment Quebec were important contributors in the 
process of bringing relevant information to the table. This also involved a role 
as a filter and a translator for Raufoss ASA. The information Raufoss ASA 
received was already digested and transformed by these Canadian 
organisations. 
 
Strategic considerations 
One other important decision Raufoss ASA had to take at an early stage was 
which role SGF should get as a partner. One Norwegian reflected upon this 
issue in this way: 
 
“SGF would like to have 49% of the shares in RACC, but we did not want to 
have that kind of investor involved at such a level. The reason was that we 
viewed them as a financial investor and was afraid of them being too 
bureaucratic. We did not want them to be in control of more than 20% of the 
shares. This was because we wanted to have an opening for a more industrial 
partner on the more long term perspective and still being able to have full 
control in the company.” 
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What he is referring to here is that in the long run Raufoss ASA wanted to 
control over 51% of the shares, and in this regard they have to take some 
strategical considerations for how to involve, and to what degree, they should 
involve SGF as a partner in RACC. 
 
Another important role for these place marketing organisations was that they 
organised viewing trips in the area for the representatives of Raufoss ASA 
when they visited the region to get to know it better. This was of importance for 
the company, as this way they got in contact with a range of different and 
interesting firms that they saw as potential partners at a later stage. These trips 
also included visits to local technical schools to get a glimpse of the level of the 
technical training in the area.  
 
Place marketing or industrial development 
The role of SGF and Investment Quebec is in my view, two fold; They are 
supposed to ensure good industrial solutions for foreign industry that chooses 
Quebec as the region to establish their factory in, this includes good financial 
support or co-investment, and they also have a role as salesmen for this region, 
where their task is to attract businesses and capital to the area. This is not 
unproblematic. Are they trustworthy? Do they in heart act as salesmen for their 
home region, or are they able to act as impartial advisors? I think these are 
important questions when industrial actors operate in the global space and meet 
new places with other actors and another socio-cultural setting than what they 
are used to.  
 
What I have seen from these regional investment organisations and of their 
presentation material, is that they present the headlines and key figures at a 
rather aggregate level. What I find more important and interesting is what they 
do NOT tell. What is behind the headlines, and what is behind these key 
figures? To get a grip on this you have to go into a deeper discussion and take a 
more analytical position. In a situation where it is required that you take 
decisions at such a pace that you keep up with your plans; there is not much 
room for very deep analytical discussions and analyses. The headlines and key 
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figures therefore are likely to have an important effect on the choices the 
industrial establisher finally ends up with. My perspective on this is that 
regional marketing firms such as IQ and SGF should be handled as what they 
are, namely important partners, but also actors acting on behalf of their region. 
In this perspective it can be claimed that they are important actors to 
incorporate in the network, but at the same time it is important to be aware of 
their double role.  
 
The second step enrolling the first experts 
When Raufoss ASA had come to a decision of location, the next step was to get 
in touch with local experts on hiring processes that could support them in the 
initial stages of building the new Canadian organisation. Through their contacts 
they chose a consulting firm that supported them in their search for those who 
should become the Canadian management group. In the first selection process 
of those that were to go on  to become important members of the Canadian 
organisation, Raufoss had to rely on the external consultants. This did not mean 
that the consultants hired the employees, because that was taken care of by the 
Global Organisation 1. The role of the consultants was to arrange the 
recruitment process and advise Raufoss ASA where to search for employees. 
This role is important in such an early stage in the process of establishing a new 
plant. To get good advice at this stage is crucial for the further development. 
But another aspect that is important when you have a tight schedule is that the 
relationship with such experts is sufficiently successful so that you do not need 
to change consultants during the process. To establish new relations is time 
consuming, and it is important to avoid such change if possible. 
 
The internal enrolment 
As mentioned in chapter 10, the management group was hired first. To be 
correct, one process engineer was hired first, then the plant manager and then 
another process engineer. The further hiring was characterised by operators 
with different backgrounds; at first five operators that were seen as the core 
crew. In the coming months they would become the most important actors in 
the technology transfer from the Canadian side, in addition to the management. 
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An accountant was also hired at this stage along with a receptionist that also 
had some accountancy experience and education. What was prioritised in this 
early stage of the establishment was to ensure technical and operational 
competence, and also financial competence to have control with the economic 
situation of the project. This was both a logical and reasonable way of handling 
the hiring. The organisation was growing in accordance with the challenges and 
the tasks at hand in a generic way.  
 
The Human Resource Management 
When the organisation had grown considerably, to approximately about 25-30 
members, a person responsible for human resources was hired. This Human 
Resources Manager became responsible for the personnel and the way they 
were handled. She was a very skilled person with good experience and a way of 
working very closely to the personnel. The hiring of the HR Manager had a 
very positive effect.   
 
The operators at RACC could choose between two different unions. They 
ultimately chose to enter the union that was regarded as the toughest one. This 
was done before the HR Manager was hired. One of the respondents put it this 
way when he tried to describe the importance of the HR Manager and the effect 
she had on the organisation: 
 
“To bring in the HR person earlier, that would have helped us not to get 
unionised.”  
 
This is just one of several statements that underline the importance of getting 
the HR management into a structured and controlled system. Based on the 
knowledge of the pressure this Canadian organisation had been working under, 
I find it neither strange nor surprising that the existing employees were satisfied 
to have a person on board that wanted to listen and had them as the main 
objective of the working day. Based on this, it was not a surprise to hear some 
informants say that this hiring was done too late. The period before the HR 
Manager was hired was characterised by a focus on technical issues, and human 
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resources were more or less neglected. One of the Canadian managers 
expressed it like this:  
 
“Many of our people are engineers so if the machine makes a funny sound they 
are there; “something is wrong here” you know their ears are wide open on 
equipment. If the morale is down or something like that, no one even notices it.  
They just walk right by. We should have detected that we were going towards a 
union. And we did not, not enough. Even when we put XX as supervisor, we 
took a decision on that, and once we announced it, the operators told me that 
they thought we had made the worst decision ever. I said how can you say that, 
he has drive and …?... They said you will find out yourselves. And they were 
right. But how could we take such a decision together and none of us had that 
type of feedback from the floor? But we knew which machine was having a 
problem and which bolt was loose, but we all were equipment oriented. And 
now as XX (The HR Manager) has come in we know a lot more about what is 
going on the floor because she is involved. Right now I know who on the floor 
are for the union and who is not.” 
 
The relatively late hiring of the HR Manager has, according to this quotation, 
had a negative effect on what was going on in the organisation before the 
hiring. When the organisation got a professional in to take care of the human 
resources, the situation improved. The general approach in the organisation is 
that this should have been done much earlier. This is an interesting reflection 
made in an organisation that has been under severe pressure over a period of 
time. My view is supports their own reflection in this way.  
 
Another interesting aspect of not hiring the HR Manager at an earlier stage, is 
that this was not in accordance with their own definition of technology. Their 
definition included both knowledge and attitudes and skills and not only the 
technical issues. Their definition was in accordance with the theoretical 
approach I have argued in this dissertation (see chapter 6), but by focusing on 
just technical personnel in the early phases they were not able to follow up this 
definition in their practical work. In practice knowledge, skills and attitudes 
have been neglected at a certain degree. 
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What went wrong? 
When they had a well articulated definition of technology and a view that took 
care of what is seen as important aspects of working with technology, an 
important question arises; why were they not able to see this in the first place? I 
think there are at least two aspects to be emphasised in this relation.  
 
Too focused on technology 
First of all I think it is important to remember the time pressure both the 
Canadian and the Norwegian organisation were working under. Acting and to 
keep moving were crucial under the whole process. Whatever they were doing, 
they knew that the date for start of production was July 2003, and by then the 
equipment had to be in place and the plant had to be able to run at the promised 
rates. Under these circumstances there was a kind of logic in starting hiring 
those who should be responsible for installing the equipment and getting it to 
run first. This meant that the technical management and operators were hired 
first. Furthermore, it is also logical to wait with the hiring of your HR Manager 
until they have someone to manage.  
 
So far this was a rather obvious way of doing it. But this is also a kind of a 
“technical trap”, where the concrete and obvious gets priority, and what is not 
that obvious and concrete is set aside. Managing the people that are going to 
operate the equipment was one such non-concrete activity. Even if this is an 
obvious situation where, what I call the “technical trap”, has occurred, it does 
not mean that hiring the HR Manager should have been done at the same time 
as the rest of the management, even though some argued for such a solution 
when they looked back at the development. If they had looked up from their 
machinery and their installing equipment some months earlier, it would have 
improved the situation a lot. I think that hiring the HR Manager at the same 
time as the organisation moved into the plant, and then starting to hire new 
operators, would have been a more efficient solution.  
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The outsourced Human Resource Management 
Another aspect that could have played a role in this situation is found at the 
parent organisation in Norway. In cooperation with Northern Europe’s largest 
private research institution, SINTEF32, Raufoss ASA had launched a project 
where the HR management was outsourced to experts at the research institution. 
This was a very interesting project, and the intention was to improve the HR 
management by using the best expertise available for this purpose. In many 
ways this outsourcing was a innovative project. The intention was to upgrade 
the importance of HR Management. This upgrading was done by using experts 
on this subject and thereby increasing the quality of the processes taking place 
in the organisation. I have not evaluated this project, so I cannot say if the 
results internally were in accordance with the intentions, but in relation to the 
technology transfer, this project made a rather odd appearance. Commenting on 
this issue one Canadian manager presented his thoughts this way: 
 
“We hired for the GME plant33 external consultants in human resources from 
SINTEF. That sending a message for me, when I saw it was like …ok this is not 
top priority, we are outsourcing this or we want to use this as a variable cost. 
This is how I am thinking about it, so we are not developing core competence at 
managing our resources and that should maybe have been the first person to 
hire before the plant manager (laughter….) especially in technology transfer.” 
 
This person is pointing out a very important element of such an outsourcing.  
Outsourcing is what you do with something that you won’t develop yourself 
and something that others can do better than you. And this was also partly the 
reason for the outsourcing; somebody, in this situation SINTEF, was capable of 
doing this better than Raufoss. But the result was that it was interpreted as a 
signal of degrading HR management as a core competence in the company. 
Seeing HR management as a variable cost is a powerful signal to send both to 
external and internal human resources. The signal this sends is rather different 
than the intentions. The way I see it and the way I interpret those who were 
                                                 
32 The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology 
(SINTEF) 
33 The plant in Norway. 
 210
Analysis and Conclusions 
involved in this, are that their intentions were for the best, but the effects were 
sadly the opposite. 
 
The local suppliers  
Another factor that Raufoss ASA has been very focused on is the need to enrol 
local suppliers in North America. This had high priority at a very early stage of 
the process. This is an issue where the company has high competence. Getting a 
supplier approved is based on the supplier being capable of delivering the 
specified product at an acceptable price. The quality, as mentioned in chapter 
11, is an important issue for Raufoss. To be sure they could get the qualified 
suppliers they wanted, the process of searching for suppliers in North America 
started at a very early stage. Enrolling the local suppliers is both important in 
terms of getting qualified deliveries at the right time, but also it could be an 
advantage for Raufoss in a longer term. By establishing contacts with suppliers 
on both sides of the Atlantic, they could at some point be able to get better 
prices because of higher volumes.  
 
Enrolling local suppliers in North America also had other advantages, and this 
is related to having North American staff present. The purchasing department at 
RACC knows more or less, the North American businesses that are relevant, 
more so than the purchasing department at Raufoss. At least they have a better 
understanding of North America than they have at Raufoss. This means that 
they also are in position to see other solutions. With this knowledge they have 
been able to improve both delivery times and delivery conditions for the whole 
company (see chapter 12). This would not have been possible if they had 
decided to serve the plant from their European suppliers, which in practice 
would have been impossible.  
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13.2 Enrolling the technical actants in the Network 
 
One of the most profound features with Actor Network Theory (ANT) is the 
way it includes the technology as an actor equal to humans. This in particular, is 
what makes ANT a relevant theoretical approach in this thesis. In accordance 
with the arguments of ANT, the enrolment of the technical artefacts are equally 
important to the enrolment of the human actors as presented above. In the 
following presentation I will show how the enrolment of the technological 
artefacts has taken place and what consequences the enrolment of technological 
actants has in contrast to the enrolment of the human actors. 
 
The starting point of enrolling the technical artefacts 
The starting point for the enrolment of the technical artefacts in Montreal was in 
fact on the other side of the Atlantic; at Raufoss. This was the first place where 
the Canadians saw, touched and experienced the technical artefacts that a year 
later would become their own. This first stay at Raufoss for the five operators 
and the Canadian Management lasted, as mentioned in chapter 9, for a period of 
up to six months. During this period the only place where the Canadians had 
contact with the technical equipment was at Raufoss. In Canada they hardly had 
an office to go to. These first stays at Raufoss for this group of Canadians were 
an important part of the Raufoss strategy concerning technology transfer. It was 
important for Raufoss to bring the Canadians over to Raufoss so they could see 
the technical equipment running and at the same time have the technical 
environment available to their process of understanding this technology.  
 
With a little help from the Norwegians 
Being present at Raufoss they had a lot of Norwegian workers available to 
direct questions to. In this way the Norwegians acted as resources for the 
Canadians in their process of getting to know the equipment. The Norwegians 
acted as translators for the Canadians in their attempt to understand this 
technology. When the Canadians were trying to understand the logic of these 
machines, they interpreted the inscribed meaning of the technology. To be 
concrete, this includes a whole range of elements from an obvious inscription, 
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from our cultural perspective, like the red emergency switch to a far more 
complex inscription like the structure of the aluminium of the finished product 
that you can view through a microscope. This structure can, to a trained eye, 
give a lot of information about its strength and other characteristics. But to an 
untrained eye, this information is more or less worthless. Through these 
interpretation processes, the Norwegians acted as translators in the effort to 
make these learning processes and the enrolment of the technical actants as easy 
as possible for the Canadians. This means that the Norwegians at Raufoss were 
important helpers for the Canadians in their attempt to enrol the technical 
artefacts. At this stage in the transfer process, incorporation of the technical 
actants was a process where the Norwegians and the Canadians worked tightly 
together. But it is important to remember that this stage in the process was 
rather special as well, with a situation where a few selected operators and 
management representatives were present at Raufoss.  
 
Inscriptions 
According to Akrich (1992), inscriptions refer to meanings linked to and 
attached within technical objects. Through these inscriptions, the technical 
objects embody meaning and a set of different relations. In other words, the 
innovator or constructor of the technical artefact has inscribed his or her 
understanding and knowledge into the artefact. This means that to understand 
the technical artefact the end-user has to understand the inscriptions attached to 
this technical object. During the Canadians’ first stay at Raufoss, they got a 
some impression of these inscriptions and what was behind the technology they 
were working with. This was also an important point for Raufoss ASA and their 
strategy in the technology transfer, the Canadians had to understand what was 
behind the technology and the technical equipment. In their eyes, their 
technology is special and different from a lot of other technologies; this is 
especially related to the aluminium and its characteristics.  This argument can 
be seen as a tacit acknowledgement of the technology’s inscriptions, tacit in the 
sense that it was never explicitly expressed by Raufoss ASA. The way I 
interpret this is that they had an awareness of that there was “something” there, 
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but they did not have suitable concepts or terms to express it properly. In lack 
of a better alternative, this was expressed in ways such as :  
 
“ It is important that they also understand what is behind the technology and 
not only learn to operate it” 
 
Another example is this:  
 
“ there is so much of the competence here at Raufoss that is in the walls at the 
plant, that is not obvious at first glance” 
 
Both these expressions from people at Raufoss ASA can, in my perspective, be 
seen as pointing at something that can be understood to be inscriptions in the 
technology itself, as well as inscriptions in the social setting this technology is 
developed and operated within. By inscriptions in the social setting I am 
referring to Thrift’s (1997) conception of “places as passings that haunts us”. 
The social setting at the place Raufoss is inscribed in the technology. And the 
technology is inscribed in those who work there. Inscription therefore has to be 
understood in a dialectical way. It is not only the social activities that are 
inscribed in the technology, but in a social setting or a place like Raufoss, the 
technology becomes so essential that it also inscribes the place. This argument 
must not be understood in a technology deterministic way. The point is that 
there is a dualism in this relationship, you cannot understand the technology 
without understanding Raufoss, and you cannot understand Raufoss without 
understanding the technology. This argument can be taken to a higher level by 
claiming that you cannot understand the world as we know it today without 
understanding internet and information technology in general, and you cannot 
understand internet and the information technology without understanding the 
world. 
 
Inscriptions; also a technical aspect 
In an attempt to take the inscription discussion back to a more concrete level in 
the process of technology transfer, it is important to be aware of the complexity 
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of the technology at stake. Understanding the social meaning inscribed in the 
technology from Raufoss is about understanding a lot of complex relations, 
both social and technical. The technical relations that have to be understood are 
of course linked to the social aspects at stake, but at the same time they are still 
technical issues. An example of this can be illustrated by the following 
argument. Let us say that during testing of the finished product, the strength of 
the product is not good enough. When tested, the suspension arm breaks. The 
question that arises is then; why does it break? If we know it was not an 
external influence that caused this situation, the answer to this can be either the 
material is too soft or too hard. A skilled and well-experienced engineer can, in 
this situation, take the damaged part into the laboratory and examine it under 
the microscope, and by looking at the structure of the aluminium, can say a lot 
about the reason for this damage. The structure of the aluminium can say a lot 
about the history of this particular part, whether it has been heated too much or 
whether it has been cooled down too slowly at one stage. This information is 
very important in the search for what has gone wrong in the production process. 
Another way to put this is to claim that what this engineer is doing is 
interpreting inscriptions made by the machinery. Of course all adjustments on 
the machinery are made by humans and in this way the social aspect is of 
course present. But situations might also occur where the inscription is not 
made by humans but entirely by the machines. When the resistance of a robot 
arm is worn out, and it starts to create marks or scratches in the suspension 
arms, this will hopefully be noticed by the internal control. These marks are in 
the way I understand it, inscriptions made by the machinery that says; the 
resistance of the robot arm is worn out, it is time for maintenance. This message 
has of course to be interpreted by the control and understood or constructed to 
be meaningful in a way that makes sense.  
 
I am aware of that a perspective like this, is to some extent, challenging my own 
position, that technology is socially constructed. But either way I find it 
relevant to question this position. Because the perspective presented has been 
relevant in this case and as the technology is becoming more advanced and 
automated, through use of ICT in the production processes. On this background 
I find it to be a relevant question to ask. A conclusion on this must be that our 
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positions in this relation should be developed in a more nuanced way to meet 
the challenges of the future technology. In chapter 6 I have questioned whether 
the empirical examples Akrich (1992) presents, are good and complex enough 
to be seen as relevant for today’s far more complex industrial processes. I think 
the point shown in this section illustrates this question fairly well.  
 
The role of the innovators 
When discussing Akrich’s (1992) term de-scription in chapter 6, I state, in 
accordance with her, that this is a process between the innovator and the end-
user. This is pretty much what I am describing in this chapter as well. And in 
that relation I want to address a few points about the innovator. The innovator 
in this outline is a very complex object. In one perspective the innovator is a 
person at Raufoss who has been central in the process of developing this new 
technology or at least part of it. In another sense the innovator might be 
someone who has developed a machine and as such, be unknown to the people 
at Raufoss as well as the Canadians. The innovator can thus be both a known 
person and a total stranger. The role of the innovator can therefore be limited to 
the inscriptions that are in the machine or the technical artefact. But in the 
situation where the innovator is a living person at Raufoss, who is available for 
the Canadians, the innovator is much more than an object that has inscribed 
something in a technical artefact. Inscriptions can, in an abstract way, be argued 
to be descripted through a process of negotiation between this innovator and the 
end-user.  The innovator’s role can therefore be said to vary between the rather 
abstract role and a more concrete role. The innovator can be an abstract figure 
when the innovator is unknown. An unknown innovator communicates with the 
end user, as a negotiation partner in a predetermined negotiation, through the 
technology he has inscribed. But when the innovator is a concrete person 
working at Raufoss that is open for questions and taking part in a real time 
discussion and negotiation, then the role of the innovator is completely 
different. This should underline the understanding of the innovator as a multi-
faceted actor and not one or the innovator. When we recognise the innovator to 
be a diversified figure, we also recognise the innovator’s role to be diversified 
depending on which relation he has to the end-user. The innovator that is 
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walking around the production line at Raufoss with the Canadians has a quite 
different role than the inventor of a machine that is bought from Germany, for 
example. Either way, the inscriptions and the process of de-scription are 
important features in this communication between the end user and the 
innovator. The process of de-scription is a much easier one, when the end user 
works in close cooperation with the innovator. This has very much been the 
situation in the process of establishing the plant in Canada.  
 
De-scriptions through negotiations 
In the section above I have considered the role of the innovators, and I have 
also touched on the relation between the innovator and the end-user. This 
relation and interaction seems to be of high importance in the process of 
understanding and further developing the technological equipment. In chapter 6 
I have outlined the translation model that Latour (1987) emphasises. The main 
focus for me in this connection is how ideas are transformed in the interaction 
between different actors, as in a process of transferring technology and 
knowledge, which is the case here. I put forward three important notions in this 
relation: interpretation, translation and negotiation. Interpretation describes the 
process where the individuals internalise information and adapt it to their 
understanding “of the world”. When they externalise their understanding, they 
are translating this information to somebody else. The processes of 
interpretation and translation should in my opinion be regarded as processes of 
negotiation, where different individuals or different groups are trying to 
configure a common understanding of a situation or a challenge (see chapter 6). 
In relation to enrol the technical actants in the network in Canada, this is 
important. When the innovators, or those with extended experience of the 
technology from Raufoss, work together with the end-users in Canada, these 
conceptions describe the situation very well. The Norwegians explain how the 
equipment works and what the ideas are behind this technology. They try to 
translate their understanding of the technology to the Canadians. The Canadians 
interpret this information and adapt it to their previous understanding. On the 
basis of this interpretation they then try to translate their understanding to the 
Norwegians, who then interpret this information. This interaction must be 
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understood as a negotiation process where, in common, they are trying to 
understand the technological actants through a process of de-scriptions. But just 
as important, they are trying to understand each other’s understanding of the 
technology. This makes this process even more complex because it includes an 
understanding of each other’s socio-cultural background and experience. In 
chapter 11 I have showed that these are troublesome and complex issues to cope 
with. This emphasises the importance of understanding the learning processes 
as one which includes both the technical and the socio-cultural learning, as I 
have emphasised in chapter 12.  
 
Technology transfer on basis of the translation model? 
The last sections show that the way this technology transfer has been carried 
out, has to a large extent been similar to the translation model that I presented in 
chapter 6. The technology has been transferred from Raufoss to Montreal 
through processes between individuals, that I have discussed and found to be 
characterised by interpretations, translations and negotiations. These are, as I 
have argued, important factors in, and aspects of, the translation model. It has 
been an interactive process between Norwegians and Canadians, which may be 
seen as an example of the interactive innovation model, or at least a process 
characterised by interactive learning. At the same time it can also be mentioned 
as a critique to this that the Norwegians, as the innovators of the technology, 
had the opportunity to force this technology on the Canadians, as described in 
the critique of the diffusion model (chapter 6). Even though I don’t find it 
possible to claim that this technology transfer has been carried out like the 
diffusion model argues. The process has been characterised by what Latour 
(1987) argues to be central aspects of the translation model.    
 
 
13.3 Summing up the enrolment of the actors and the 
actants 
 
 
In this chapter I have analysed how the different actors and actants have been 
enrolled into the new actor network Raufoss ASA had to establish in North 
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America. I have divided this into one sub-chapter with focus on the 
organisational enrolment and one sub-chapter with focus on the enrolment of 
the technical actants. Through this discussion it has become evident that these 
enrolment processes are related to each other. This is especially the case when 
analysing the enrolment of the technical actants, which through inscriptions, are 
tightly connected to the socio-cultural aspects. Enrolling the technical actants, 
including learning the technology, is also a complex socio-cultural process as 
described in my discussion of negotiations, translations and negotiations. 
 
The technology has been too focused upon in the transfer process I have 
described. It has been right to focus technology at a very high degree, but at the 
same time it has to be understood that when technology is emphasised, it should 
be in a broad definition of the term. This means including the knowledge, skills 
and competence to a higher degree. The focus has in other words, been too 
technical, meaning that important issues have been neglected in the enrolment 
of the technological network. At the same time it is important to underline that 
the focus on the socio-cultural aspects increased after the hiring of the HR 
Manager, after which the situation greatly improved. This suggests that RACC 
as an organisation, experienced and learned through this transfer process. This 
shows that they were capable of adapting to the new situations that arose during 
the transfer process. In my opinion this indicates that they were capable of 
reflections in actions as Shön (1983) emphasises.  
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14 Place in the global economy 
 
In chapter 1 I elaborated on the research question; to what degree is place and 
reciprocity important and prominent in this case of technology transfer. Place 
has been an important topic through this thesis and in this chapter I will 
highlight how place has been important in this transfer process. By focusing on 
place, the prominence of reciprocity also becomes evident. The prominence of 
reciprocity in the global economy has been one of this thesis’ core questions. 
 
Globalisation has as stated in chapter 3 been an enabler for technology transfer.  
At the same time technology transfer might be seen as an operational part of 
globalisation. By this I mean that a technology transfer as shown in this thesis 
where people from different places meet and experience and learn from the 
interaction with each other is globalisation in practice. These actions are 
shaping globalisation. So in this relation globalisation is both exogenous factor 
who makes technology transfer possible at the same time technology transfers 
like this is shaping and influencing what globalisation is. My main argument for 
this is that the decisions that are taken in such a technology transfer is affecting 
the way the transfer, and thus also the way globalisation, is carried out. These 
decisions are taken by individuals, as carriers of places, thus place is a 
prominent and important factor in technology transfer and shaping and 
influencing the globalisation processes. The importance and prominence of 
place will be emphasised through my main findings that is summed up in this 
chapter. The reciprocity in the global economy is essential part through this 
summing up. 
 
Understanding place in a complementary way 
Throughout this thesis I have presented different approaches to place. I have 
presented several in chapter 3, and in the analysis, place has been perceived in 
different ways. In a more or less normative way, I have developed an 
understanding of place based on seeing it as a social construction and as 
“passings that haunt us”(Thrift 1999:310). When we take the Raufoss 
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representatives’ view of place into account, seeing place as a location or spot on 
the map as presented in chapter 11, this represents another and maybe a more 
everyday approach to place. The more comprehensive understanding of place as 
described above, is an understanding that is rooted in a professional 
understanding and discussed amongst academics. While the more everyday 
approach of seeing place simply as a location or “a spot on the map” represents 
a perspective that huge numbers of people share. In my perspective, these two 
understandings should be seen as complementary rather than in opposition to 
each other. The understanding with a basis in the academic discussions is a 
fruitful contribution to the common everyday understanding, at the same time 
seeing place as a location also implies a geographical delimitation that is 
meaningful for people. This shows the complementary aspects of these two 
approaches.  
 
 
14.1 Place in a cultural perspective 
 
As shown in chapter 11, when Raufoss considered culture as a potential 
challenge, they quite quickly concluded that this would not be a major issue. 
The reason being that they saw Norway and Canada to be quite similar. The 
argumentation was in many ways based on a quite physical conception of place, 
where they argued that Canada was very similar to Norway in terms of; similar 
climate, just a little bit warmer in summer and a little bit colder in winter, both 
countries had mountains and fjords and there were even tracks for cross-country 
skiing in Canada. And these considerations were then strengthened, through the 
interaction with the well-educated people from SGF (The Société Générale de 
Financement du Québec) and Invetissement Quebec that spoke English fluently, 
for example. So from a mixture of physical considerations of the place Montreal 
and Quebec and the experience with a limited number of the inhabitants of this 
place, they constructed an understanding of the places Raufoss (Norway) and 
Montreal (Canada) to be similar. But as the analysis in chapter 11 shows, these 
considerations proved to be a much too narrow analysis of the cultural issues at 
play in these two places. There were more substantial differences than expected.  
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The cultural differences 
In the analysis in chapter 11, the differences in the attitudes concerning problem 
solution have been emphasised as one of the cultural differences. Where the 
Canadians are very eager to get the production line going, the Norwegians are 
more analytical in their approach to solve the problem. Based on Gertler (1997), 
I argue that the background for these differences can be traced to the different 
institutional structures between Canadian and European capital. This can be 
seen as an institutional heritage where the Canadian capital has been far shorter 
termed than European capital. This institutional heritage has lead to Canadian 
workers being more eager to keep the production line going. In opposition, the 
Norwegians are more concerned about getting the technology to function 
properly. This Norwegian practice can also be seen as an institutional heritage 
from the Raufoss society where the Raufoss’s representatives have their 
background. The technology culture (Nilsen 1999, Dale and Nilsen 1999) has 
been a prominent cultural feature at Raufoss. And this I have also linked to the 
“proud engineer” tradition that Cookes (1994:93) has found prominent in 
German manufacturing.  
 
The differences in problem solving can also be seen in relation to the 
differences in the focus on quality and production orientation. While the 
Norwegians are concerned about quality and spend quite a lot of time on 
ensuring that everything is working properly and the quality is as good as it 
should be, the Canadians feel frustrated because in this situation they do not get 
the job done as they wish to. The Canadians eagerness to earn their paycheck is 
one of the fundamental reasons for this eagerness. This must also be seen in 
relation to what I, inspired by Gertler (1997), have called an institutional 
heritage. I have argued that the more short term Canadian capital through 
history has contributed to a collective definition on what is seen as important on 
the shop floor, and has in this way been an important factor for the production-
oriented approach of the Canadians. This orientation towards production has 
become a cognitive institution with normative aspects for the Canadians, and 
this is an institution in opposition to the institution that characterises the 
background of the Ex-pat team from Raufoss, namely the technology culture 
and the “quality above all” attitude. 
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Such basic attitudes 
Another cultural difference that became evident through this study was the 
significant difference between the Norwegian collectivism and the Canadian 
individualism. In chapter 11 this has been referred to as “such basic attitudes” 
by those involved. One of the consequences of these basic attitudes is a totally 
different way of viewing the world. As referred to in chapter 11, it seems like 
the Canadians and the Norwegians have a totally different interpretation of what 
a meeting is. One way of interpreting the Canadians’ understanding of a 
meeting might be; an arena where they could figure out the solution on their 
own and afterwards fix the problem, and then get credit for fixing the problem, 
individually. This is in complete opposition to the Norwegians’ conception of a 
meeting, which can be interpreted as; an arena where the technology and the 
production line is the main focus and the objective is how the individuals can 
participate in finding a solution in common and in this way commonly 
participate in the improvement work. This illustration of the differences 
concerning individualism and collectivism is at some point put at the edge, but 
it is either way representative for the differences experienced between 
Norwegians and Canadians, experiences that were unexpected at first. 
 
The cultural and institutional heritage these basic attitudes represents must be 
seen as important features and differences between the places Raufoss and 
Montreal. Those involved have referred to these differences as “such basic 
attitudes” and “What has surprised me the most is ……that I discovered how 
incredible important it becomes what your mother and father have been 
teaching you during your growth.” This is experiences that illustrate that the 
actors in this process of transferring knowledge and technology are carriers and 
representatives of different social systems that are anchored in, and have been 
developed at, different places. The consequence is that they carry different 
social constructions and are haunt by different places. This adds a complex 
factor to the process of transferring the technology across the Atlantic. 
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Language 
When studying how these cultural differences are expressed, one essential 
expression is language, both the orally spoken and also body language. These 
issues have been emphasised thoroughly in chapter 11. I have also presented 
language as a problematic issue, where Raufoss at the start of the transfer 
process did not recognise the language to be a problem. This changed, and it 
was decided that English should be the only spoken language at the plant. This 
decision was changed again when they discovered that some of the operators 
did not fully understand what was being communicated in English.  
 
The language issue is a very interesting one in my view. This is because it has 
so many features that are important from a cultural view. At first we can view 
language as an expression of some more fundamental ideas and modes of 
thought, as shown in chapters 4 and 11. This illustrates Hannerz’s (1992) 
conception of culture in a relevant way. A substantial proportion of the 
Canadians relate themselves to France and their French ancestors. This is a 
heritage they are very aware of and also proud of. When talking about the 
differences between Norwegians and Canadians, the Canadians emphasise that 
they are Latin blooded. This is, in my opinion, relating to both their biological 
background but also to a cultural heritage as well. Their conception and use of 
the word ‘Latin blooded’ must in my terms be viewed as both their biological 
background and what they have been socialised into. The result of their close 
connection to the French background and way of being is, as shown in chapter 
11, expressed through language both orally and also by body language. 
Interesting in this perspective is to notice that the social distribution (Hannerz’s 
third point, see chapter 4) of this phenomenon of French influence was far 
higher than expected by Raufoss at the initial stages of this process.   
 
Some concluding remarks on culture and place 
A conclusion that can be drawn out of this is that the Montreal area was far 
more influenced by the French and French history than expected. But there is 
also another important point to make in this connection. The Montreal area is, in 
addition to being under French cultural influence, also influenced in general by 
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North America. This is shown in the discussion on the individualism versus 
collectivism and also in the discussion on both different problem solving 
attitudes and production orientation versus quality orientation. In all these 
discussions the Canadians seem to be influenced by what I recognise to be a 
North American inspired way of thinking. This is related to the more short-term 
capital that I, in accordance with Gertler (1997), have addressed as Canadian 
capital, but on a general basis it seems reasonable to address this as North 
American capital. It can also be argued that the individual focus might be 
understood as a more general North American phenomenon. When knowledge 
about the “American dream” as an important myth or inspiration dominates in 
the USA, it is reasonable to take this into consideration as well. This turns the 
whole cultural discussion into an interesting topic concerning the creolization 
perspective that I introduced in chapter 4. In this perspective the plant and in 
particular, RACC becomes an arena for a creolization process. Here at least 
three main cultures or culturally inspired systems meet and operate towards the 
same goal, namely delivering suspension arms to General Motors. This arena 
then becomes an arena where the different cultures have to adapt to each other 
and learn, and in a common way define how to do things in accordance with the 
other cultural understandings present. The Norwegians are carriers of what can 
be understood as ideas and modes of thought representative for the place 
Raufoss, but also Norway in more general terms, and the Canadians are carriers 
of ideas and modes of thought representative for Montreal, which is influenced 
by ideas and modes of thought from its French ancestors as well as North 
America on a more general basis. The sum of these ideas and modes of thought 
are then expressed within the frames of the plant and the RACC organisation. 
Through interpretation, translation and negotiations the expression of these 
ideas and modes of thought are adapted and related to each other. The process 
of adapting and relating these different ideas to each other should be understood 
as a creolization process where new ideas and modes of thought are established 
on the basis of the different expressions expressed in this context.  
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14.2 Place in the perspective of enrolling the network 
 
In the analysis presented in chapter 13, I have shown that establishing a new 
network for the production plant in Montreal has been an operation with many 
facets. The process has ranged from the first accidental contact with the supplier 
that advised Raufoss ASA of Montreal, to the more complex processes of hiring 
and training competent personnel for operating the advanced technology on the 
shop floor. In this spectrum of various tasks, understanding place is a central 
issue. In the following I will argue for a perspective taking place into these 
considerations and addressing the understanding of place as a central element in 
comprehending the establishment of production sites at new spots in the global 
economy.  
 
Knowing the local markets 
Raufoss ASA’s decision of entering a partnership and cooperation with SGF 
and Invetissement Quebec was based on the experience that a local partner 
could provide them with important local knowledge. This local knowledge was 
both of general and more specific character. On a general basis this was 
knowledge of the local legal/law system, and more specifically about 
knowledge of local firms to cooperate with and local suppliers. In addition to 
these Canadian governmental organisations, Raufoss ASA also hired a local 
consultancy firm to support them in their hiring of employees. The knowledge 
they provided was about where to search for different competences, for 
example, via which newspaper to search for an operator and via which 
newspaper to search for an engineer. This knowledge of the local workforce 
market eased the workload for Raufoss ASA, and most certainly provided 
Raufoss ASA with the successful hiring of the first experts in their 
establishment of the RACC organisation. 
 
Strategic considerations 
A perspective that was evident from the start of the transfer of the technology 
and knowledge from Raufoss to Montreal was that The Top Management 2 
believed that the process had to be under the control of Raufoss ASA. This 
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meant that personnel with thorough knowledge of the technology should be in 
control of the process, in other words, that people with their basis in the Raufoss 
society and industrial area should be in control. One result of this was their 
strategic considerations referred to in chapter 13, about how large a share the 
Canadian partners should be allowed to have in RACC. This can also be related 
to the analysis carried out in chapter 12 where I argue that Raufoss ASA at first 
had a one- dimensional perspective on learning, as well as the strategic 
considerations mentioned here.  
 
In the relation between the representatives from Raufoss and the representatives 
from Montreal, in this case the SGF and Investissement Quebec, there was an 
interesting situation concerning what should have the main focus. These 
representatives of Montreal can, as mentioned in chapter 13, be seen as 
organisations that have their main activity in place marketing. This is in 
opposition to the representatives of Raufoss who see their main activity as 
industrial development. So when Raufoss ASA stressed that they should be in 
control of the transfer process, the argument is that they will ensure the 
industrial development in the project. This is of course important in the initial 
phases of the project, and especially before the final localisation decision is 
taken. To succeed in an industrial development project such as this, it seems 
important to have full focus on the industrial needs. This means that Raufoss 
ASA’s decision of having full control must be regarded as important. At the 
same time I find it important to distinguish between having full control in 
relation to the partners on an aggregate level, and having full control concerning 
the employees at the RACC organisation. In relation to the RACC organisation, 
the processes have in a higher degree, been characterised by involvement and 
cooperation, which in my opinion have been essential for achieving the results 
they have. So, on a more operative level the strategic considerations have been 
more characterised by integration and involvement, despite efforts at an early 
stage on signalising that the technology was developed at Raufoss and that the 
Canadians had to remember this and adapt to the technology. In practice this 
became more influenced by what can be characterised as interactive and 
reciprocal learning. I will in the following reflect further on how the relationship 
between the parent organisation and the RACC organisation has worked out. 
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Establishing RACC and the cooperation with Raufoss ASA 
As stated above, the enrolment of the first local employees was done in 
cooperation with local companies. But as I have concluded in the analysis in 
chapter 13, establishing the Canadian organisation was not done without 
problems of course. After a while language became problematic and the first 
engineer that was hired had to resign. But in general the RACC organisation 
became an organisation that delivered the results that the customer, GM and the 
owner, Raufoss were very pleased with.34
 
Additionally, the cooperation between RACC and Raufoss ASA is an 
interesting issue. At first the Global Organisation 1 had a function as a 
coordinating link between these two organisations. But in early fall of 2002 and 
until they reorganised this organisational structure again, as shown in chapter 9, 
Global Organisation 1 was shut down. The responsibility for coordinating the 
activities between these two sister organisations was now delegated to the plant 
Management at RACC and RCT. The result was that the coordinating activities 
were more or less neglected. In such a start-up phase, as both these two 
organisations were at that time, with a complex technology and a tight schedule 
for deliveries, the plant management’s focus is drawn towards the daily 
challenges and the concrete objectives, such as getting machine X to function 
properly. The technical trap snaps shut again. The more strategic and 
coordinating activities lose their focus and are therefore less prioritised. This is 
of course also a result of the long distance between the organisations both 
physically and in time. There are only a couple of hours during the working day 
that the plant management have common working hours and as they are very 
busy, it might be hard to be coordinated. As a result of this situation, a new 
reorganisation was carried out during the spring of 2003. Now a new global 
organisation was established as Raufoss ASA saw the need for a coordinating 
link between these two organisations and places. The Global Organisation 2 had 
the function as a pipeline between Raufoss and Montreal. This was an important 
                                                 
34 During the PAPP and R@R testing, RACC performed very well, they were one of the two 
suppliers for GM that scored full score during these tests. These tests were done with 
representatives from GM present. 
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decision for the further development of both the plant in Montreal and the 
cooperation between RACC and Raufoss ASA.  
 
Enrolling the actor network, what about place? 
There is need for an increased focus on the enrolment of the socio-cultural 
factors. The enrolment of the SGF and IQ as Canadian partners was important 
in this regard, but this should have been carried out with a more explicit and 
analytical focus on the socio-cultural issues. From my perspective there is a lack 
of systematical approach to these issues. A more systematic approach would 
have increased the value of the time spent and the resources used on this 
cooperation. The result of a non-systematic approach is that the picture you get 
of the place is fragmented and not grounded in a professional way. 
 
To expect that two sister organisations will cooperate on their own is at least 
naive. You need to organise the activities in a way that encourages those 
involved to cooperate. As shown in this thesis, it has been a demanding task to 
get the individuals from these two different places to cooperate with each other 
without too much friction. Therefore it seems important that somebody has an 
explicit responsibility to push this cooperation forward. In that way a link needs 
to be built between these two organisations and places, that ensures the 
interaction necessary for the learning and interaction process is sufficient. What 
seems to happen if you do not have a stakeholder in this process, is that 
everyday activity takes too much attention, which leads to poor focus on longer 
term learning activities. The technical trap snaps shut again, and the importance 
of getting to know the individuals that are carriers of another place is likely to 
be neglected. 
 
 
14.3 Places in the reciprocal learning process 
 
What is expected in one place is not automatically what is expected in the other 
place. This is due to life-long learning that differs between places and is related 
to how and where you were brought up during your childhood and upbringing. 
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As stated in chapter 12 the learning carried out in this transfer project was of 
both explicit and tacit knowledge. The tacit dimensions have mostly been 
carried out by working together with the experts from Raufoss ASA. This has 
been done both in Canada and in Norway. The learning carried through at 
Raufoss, during the time the Canadians spent there, seems to be of high 
importance, because this delivered the Canadians the opportunity to utilise the 
whole network of resources at Raufoss in their learning process. It was 
important that the Canadians spent this learning process at Raufoss. This is also 
where the classes was arranged, that was devoted to the explicit knowledge and 
learning. When Raufoss Automotive Components Canada (RACC) was 
established and the Ex pat team was in place in Canada the learning processes 
of course continued there.  
 
During this technology transfer project the perception of learning has changed 
from a one dimensional process to a reciprocal understanding of learning. This 
became evident for those involved when they experienced that they learned 
from each other and together with each other. This was in opposition to what 
their focus had been at first. The focus was then technologically oriented and 
the knowledge of this technology was in Raufoss ASA’s possession. Gradually 
their perspectives regarding learning changed as they experienced their different 
cultural background and experienced the need for understanding each others 
ways of thinking and behaving. This helped turning the perspective on learning 
from a one dimensional technical issue to a reciprocal issue with focus on the 
socio-cultural elements and understanding each others background in example 
place. 
 
What is rewarded is important for what is focused in the learning process and 
how the learning process is organised. Individual actions seem to be more 
rewarded by the Canadians than the Norwegians appreciated. This was creating 
a rather tense situation based on fundamental differences in the understanding of 
what is meaningful activity and action. The confusion of what was being 
expressed and the reasons why the “others” acted so differently created a lot of 
frustration. In this situation the concrete technical challenges were put forward 
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and the socio-cultural issues not prioritised as much as they should. The result 
was that they were not able to create good enough learning processes for both 
the technical and the socio-cultural training. In the following I will present a 
proposal on how this could have been carried out. 
 
What could be done differently? 
Based on the experiences from the way learning was perceived and the learning 
process that lead to a change in this perception I have ended up with a proposal 
to what could have been done in a different way to help the learning process 
become more efficient in a technology transfer like this.  
 
The technical training 
The technical training should be organised in a way where the experts give 
lectures at a very early starting point. These classes should only be for the 
Canadian operators, so the teaching can be adapted to the same level for 
everyone. This would most likely make it more motivatory as well. This should 
happen before the operators have visited the shop floor, but after they have been 
through the visualisation project. The visualisation project would then function 
as a teaser but also it will help the absorption of all the new information given to 
them by the lecturers. The lectures must be strictly organised and structurally 
presented. Their aim is to give the operators as much formal and explicit 
knowledge as possible, and as be effective as possible. This is supposed to give 
them a basic understanding of what this technology is about. It should deliver 
notions and concepts related to what they would later experience on the shop 
floor. This preparation, combined with the visualisation programme, would 
make the operators more prepared and increase their capability to qualitatively 
absorb the information they would get from the moment they enter the shop 
floor. With sufficient background and basic knowledge about the production 
process and the characteristics of aluminium, they would be ready to start 
learning by doing. After gaining experience on the shop floor for a few weeks, 
they would be ready for more theoretical input in classes. This should then 
continue during their six months training in Norway. Once a month classes 
should be arranged to ensure the theoretical understanding of the operators. 
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However, it must be said a solution like this would most likely meet some 
resistance from the operators, because they are very hands-on and practical by 
nature. Theoretical approaches should be kept to a minimum in their view. But 
in this situation, my opinion is that this is so important for the success of the 
process that the management has to ensure the fulfilment of this interaction 
between theoretical and practical teaching.  
 
The interaction between the technical and the practical is important because so 
much of this technical knowledge is tightly related to the social characteristics 
of Raufoss. This is indeed tacit knowledge that is not highly available, and a 
learning by doing process where they are working with experienced operators 
and the technology is necessary. The theoretical input has its main purpose to 
increase the quality of the practical lessons, and also to create an arena for 
common reflections of how these technical solutions differ from the experiences 
they have from previous work. 
 
The socio-cultural learning process 
Like the technical learning process, the socio-cultural learning has to be divided 
into theoretical and practical training. But there are some important differences 
in the organisation of the teaching. The classes have to consist of the Canadians 
and the Norwegian Ex-pat Team, and also the Norwegians who would be 
working most closely with the Canadians from their base in Norway. The 
argument for this international composition is that the socio-cultural 
understanding has to be learnt and constructed in common and together with 
those colleagues the workers are supposed to understand and construct meaning 
with. In an early phase of this process consultant experts should be hired to give 
an overview of the Norwegian and Canadian culture and business culture 
implications that have been experienced earlier. This is to prepare the 
participants for what might come.  
 
By organising the socio-cultural training this way, all those involved would 
have started at a higher and more common knowledge level when they began to 
interact with each other on the shop floor. This would have helped them 
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understand each other’s reaction pattern much better and greatly eased the 
frustration. The implementation of the technical equipment would then have 
been a much smother process. 
 
 
14.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The essence of this thesis has been the process where people from different 
places meet and the reciprocity this situation is an arena for. The mutual 
exchange of knowledge, skills and ways of thinking over a whole range of 
factors stretching from pure technical calculations to a more or less common 
cultural experience are vital elements of the technology transfer process. This is 
of course related to the changes the world economy has experienced for at least 
the last thirty years. The knowledge of the recent changes in the global 
economy, and also the relation to history that Giddens (1990) argues for in his 
definition of modernity, is essential for the understanding of place I try to argue 
for in this thesis. The main argument for this approach is that this kind of 
technology transfer is more or less the operational result of these societal 
changes. At the same time this is one of the great challenges the global 
companies are facing, a challenge that is about how to utilise the possibilities 
that the global economy represent. My experience from working with global 
Norwegian based businesses is that there is substantial potential for 
improvement according to this understanding. The focus on technical and to-
the-point-oriented cases and everyday tasks is often too prominent without 
enough room for constructing a broader common understanding that the 
technical challenges and understanding must rest upon. At the same time it must 
be mentioned that from my perspective, there is a positive change in the right 
direction going on. On the basis of working industrial and business oriented 
since I started my studies in 1997, I feel that I can dare to point at such a change 
of direction. The reason why this is important is to contribute to businesses 
growth, of course. But far more importantly, I think that increased knowledge 
on these issues can contribute to ease the work for a number of people around 
the world that are struggling with such challenges in their everyday work. 
Without the knowledge of what is going on, in the interaction between 
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individuals as carriers of place in projects such as this, such challenges remind 
me of fighting with moveable shadows, creating a lot of frustration and stress. 
Increased knowledge of these issues will ease the job much more effectively for 
those working in the operational consequences of an intensified global 
economy. 
 
Both business and academia have a long way to go before this knowledge is 
sufficient to support these processes fully. There are a lot of collaboration skills 
and ways of thinking to be learned in both academia and business. This thesis is 
an attempt to create new knowledge on this subject with a scientific approach. 
Even though the literature within this field is growing, I think there is a need for 
further investigation on these issues to create sufficient knowledge about this on 
broader terms. I think this is especially important on the operational 
consequences of globalisation. To do so, academics and industry have to work 
closely together to be able to work out relevant cases and knowledge on these 
issues. 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have delivered arguments for the importance of place and the 
prominence of reciprocity in the global economy. I have showed that the 
cultural and institutional heritage at different places involved in such a 
technology transfer is considerable affecting the process at several levels. The 
learning processes underline the reciprocity of this process. At first learning was 
assumed to be what can be called a one-dimensional character, but as those 
involved got more experience during the project, this changed gradually towards 
what can be characterised as reciprocal or interactive learning. I have found that 
those involved perceived technology in a broad way and included knowledge, 
skills and attitudes when they defined it. But when enrolling the network at the 
plant in Montreal, they were not able to follow-up their intentions. They fell into 
the technical trap and focused too much on the technical actants. This could be 
explained through recognising that they are trained to handle technical 
equipment and not the socio-cultural issues. A more holistic approach and 
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background to these challenges is therefore preferable, to meet the reciprocal 
challenges that the global economy requires.    
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